DANGER SPOTS IN THE PATTERN OF AMERICAN SECURITY

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SPECULATION about the future, particularly about the nature and character of the problems which Americans may have to face in foreign policy, is admittedly risky. It is particularly so at a time when international society is far from static and domestic policy in a score of states may at any moment directly influence and even fundamentally change the balance of power as it now exists. Nevertheless, such speculation can be justified. However effective present policy may be judged to be, few would be brash enough to assert that "we planned it that way." Postwar American policy, in the main, has not been planned: it has consisted until very recently of a series of reactions to the diplomatic and military initiative exercised by the Soviet Union and its satellites. These reactions have created a current pattern of policy for the United States which contains more long-range commitments for this country than at any previous time in American history. Future policy obviously must operate within the limits established by these commitments. Yet these are fairly broad in character in many areas of the world and any one of a number of policies might be chosen. It is not too soon to begin to plan now for some of the problems the United States will face in the very near future.

I

Since the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, the United States has been engaged in a careful and delicate series of negotiations designed to create a pattern of security commitments which will have a reasonable chance of withstanding whatever threats the Soviet Union and her allies may contemplate in the future. Although not yet complete, this security system consists of a series of interrelated and partially interlocking regional alliances.

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In the Pacific, there is for the northern area a peace treaty and mutual defense agreement with Japan; for the middle area, a series of agreements with the Philippines and a policy toward Formosa designed to prevent that island from falling into the hands of the Chinese Communists; in the south, mutual defense agreements with Australia and New Zealand which secure the active aid of these two members of the British Commonwealth. In Europe, security for the United States is substantially considered as security for Western Europe and the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with its combined military and economic programs, is the mechanism for the protection of American interests. The pattern for the Middle East is not yet firm, but in addition to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey within NATO—to provide for the defense of the northern flank—it appears to call for the creation of a "Middle East Command" in which Britain, France, the United States, and Turkey will be associated for security purposes with such other states in the area as will participate.

While each of these alliance systems is nominally brought within the ample confines of the United Nations Charter, it is nonetheless quite clear that the United Nations is regarded as of secondary importance. While the General Assembly would no doubt be called upon to recommend action against the aggressor in another case—as the Security Council did in the case of Korea—the core of military support would undoubtedly come from those countries within the alliance system. Of these three regional systems, it is clear that that covering Western Europe is and for some time to come probably will continue to be considered the most important.

However successful this pattern of security may prove to be within the next year or two—and the earnestness of our pressure upon Western Europe for rearmament and economic integration clearly indicates our conviction that Western Europe at least can be saved by prompt implementation of our proposed policies—this alliance system contains two weaknesses which raise serious question as to how long it can successfully endure. The first frailty arises from the fact that the United States has chosen to

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depend for its security on allies whose aid will be given us on a basis we cannot really control. The second weakness springs from the nature of the alliance system as it is constituted: because of our intense concern for Europe, the system does not now provide for sufficient flexibility of policy to adjust to the changing political pressures developing outside of Europe proper.

II

It is, of course, true that every nation entering into a defensive alliance for security always, by the very nature of the agreement, abandons some portion of its complete freedom of action. It does so because it believes that the added strength it derives from the association with an ally more than outweighs the independence it surrenders. In view of the overwhelming threat of the Soviet Union, it is logical to believe that the more numerous and the more widespread the network of American alliances, the greater its available power to repel threats to American security. Further, there appears to be good reason to accept the thesis that the existence of strength in being on the part of the free world will in fact deter the Soviet Union from attacking at all and will, in time, lead to a reduction of Soviet pressure.

The alliance systems of the United States, however, are being constructed at a period in world history when the political stability of states upon which enduring alliances must rest is under constant threat of economic disintegration and collapse. The first obligation of a government is to insure to its citizens their continued survival. If economic pressures become great enough, almost any government, when put to the final test, will moderate or abandon a political association if only an alteration of policy seems to offer the possibility of maintaining or achieving living standards adequate enough to permit the regime to survive. In two major areas of American security—the North Pacific and Western Europe—economic factors are likely to determine in the long run whether our principal partners will be able, even if they so desire, to continue as allies. And in neither of these areas, particularly in the case of Japan, can the United States feel any assurance of being able by its own action to affect the eco-

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nomic forces at work enough to insure continued political cooperation.

The case of Japan is, perhaps, the most obvious. Japan has a total present population of more than 83,000,000 living in an area with about as many square miles as California, and only one-sixth of the land is arable. The population is increasing at a rate of nearly a million a year. It is apparent that Japan must trade to survive; trade in even greater volume than it did in the period before 1939. The essential elements of the pattern of Japanese trade are also clear and cannot vary appreciably from those which obtained in the interwar period. Japan needed both raw materials and food. Both were paid for by a high volume of exports, proceeds derived from a developed carrying trade, and from some overseas investment. Japanese exports, which bulked as the largest factor, met with increasingly narrowing markets as countries with high labor costs resisted the admission of low cost Japanese products. While the United States was a substantial purchaser, that portion of the American market opened to Japanese imports was not enough to make up Japan's trade deficit, nor were those small segments of the Australian, Indian, and southeast Asian markets which were permitted to Japan. While the China market afforded Japan possibilities, strong anti-Japanese Chinese nationalism, taking the form of a successful boycott of Japanese-made goods, considerably curtailed Japanese exploitation of the Chinese market. Further, the largest single source of Japanese raw materials, particularly iron ore, was China. Facing this situation, Japan sought to establish a "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere." Instead, defeat in World War II and the subsequent rift between the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds have narrowed Japan's markets even more. The trade deficit problem is for Japan further from solution than ever before.

What are the prospects that Japan can develop sufficient trade outlets to provide for that political stability which must be the primary basis of continued adherence to the alliance system of the United States? Officially, the United States is apparently convinced that, for the next few years at least, there will be a consistent and fairly large demand for Japanese exports. India, in the midst

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of a development program, is a logical purchaser; Pakistan even more so. The planned program of immigration into Australia from Europe has created enough shortages in that country to indicate that the Australian market can absorb more than it did during the prewar period, and Australia is currently purchasing Japanese steel, for example, to assist it in coping with its housing and industrial shortages. The potentialities of southeast Asia—Burma, Siam, Malaya, Indo-China—are, if the area can be kept out of the Soviet orbit, undoubtedly considerable, both as a market area for Japanese exports and as a source of important and vital raw materials needed by Japan.

Given the assumption that the American alliance system is designed to be effective for a relatively long period of tension with the Soviet Union, the basic question in regard to Japan is whether the "terms of trade" between industrial and raw material areas will support Japanese economy. If Japan can purchase cheaply from other areas than China the heavy materials, such as coal and iron ore, needed to sustain heavy exports of industrial products, there is reason for optimism. Traditionally, however, China has always been a cheaper place to get these imports. Optimism must be qualified, therefore, until it is clear that Japan can survive without close economic relations with China or other areas which are or may be under Communist control.

The desire of the Australians to secure a mutual defense agreement from the United States before they signed the Japanese peace treaty indicates that that country, at least, was concerned that Japan might, for economic reasons, "jump the fence" and become politically tied with the Chinese Communists. The continued participation of Japan in the American alliance system, in other words, depends partially upon the extent to which other American allies will assist in supporting both an increasingly high volume of Japanese trade and cheap sources of raw materials for Japan. And as presently planned, the bulk of this trade is to be with areas—India and southeast Asia—whose governments are either currently suspicious of American motives or anxious to maintain high prices for raw material exports or not completely invulnerable to further Communist expansion.

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In comparison with the problems of Europe, however, those of Japan appear simple. The United States has vigorously supported two parallel policies in Western Europe: economic unification on the one hand and military cooperation on the other. The logical French mind has produced schemes which spell out in some detail just what these policies would mean if fully implemented. France, with the full support of Italy and apparently of the United States, is advocating what amounts to economic federalism in the immediate future and political federalism to start functioning by 1954. Further, this supranational political and economic structure would find its military strength in a European Army with common uniforms, common supply, common budget, and common command exercised under a supranational board appointed by the six participating states—Italy, France, Western Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. And the European Army, integrated with the over-all military arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would therefore become a major factor in the implementation of American security through NATO. It may accurately be said, therefore, that to the extent that the success of the American alliance system in Western Europe is dependent upon the achievement of two goals, economic viability and military cooperation, our security depends upon allies whose actions are at least problematical.

Within certain limits, the United States does have a measure of control of the economic factors in this equation: just so long as the United States is willing to "pick up the check" in the form of economic aid roughly equivalent to the trade deficits of Western Europe as a whole, progress toward economic unification appears possible. Continued inflation, a marked drop in the Western European standard of living, a change in administration in the United States, or a tactical relaxation of political pressure on the part of the Soviet Union are merely a few of the factors which might change overnight our capacity to implement this element of our basic objectives. Achievement of stable economies in Western Europe as a whole, however, appears to depend upon a number of uncertainties. Reorganization of the tax structure—and

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tightening of tax collections—seems essential, yet has plagued more than one government in Italy and contributed to the downfall of two in France. Achievement of reasonable trade balances by Western Europe is at least partially dependent upon stabilization of military budgets at lower levels than those called for during the next three years. Since it seems highly doubtful that the American people will accept as a permanent feature of American foreign policy the subsidization of the economy of Western Europe, it is at least problematical that we have, in fact, any more control over economic factors in Europe than we have in the case of Japan.

The political problems in this segment of our alliance system are no less perplexing. No solution has been reached for the question of Germany, and while the Germans may be willing, for the short term, to participate in a form of economic federalism with the rest of Western Europe, there are strong political forces at work in that country with which it will prove increasingly difficult to deal. The demand for unification with Eastern Germany is not diminishing and may well flourish because of three continuing pressures within Western Germany itself. The Social Democrats believe that Schumacher would be Chancellor in place of Adenauer if Germany were united; Western German Protestants are anxious to regain their majority position by rejoining the predominantly Protestant Eastern Germany; and refugees from the Russian zone are adding to the clamor. But Germany is not the only problem. Neither Belgium nor Denmark was enthusiastic about the recommendations of the Harriman Committee, appointed by NATO, which insisted that both countries sharply increase their military budgets and their commitments to the formation of a European Army; and Belgium and the Netherlands apparently are far from convinced that they should agree to either a common command, a common budget, or common supply policies for that Army. The continuing forces of nationalism, in short, may limit the European Army to "national contingents" serving under a supreme commander but subject to the veto of individual countries. It is safe to say that no French government could consent to participation by Ger-

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many in such a force on that basis, and without German participation it is unlikely—in the absence of radical technological changes—that the military side of this portion of our pattern of security can be adequately implemented.

Other difficulties could be cited, but enough have probably been given to indicate both the nature of the strains to which the alliance system is subjected and the extent to which some of the major forces affecting the political decisions of our allies lie in areas where American influence and American policy can have at best only indirect results. We can persuade, but cannot—and indeed should not—force. While it can readily be admitted that the persuasive power of six to seven billions of dollars of mutual assistance aid is considerable, it is not necessarily compelling and it is not likely to be permanent. While fear of the Soviet Union may provide sufficient cement for the alliance to hold together for a few years, there is little reason for optimism that it can be made self-generating for any extended period.

III

It is in regard to southeast Asia and the third area of the United States alliance system—that proposed for the Middle East—that the rigidity of present policy becomes an element of weakness rather than of strength. These areas include, on the one hand, basic raw materials and, on the other, large populations in underdeveloped, semi-colonial countries, politically immature yet strongly nationalist in aspiration. The Middle East contains an estimated 71 per cent of all the world's known oil reserves; southeast Asia possesses important and vital sources of natural rubber, tin, hemp, mica, jute, and other essential ingredients of our modern industrial society. Both are also areas in which national independence has only recently been achieved after decades of struggle against European overlordship. Indeed, since 1945, no less than ten new countries have joined the society of nations from this area—Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Libya, Jordan, Ceylon, Burma, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. It is one of the ironical paradoxes of modern history that the continued independence of all of these, with the possible exception of India,

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Pakistan, and Indonesia, depends upon a continuing military alliance between the United States and the very countries against which the nationalist independence movements were directed—Britain and France. None of these countries, with the possible exception of India, possess at this time either military or economic power, although some—notably Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and Indonesia in southeast Asia—have considerable diplomatic bargaining capacity by virtue of possession of raw material resources of some magnitude. Without the interposing military power of Great Britain, France and the United States, few of these new countries could now survive the almost certain expansion over their territories of the Soviet Union or its satellites.

The policy of the United States toward underdeveloped areas, whether they be technically independent or in the process of achieving independence, is and will continue to be seriously handicapped by our association with those Western European countries against whom the nationalist aspirations of the peoples in these areas are directed. We not only become tainted with their own histories of imperialistic control but become in the minds of the peoples of the area imperialists ourselves. In view of our postwar policies toward the colonial areas, this growing suspicion of American motives has its elements of irony, too. The view of the United States on India during the war was certainly instrumental in accelerating the achievement of Indian independence. Quite clearly, American insistence on negotiation forced the Dutch to accept an Indonesian settlement far different from what they wanted. And in Iran American pressure certainly moderated British policy. Yet the suspicion remains and waxes, and the logic of military requirements for defense against Soviet aggression is insufficient to overcome the glandular emotion of nationalism. Given the original assumption by the United States that Western Europe is the area of primary importance to American security, it is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to resist the arguments of our Western European allies that we should take no action which will tend to weaken them anywhere. We are, apparently, being persuaded that further con-

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cessions to the demands of colonial nationalism would weaken our European allies and are therefore following the British lead in Egypt and Iraq and the French lead in North Africa. Such a policy on our part is bound in the long run to impair, if not obliterate, our chances of formulating policies for these areas which will remove their suspicions of American motives and lead them to be more than unwilling and temporary partners in the program of the United States for the achievement of a secure world.

The pre-eminent importance of keeping Western Europe out of the Soviet orbit, in other words, has led the United States to create a system of alliances which, however successful it may be for the next few years in Europe and the Pacific, does not readily permit the fabrication of policies elsewhere in the world sufficiently independent of those of the great imperialist powers of the last century to enlist support for American views. The pattern of American security is too rigid to meet the tests of sound policy in the whole area from the eastern end of the Mediterranean to the China Sea.

The United States, to take only one current example, cannot long continue to straddle the issues involved in the Tunisian problem—of real concern, be it noted, to no less than twelve Middle Eastern and southeast Asian countries—by the device of abstention in a critical vote in the Security Council. These issues must be faced: the dilemma is clear. How is the United States to retain the friendship of its European allies if it supports liberation movements in their colonial territories? Yet how closely can we afford to be linked, in these crucial areas, with the swan songs of Western European hegemony?

IV

Granting that in an imperfect world no system of security can be perfect, the question arises as to the directions in which American foreign policy can be channeled during the next four- or five-year period which will avoid the long-run frailties which have been suggested. How can or might the United States recapture flexibility and independence of foreign policy without at the

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same time jettisoning the very real temporary contributions to American security already created? Theoretically, the United States could consciously and aggressively pursue a policy of establishing a *Pax Americana*: of using financial aids and grants, military power and military posturing to force our allies in Western Europe to do our bidding no matter how distasteful it might be to them or to insist that underdeveloped countries restrain their immaturity, choke off their national feelings, and come under the beneficent influences of American leadership. At best, however, any such policy would prove self-defeating within a short time; at worst, it would bring the American economy to its knees and prepare the way for Soviet world domination. Indeed, it is at least possible that current Indian, Asian, and Arab suspicions of the United States are not unmixed with fears that they are becoming parties to policies which are little more than ingredients of a *Pax Americana.*

The target date for the development of adequate military forces in Western Europe to deter Soviet aggression in that area has been set as 1954, 1955, or possibly 1956. Until that time, marked modification of the pattern of American security appears unlikely. Yet it is the period immediately following whatever the date turns out to be which may prove critical and in which the frailties of our alliance system may become most apparent. It is a basic assumption of this analysis that, barring a war, if our European policy proves reasonably effective there will exist through the NATO machinery a sufficient force in being to deter Soviet expansion westward on a fairly permanent basis. (The word "permanent" like the word "never" is unwisely used in international relations—it is used here to connote a period of stability capable of lasting for a decade or more.) That force may or may not be in the form of a European Army serving a European federation; it will, on some basis, exist. One can reasonably assume that the achievement of even the appearance of security in Western Europe will give rise to some relaxation of the bonds of NATO, to a resumption of a feeling of policy independence in Europe, and to strong domestic pressures for a reduction of American economic aid. By this time, too, Japan in the Pacific

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will be entering the long struggle of trying to locate and utilize adequate sources of raw materials and adequate markets for export. In the Middle East and southeast Asia, it is unlikely that nationalist ferment will have subsided or that development plans will have been realized. The plums in these areas will be even riper for Soviet picking.

By 1954 and 1955, therefore, we must be prepared to include within the framework of American security policy planning two new elements to meet the changed political and economic strains of the following few years. The first of these elements is the willingness to respond to any opportunity for mitigating tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. The second is the existence of programs which clearly dissociate American policy in the minds of Asian and Middle Eastern peoples from those elements in French and British policy which have aroused animosity. This is a difficult but not impossible task.

Experts on Soviet policy appear to be agreed that the Kremlin is capable of adjusting its line to new factors in the international distribution of power. The existence of strong European military forces may well persuade the Russians to alter their timetable for the collapse of capitalism, for example; or it might merely indicate to them that they should substitute expansion to the south for expansion to the west as an early objective of their foreign policy. In the former instance we might well be faced with Russian proposals, which, however specious they may be, would contain offers which might permit of a reduction of tension in Europe by, for example, Western acceptance of the present *status quo* in Eastern Europe. There is little doubt that such suggestions would prove alluring to many members of NATO, however unpalatable they would be to the United States. Yet if we are not prepared to negotiate with the Russians from a position of strength, we are likely to lose the confidence of many of our allies. It is all too common an occurrence in history for a state, possessing an advantage, to continue to insist upon a still greater advantage before being willing to reach a settlement with a powerful and dangerous adversary. Signs are not lacking that some of our Western European allies already believe that the

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United States is too unbending in its attitude toward the Soviet Union. The necessity of nineteen ballots to elect Greece to the Security Council during the sixth session of the General Assembly is only one of many indications. It is not axiomatic that all wisdom resides in Washington, and we would do well not only to recognize but to encourage the possibilities that our allies will seek to exercise a moderating and independent policy between ourselves and the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that they will abandon all principle to expediency; the world is too well aware of the results of Soviet expansion. Our allies may, however, have a somewhat more objective view than the United States as to where principle and basic security are involved and where they are not. We should be prepared to accept these differences with equanimity if not enthusiasm. While it is admittedly doubtful that a concession to the Soviet Union is ever regarded by the Russians as more than a sign of inherent weakness, we should be prepared to see our allies attempt the experiment, particularly in areas where the issue of security is at best tangential. There may come a time when it is not wise to ride roughshod over every Soviet draft resolution in the United Nations and it may well be that our allies will recognize this time more quickly than we.

If we are not only to accept but to encourage the development of independent policies toward the Soviet Union by our Western European allies, we should, by the same token, prepare and execute independent policies of our own toward those areas where the policies of Western Europe have proved to be notably unsuccessful: the Middle East and southeast Asia. This is all the more desirable should the presence of a deterrent force in Europe lead the Russians to try to expand southward. The traditional policy of the United States of friendship for and encouragement of independence movements has had to be tempered by recognition of a military fact: the existence of small, insecure, and relatively weak states in these areas plays into the hand of the Soviet Union. These military and strategic factors have forced the United States into apparent support of France and Britain and this fact has not gone unnoticed.

Although each region has problems peculiar to itself, they

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exhibit certain similarities which permit consideration of applying to both the same broadly defined policy. There appear to be four basic requirements before the countries in these areas can make effective contributions to world security. First, they must be encouraged to develop a sense of responsibility toward their own and the world community. Second, there should exist a framework of regional organization which will accelerate as much as possible such a development. Third, the states in these areas must feel and in fact possess sufficient independence of action to remove their constant suspicion of pressure exercised by Western powers. And fourth, for purposes of American and world security, there must be adequate provision made for defense. What type of policies might be initiated now by the United States which, over a fairly long period of time, might have a reasonable chance of meeting these requirements and at the same time prove ultimately acceptable to the governments in the area?

Ignoring for the moment the special difficulties in each area—the existence of Israel in the Middle East and continued French control of Indo-China in southeast Asia—few will deny that the rest of the countries in each region have a number of common problems; some of these are economic, such as development plans, some political, such as the question of Arab refugees. There can be little question, either, that most of these governments look to the United States for economic aid. Nor can there be much question that the method used by the United States in responding to similar needs in Western Europe sharply accelerated European political and economic cooperation, even though some pressure for such cooperation had existed before the establishment of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation which drew up the blueprints for the Marshall Plan. Despite the difficulties, there would be real merit in an attempt by the United States to establish two "little OEEC's," one for the Middle East and one for southeast Asia. In each area, the countries of the region would be asked to plan jointly for their needs and to determine jointly the allocation as between members of such funds as might be forthcoming from the United States. Some joint planning already exists in each area, although it is more

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developed in southeast Asia than in the Middle East. Both the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the Colombo Plan represent the beginnings of regional planning, as, indeed, does the less developed and less intensive work of the Economic Committee of the Arab League. Just as was the case for Europe, in short, the United States would insist upon dealing with the areas as a whole, on the basis of total balance sheets for the entire region, rather than on a country-by-country basis. Such a policy would be an open and avowed move to support the growth of regional associations in each area, with the full knowledge and indeed the expectation that economic cooperation for the allocation of funds would almost inevitably lead to closer political association and ultimately increase rather than decrease political independence.

V

Could such policies be established in these areas, how successful would they be, and what might reasonably be expected as the outcome? Before turning to an analysis of each area, it is important to point out one immediate weakness in the suggestion. The success of American policy under the Marshall Plan was not unrelated to the magnitude of the American financial contribution, and, during the next few years, no funds of such size are likely to be available for economic development in either the Middle East or in southeast Asia. Indeed, it is doubtful if the countries could readily absorb such capital. Only about one billion dollars of the 7.5 billion appropriated under the Mutual Security Act in 1951 is available for non-European expenditure, and assistance to Latin America and Nationalist China leaves only about a half billion to be applied to the areas in question. Nonetheless, five hundred million dollars has some persuasive effect, and greater emphasis may have to be placed on these areas after 1954 or 1955 if the Soviet Union, deterred in Europe, increases its pressure upon these countries.

So far as the Middle East is concerned, it is quite clear that the policy would meet with immediate resistance by both Arabs and Jews and no doubt by the British and French as well. At the pres-

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ent time, American aid to Israel is approximately $64,000,000 annually and the sum appears likely to increase. Before the recent aid to Iran, American aid to Arab states, apart from assistance to Arab refugees, totaled less than that given Israel. Arab and Jewish feeling continues at a high level of bitterness. Further, both the United Kingdom and France are concerned about American action in the area, the British believing that royalties for oil paid by private American companies was a major factor in creating the difficulties in Iran, and the French deeply concerned lest American "idealism" undermine their control in Morocco and Tunisia. The Israeli nation would undoubtedly hold itself aloof from any joint economic planning with the Arabs. And any program of American economic aid predicated upon the desirability of strengthening the Arabs by the encouragement of mutual planning and mutual action could hardly fail to worry the British, whose troubles in the Suez and the Sudan might well increase. The international opposition to such policies would be paralleled, no doubt, by domestic opposition; for American Zionists are likely to oppose any measures whose effect is to increase the strength or cohesion of non-Jewish parts of the Middle East.

Despite the obvious difficulties, however, the long-range significance of such a policy could be considerable. At some point, both Arabs and Jews must recognize that once an egg is broken it cannot be put back in its shell, and when that recognition comes, limited joint economic planning may not prove as impossible as it seems today. At some point, too, both British and French may prove more flexible in their approach to problems of nationalism in these areas than they have in the past. In the intervening period, the United States would have advocated a form of independent regional cooperation which would effectively differentiate American policy from the traditional policies of Britain and France. If the Arab countries could be persuaded or led (or, by conditional grants for economic development, "bribed") to consider their economic and development potentials as a whole, they might not consider their future as gloomy as they do now. If those countries receiving enormous oil royalties—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq—could be persuaded to recognize an ultimate and im-

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portant responsibility for the development of the Arab world as a whole, some progress would have been made toward political maturity. If the countries of the area can be persuaded over the next five years to cooperate in economic matters, it is almost inevitable that they will tend to elaborate machinery for the more successful amelioration of political problems which exist between and among themselves. Once there has been a firm measure of economic progress and the development of political maturity, it is not impossible that Israel, whose economic future clearly is tied to that of the area as a whole, would prove more amenable than is now the case. From the point of view of the pattern of American security in the future, the net gain of any development along these lines would be substantial. Some dangers for American policy might well remain if the increased economic collaboration among the Arab states was not accompanied within each state by domestic and social reforms. Little benefit would accrue to American security, for example, if the United States were completely identified in the minds of the people with an unpopular ruling group on the verge of being thrown out of power. Increased economic stability, however, coupled with a reduction of political tension, could well increase the possibilities of broadening and strengthening the bases of popular government in that area.

The difficulties of pursuing a conscious policy of encouraging regionalism in southeast Asia are probably less than in the Middle East, despite the dissatisfaction of newly independent governments of the region at the continued presence of the French in Indo-China. First, a measure of cooperative planning has already taken place within the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. One has only to compare the latest with the first report of ECAFE to be impressed by the difference: realistic appraisals of common problems have been substituted for visionary economic dreams in four short years. Second, there exists somewhat less divisive rivalry for political leadership among the countries of the area. India's bid for political and economic leadership at both the New Delhi and Baguio conferences has not and is not likely to be seriously challenged so long as China remains within

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the Soviet orbit. Third, resources are more evenly distributed among those underdeveloped countries which seek development than is the case in the Middle East. Active encouragement by the United States of cooperative planning for the use of outside aid in the form of monetary grants, technical assistance, export marketing facilities or, indeed, any of the multifarious problems facing those countries would tend, in the long run, to accelerate economic development and political cooperation. The acceleration of economic development would, in turn, tend to increase the capacity of the area to consume Japanese exports and, to that extent, support American security policies in the North Pacific region. The acceleration of political cooperation would, over a period of years, create in this area, as it would in the Middle East and as it is slowly doing in Europe, a regional association with articulated methods of resolving problems within the area and a sufficient assurance of cooperation and power to be able to act with independence.

The defense of both areas, of course, would for the immediate future—and very probably for some time to come—be dependent upon the continued cooperation of the United States with Britain and France. Nevertheless, the United States would be in a strong position to differentiate a strictly military and strategic policy from a political one, instead of being in a position, as is the case at present, where military requirements tend to set the pattern within which political formulas must be found. If the countries of each area can be enlisted in military defense on the basis of partnership with the United States, Britain, and France, and if at the same time they are provided with the means for independent planning and implementation of economic development programs, the fear of Western imperialism, if not removed, will certainly be allayed.

VI

It can legitimately be charged that, if the pattern of American security is now weak because the United States has placed too large a share of responsibility for that security in the hands of its allies, a policy of encouraging the growth of independent

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regional associations will merely serve to undermine our security. To a degree—but only to a degree—this charge is true. The question must be viewed in terms of the entire international context. Security, as has been suggested above, is never absolute; it must always be relative. Insofar as the previous analysis has any validity, it suggests that so large a portion of the factors influencing the action of our allies falls outside our direct or even indirect control as to create serious weaknesses in the pattern of our security. The question really comes down, therefore, to whether there exist alternative policies which will substantially increase the total security of the United States. While a forthright effort to establish a *Pax Americana* might yield some short-term advantages, it seems quite beyond either the financial or the ideological desires of the American public. Assuming that Western Europe will have, as the result of present programs, a deterrent force in being by 1954 or 1955, the final question then becomes the form and objective of American security policy after that date. Even more immediate, perhaps, is the question of what alternatives there exist should NATO fail to be successful in creating an adequate force in being by 1955.

While it is quite clear that power cannot be arbitrarily redistributed once it has become polarized in the United States on the one hand and in the Soviet Union on the other, it is also apparent that the United States, in its own long-range self-interest, is in a position to encourage what might be termed the devolution of political power to regional associations. Such action will yield to the United States certain long-range advantages which present policy will not. In the first place, it will accelerate the growth of political maturity and responsibility in areas which now respond primarily to the enthusiasms of nationalism. In the second place, it will similarly stimulate the growth of articulated machinery within these areas for both economic and political collaboration and increase the prospects for peaceful settlement of disputes which are regional in character. In the third place, it will tend to reduce those areas of political and economic discontent out of which the Soviet Union is attempting to make political capital. Finally—and in this aspect, perhaps, it offers the largest contrast

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to the dangers inherent in present policy—it will help to create within Western Europe, the Middle East, and southeast Asia a feeling of independent prestige, political stability, and independence of action which is now often missing. This, clearly, is not the re-establishment on a world scale of the traditional European balance of power; for none of these areas, with the possible exception of Western Europe, can develop sufficient independent power to challenge either the United States or the Soviet Union. It would, however, result in the establishment of a series of regional associations whose moderating influences may, in the long run, provide more means of reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union than now seem available under present policy.

Unquestionably a policy of this sort contains serious risks within it; all policies do. Would we run greater risks than we do now that one or more of the states or regional associations might leave the free world and join the Soviet orbit? A good case can be made for the belief that the skillful implementation of a policy of encouraging independent regionalism will leave a considerably greater residue of good will toward the United States in the Middle East and southeast Asia than present policies. While initial opposition may be expected from the colonial powers in Western Europe—who feel with considerable justification that they have not only given generously of their resources in Korea but have held the line for the free world in Indo-China, Malaya, and the Middle East—they may ultimately become persuaded of the wisdom of full partnership with other areas of the world and no doubt already would prefer greater freedom from dependence upon American policy. Are the American people sufficiently sophisticated to endorse such a policy? As the regional associations grow in strength and become genuinely independent, the result may be an occasional defeat of an American proposal within the United Nations or elsewhere. Whether Americans are prepared to acquiesce in such an event is difficult to answer; but the education of the American people in foreign affairs during the last decade gives some grounds for cautious optimism.

It should perhaps be emphasized that the suggestions put

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forward are not offered as a substitute for the current program for the development of American security. Rather they are supplementary, aimed particularly for the period following 1954. The United States has all too often—as at Yalta or Potsdam—concentrated upon the immediate, without that sense of direction or planning which must be an integral part of the foreign policy of any nation which expects to continue to hold the leadership which has devolved upon it.

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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE

By ALBIN T. ANDERSON

THE mainsprings of Soviet action, expressed locally and generally, are a theme which has confounded scholars and journalists for more than three decades. A lack of adequate documentation has contributed to the dilemma of those seeking to resolve the enigma that is Russia. One obvious consequence has been to rely heavily upon the doctrinal premises in an abundant Marxist literature. This is understandable, but it is also an invitation to innumerable pitfalls because of the variety of ways in which Soviet society and Soviet policies can be conceptualized. A further danger is the loss of perspective. One cannot lightly ignore the factor of a people's historical experience, conditioned as it is, in part, by persistent geographic and economic forces. The culminating error is to overlook the frequent gaps which exist between professed aims and Soviet capacity to achieve them. Considering Soviet foreign policy as a whole, one is impressed with the fact that it has been pursued with a realistic evaluation of the consequences. Not since the early years of the revolutionary era has there been any reckless pursuit of ideological ends without a careful inventory of the available resources of power.

Geography, emphasizing as it does factors of size, location, resources, and relationship to neighbors, helps greatly to explain why Russia, whether under tsars or commissars, was destined eventually to play an unusually significant role among the nations of the world. With one-sixth of the land surface of the earth, with a variety of natural resources which have only awaited the day of their full exploitation, with a rapidly expanding population, and with a determined and ruthless leadership, the Soviet Union has achieved a status in world affairs in the middle of the twentieth century which reflects more accurately than ever before the potentialities of Russian power. It may even be argued that it has been only of secondary importance that this leadership is

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professedly Communistic, and that the values espoused are alien to the West. Words—whether Leninist, Kautskian, liberal-bourgeois, or reactionary—are not nearly so important as the stage from which they are spoken. The Russian stage is enormous, and insofar as a threat to the West has existed, and exists, it has arisen not so much from what the pronounced aims of Soviet leaders have been throughout the years, as from the capacity of the USSR to implement those aims and to achieve the ends. Means and ends have been a continuum.

The Bolshevik revolutionaries of modern times not only expropriated power; they became simultaneously the heirs of a Russian tradition. Part of that tradition was a Russian concept of destiny. The other part was the legacy of suspicion of Russia that was prompted by Russian action and nourished by outside critics. Russian expansionism was discussed almost as vigorously in the salons and drawing-rooms of the nineteenth century as it has been discussed on twentieth-century forums of the air. In his day, the astute Bismarck tried to divert the Russians from Europe by hinting that their manifest destiny lay to the east. When the Swedes unveiled a majestic statue of Charles XII in a communal park, the venerated king appeared with drawn sword, and with his left arm extended to the east, symbolically suggesting to later generations of Swedes that from there, and only there, would come any real threat to their security. Most of Europe applauded the spectacle of Russian defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905. It seemed as if the gods had intervened with just retribution against overweening ambition.

Premises and Promises

Apprehensions about Russia during the past half-century have been inspired in part, and fortified in part, by the geopolitical theories gradually formulated by Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder, and Haushofer. Geopolitics seemed to provide a scientific explanation for current developments in the power struggle then under way in the world. It mattered little that the credibility of many geopolitical concepts was questioned by more cautious scholars. Deprived of other kinds of documentation, there were

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those who succumbed to the temptation to interpret Soviet action and Soviet policies in classical geopolitical terms. This movement reached its full flowering during World War II, and the number of its adherents in the postwar period has not diminished appreciably. The partisans of this school of thought have insisted that Soviet policy, either general or specific, is incomprehensible without a knowledge of geopolitics.[1] This led to a renewed analysis of the concepts of *Raumsinn* and *Lebensraum*. Sir Halford Mackinder's hypotheses about the "geographical pivot," or Heartland, acquired new devotees and protagonists.[2] There was an understandable tendency to view every new manifestation of Soviet policy in the light of predilections and prophesies uttered by Mackinder or Haushofer. All the *mystique* involved in the controversy of land empires *versus* sea empires, the hypothesis about spatial instincts of peoples, and the erupting potentialities of the Heartland was revived. The aging Mackinder reinforced the faith of his partisans in the midst of World War II by solemnly stating that "The Heartland . . . for the first time in history is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality."[3] At the end of the war, when Soviet power seemed destined to spill far beyond its "natural" confines, Mackinder's followers revived the prophetic injunction he had uttered as early as 1919: "West Europe, both insular and peninsular, must necessarily be opposed to whatever Power attempts to organize the vast resources of East Europe and the Heartland."[4] The specter of Russian power sitting triumphantly astride the great Heartland of Eurasia was a frightening geopolitical nightmare.

A second premise frequently adduced in interpretations of Soviet policy is Marxist ideology. Classical Marxism is replete

[1] Their enthusiasm was derived directly from Karl Haushofer, who closed his *Weltpolitik von Heute* (Berlin, 1936) with these words: "The study of world politics requires a brave spirit and a strong heart. But he who comprehends its meaning belongs to that select group of souls for whom life at last has real meaning" (p. 264).

[2] At the same time honest German scholars were sounding warnings about the uncritical geopolitical approach. Cf., for example, Carl Troll, "Die geographische Wissenschaft in Deutschland in den Jahren 1933 bis 1945," *Erdkunde: Archiv für Wissenschaftliche Geographie*, I (1948), 3ff.

[3] "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, XXI (July 1943), 595-605.

[4] See his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, London, 1919, p. 79.

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with quotations predicting the decay of all other socio-economic systems and the inevitable triumph of Communism. Marxian disciples differed as to ways and means, as to time and place, but none questioned the dialectical promises of a new heaven and a new earth. The triumph of the Bolshevik revolution, the establishment of the Third International, and the widespread conspiratorial activities of Communist agents seemed a portent of the future. Communism appeared destined to spread rapidly, either through infiltration or overt conquest.

Something of a climax of apprehensions took place during World War II when Westerners began unhappily to contemplate Marxian promises and geopolitical premises. Two dogmas seemed suddenly joined in a threatening alliance. The first was the dogma of the Heartland: "Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the World."[5] The second was the dogma of inevitable world Communism. Even those who might normally be expected to view such aphorisms with suspicion were uneasy. The logic of geography and the emotion of ideology both seemed to point to the inescapable destiny of a Communist world ruled from Moscow. Stalin's assurance that he saw no reason why the two systems could not peacefully coexist for a long time to come was cold comfort. When Soviet writers tried to satirize the whole geopolitical conceptual system as a "reactionary theory" suitable only for such misguided souls as Japanese imperialists, Hitlerites, and American warmongers, it was only natural to interpret this action as disarming propaganda in the current cold war.[6] Western fears were galvanized quickly into Western action.

It is not inconceivable that there are elements in Soviet foreign policy which can be linked to classical geopolitical concepts. It is more certain that many Soviet actions are direct reflections of obvious Marxian premises. But an exaggeration of these elements obfuscates, rather than clarifies, the problem of understanding the USSR. The USSR is not merely "a riddle wrapped

5 Part of Mackinder's famous formula. Cf. his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 186.

6 Typical of the Soviet critique of geopolitics is an article by P. Fedoseyev, writing in *Pravda*, April 2, 1951. He stated, "History is not made by geographical designs, but on the basis of the laws of the economic development of society; the popular masses are the decisive force."

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in a mystery inside an enigma." It is a country and a state. It is a land of great size and immense resources. It is a people—some 200 millions of them—for whom the problem of day to day existence is as omnipresent as it is for other peoples. It is also a regime whose ultimate responsibility is that of the "security" of the state, the well-being of its citizenry (however strangely defined), and, certainly not least important, the perpetuation of itself in power. The men of the Kremlin have a keen appreciation of factors of power, a highly developed sense of timing, and a skill in exploiting every possible situation by means of propaganda, but geopolitics is not a part of their vocabulary. And it is questionable if Marxian theory is as important as a mainspring of action as it is as a justification for *faits accomplis*—accomplished acts which every modern state is wont to justify as "vital to national security."

The attention of Soviet leaders to the practicalities of power politics is evident in northern Europe, as well as in other areas contiguous to the USSR. Fortunately, the broad outlines of Soviet policy in the northern area can also be documented with considerable precision. Here it is possible to adduce some of the substantive evidence of Soviet motivation and perhaps ultimate Soviet ends.

The Soviets and the Baltic Sea

The Baltic has been a long-standing theme in Russian thought and policy. It was personalized for the Russians when Peter the Great built his new capital on the lower Neva River, which debouched into the Finnish Gulf, one of the two important fingers of the Baltic. Russians looked upon this city, and the tradition which it represented, as a mixed blessing, but it nevertheless exerted a persistent influence upon Russian policy. When the Bolsheviks returned the seat of power to Moscow, it was by no means an act of voluntary isolation or a repudiation of Baltic and Western interests by the new regime. As a matter of fact, there is evidence that in the first flush of their newly found power after November 1917 some Bolshevik propagandists hoped to transform the Baltic Sea into the "sea of the Social Revolution."[7]

[7] As quoted in August Rei, *Nazi-Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic States*, London, 1948, p. 27, and drawn from *Izvestia* of December 25, 1918.

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The recognition of the independence of the Baltic states and of Finland were simply acts of prudence dictated by calculations of current strength and weakness.

Although the Soviet government was not in a favorable position to press her claims in the Baltic until after World War II, she at no time voluntarily relinquished any of her alleged "rights." An early post-revolutionary example of this policy was her insistence upon a voice in the decision regarding the Aaland Islands. The Soviet foreign commissar, Chicherin, outlined clearly his country's standpoint in 1919 when he stated, in a message to the governments of France, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States that ". . . the very geographical position of the Aaland Islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland binds their destiny closely to the needs and requirements of the peoples inhabiting Russia. . . ."[8] In subsequent messages the Soviet government stated categorically that any decision as to the status of the islands would be considered null and void, "if Russia has not taken part in the negotiations concerning them."[9]

The Soviet government maintained this attitude consistently in the interwar period, and she made her voice most audible in the middle and late 1930's. Her violent castigation of the Anglo-German Naval Convention was largely inspired by the fact that the agreement would enable Germany to establish naval hegemony in the Baltic.[10] When the Finns and Swedes once again took up the problem of remilitarizing the islands in 1938-1939, the Soviet government was quick to point out her own interests in the matter. It was alleged that the program for militarizing Aaland was inspired by Finnish fascists and German geopoliticians, who had long dreamed of converting Aaland into a naval base for the Third Reich. An *Izvestia* correspondent wrote ominously in October 1938 that "The fortifying of Aaland, with a 100 per cent guarantee of the conversion of the archipelago into a German military base, is an agreement militating against

[8] Message of October 2, 1919; cf. Jane Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, I, London, 1951, p. 169.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[10] Vladimir Potemkin, *Istoria Diplomatii*, Moscow, 1945, III, 547. Also Gudmund Hatt, *Östersjöproblemet*, Malmö, 1941, pp. 9-10; and Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, London, 1947, I, 133-34.

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peace in northeastern Europe."[11] The strong Soviet stand against such exclusive participation in the fortification of the islands was responsible for bringing the Swedish-Finnish plans to naught.[12] The crisis had political repercussions in Sweden. Rickard Sandler, the foreign minister, felt it necessary to hand in his portfolio, in part because of the government's failure to provide the proper security for Aaland, which he considered "the buckle in the belt which links Finland and Sweden in a community of interest at the entrance to the Bothnian Gulf."[13]

Soviet sensitivity about Aaland did not abate after the conclusion of hostilities. Efforts by the Finnish government to alter the status of the islands, in response to a request from the Aalanders themselves, were met by several strong *démarches* in Helsinki and considerable press criticism. Since the proposed bill would have given the Aalanders a considerably enlarged measure of self-government, it was the Russian contention that this would violate both the armistice and the peace treaty between Finland and the USSR. Finnish sovereignty had been guaranteed by both these documents; therefore, to alter the status of the islands would be "restricting Finnish sovereignty and violating the peace treaty."[14] This fantastic interpretation of treaty obligations was a piece of sophistry in which the Kremlin could lightly indulge. But more seriously, it showed the purposefulness with which the Soviet government intended to guard her Baltic interests, not least in Aaland.

The Baltic, unlike the Mediterranean, is not so much a connecting link of water as it is an inland sea. A comparison with the Black Sea would be more apt, particularly in that the water entrance in each case is controlled by non-Soviet (one might say, anti-Soviet) powers. The long history of dispute as to the control of the Straits is well known, but there has never been any "northern Montreux Convention" to fix the status of the Baltic outlets. The Little Belt and Great Belt are parts of the defense zone of Denmark; and control over the Öresund is shared by Sweden

11 *Izvestia*, October 11, 1938.

12 Rütger Essen, *Den Ryska Ekvationen*, Stockholm, 1940, p. 162.

13 Quoted from his speech to the first house of the Riksdag, January 17, 1940; in *Svensk Utrikespolitik under andra Världskriget*, Stockholm, 1946, p. 57.

14 In both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, May 25, 1951.

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and Denmark. It is perhaps with some justice that Russia has been likened to "a man who cannot get his arms through his sleeves because they are sewed at the bottom."[15]

Only after World War II was any effort made to clarify more thoroughly the Soviet position regarding the Baltic Straits. This was a natural concomitant to the changed power situation in the north, marked by the reabsorption of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union and the elimination of Germany as a naval power. *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* for May 1950 contained a clear expression of the Soviet viewpoint regarding the Baltic and the Baltic Straits.[16] Here it was asserted that the responsibility for opening and closing the Baltic was a matter for all the littoral powers. The writer insisted that ". . . the foundation of the regime of the Baltic Straits in international law must be the effective closing of them to the warships of non-Baltic states." Such a policy, it was said, was in full harmony with the traditional position of the Soviet government and its implementation was now particularly appropriate, in view of the recent victory of the Soviet Union over Germany. "The Baltic states," it was emphasized, "and among them the great peace-loving power, the Soviet Union, have legitimate, juridical, and historically substantiated rights to carry out this measure, which does not exclude freedom of commercial navigation in the Baltic for all countries and has the purpose of protecting the sovereignty and security of the nations inhabiting the shores of the Baltic."

The Soviet attitude toward the general problem of the Baltic was thus clarified. The Baltic was an internal sea and purely the concern of the states whose shores were washed by its waters. Those states should collaborate in preventing the intrusion of any outside, "warmongering" parties. The area of authority for this recommended condominium of powers extended to the straits connecting the Baltic with the Kattegat. Throughout the article was an unmistakable implication that other Baltic powers must accustom themselves to thinking in terms of Russian, rather than German, predominance in the Baltic. The span of

[15] Hatt, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

[16] This discussion appeared in the form of a long, laudatory review of a recent master's dissertation, "The Regime of the Baltic Straits in International Law," by S. V. Molodtsov.

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her interests now obviously encompassed three points of strategic importance in the Baltic—the straits at the western outlet, the Aaland Islands, which dominated access to the Bothnian Gulf as well as the approaches to the Finnish Gulf, and the islands and waters of the latter.

Soviet Policy: Finland and Scandinavia

From a strategic point of view, there were at least three major frontier points in the Soviet northwest which seemed to be of special concern to the USSR. In the south, it was the Karelian Isthmus through which the Finnish frontier, prior to 1939, passed within 32 kilometers of the city of Leningrad. Farther north was the Karelo-Finnish line, which brought outposts of Finnish defense relatively close to the Murmansk Railway, as well as to the Stalin Canal. In the far north the impingement of Finnish territory upon Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula was important because Russia possessed there her only year-round ice-free opening to the west.

Although Soviet-Finnish relations will not be dealt with here in detail, it is not inappropriate to point out some of the strategic considerations which seem to have shaped Soviet policy toward Finland. Soviet uneasiness regarding the proximity of the Finnish frontier to vulnerable Soviet centers had been manifested prior to 1939.[17] While acquiescing in the Treaty of Dorpat (1920) which had delimited the frontier, the Soviet leaders were never happy or satisfied. For one thing, the Allied intervention in the Baltic and in the ports of Murmansk and Archangel left a legacy of suspicion which it was not necessary to keep alive in people's minds by artificial means. Second, the obvious anti-Communist orientation of the successive Finnish governments did not tend to allay suspicions. And perhaps most important, Finns and Western writers almost without exception frequently sinned against the sensibilities of the Kremlin by referring to Finland as a "glacis"—a political, social, and cultural outpost of the West against the barbarism of the East.

[17] Extensive, although inconclusive, discussions took place in 1938 which are summarized in Väinö Tanner's memoirs, *Finlands Väg 1939-1940* (Swedish edition), Helsingfors, 1950, pp. 7-27.

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No Soviet spokesman ever suggested that Finland alone constituted a tangible threat, but there were frequent warnings that Finland might become the tool of Western, imperialistic, warmongering powers. Until the Soviet-German Pact of August 1939, it was clear that the Russians included Germany in the above indictment. Forced by the pact to exclude Germany from this category, most pronouncements tended to become vague and patently meaningless. The Russo-German division of "spheres of influence" in 1939 must have given the Kremlin a respite from real fears in regard to Finland, even while she continued to insist that the dangers from that source had intensified.

It is impossible to state with scientific precision what the complete extent of Soviet aims was in regard to Finland in 1939. One can only build an hypothesis upon the rather limited evidence which exists. But in terms of immediate strategic aims, it is clear that the Russian intention was to bring Finland tightly within the orbit of Soviet influence. The abortive support given to Kuusinen's government suggests even more far-reaching aims. Finland might have been left completely independent—however tenuously and uncertainly—but acceptance of the military demands of 1939 would have resulted in two positive advantages to the policy-makers of the Kremlin. The USSR would have enhanced her capacity for immediate and decisive reprisal, which would have had a sobering effect upon possible Finnish extremist action. And second, the advantages gained would have made it possible for the Russians to anticipate the occupation of Finland by any of the belligerents, Germany or the Allies. Finland as an independent, unoccupied, and armed power was out of control. Subjected to a constricted and demilitarized frontier and partial occupation (islands of the Finnish Gulf, and the Hangö Peninsula), she could be kept under control.

The initial premise for Soviet demands upon Finland in 1939 was the insecurity of Leningrad. The Finns could maintain that just as the Finnish border was thirty-two kilometers from Leningrad, so was Leningrad thirty-two kilometers from Finnish territory, but this type of legalistic argument has never had much restraining influence on big power diplomacy. Subsequently, many responsible Finns, even while nobly acquitting themselves

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in a struggle which they considered just and honorable, came to a better recognition of the cogency of the Russian case.[18]

There was no hint of geopolitical design or of ideological motivation in the conversations held between the Finnish delegates on the one hand and Stalin and Molotov on the other. Paasikivi reported later that from the very first Stalin was frank and realistic. With maps spread out on a huge table before them, Stalin, in a matter-of-fact and not unfriendly way, remarked, "Neither of us can do anything about the geographical fact that we are neighbors."[19] He and Molotov then proceeded to argue their case from a simple premise: at a border point where the interests of two powers are involved, the one with the most at stake has an a priori right to the greatest consideration.

In the various communiqués to the Finnish government, and perhaps even more clearly in the speech by Molotov to the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, the importance of Leningrad to the Soviet Union was frankly stated, even though the details were not tabulated.[20] This site of the initial Russian revolutions had nostalgic historical, as well as practical, meaning to the leaders of the USSR—perhaps shared in large part by the masses of the Soviet peoples.[21] Between the two wars the city had doubled in size, with a population somewhat in excess of three million by 1939. Despite the rapid development of other areas and many new cities, Leningrad continued to be one of the largest industrial centers in the USSR, responsible for the output of something more than 10 per cent of the industrial production of the country,[22] and with a much higher figure for such critical items as machines and machine tools. It was a communication hub and terminal of major importance, with rail and water connections to the interior of the USSR, to the Arctic north, and to the outside world. It served as an administrative center next in im-

18 For one person's opinion of the legalistic-optimistic attitude of the Finnish government, cf. Carl O. Frietsch, *Finlands Ödesår, 1939-1943*, Helsingfors, 1945, especially Chapters I-III.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87. For a slightly different version, cf. Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

20 *Finnish Blue Book*, New York, 1940, pp. 56-60, for the appropriate extracts of Molotov's speech.

21 It seems to the author that nothing else can explain the unusual amount of publicity given to the specific demands.

22 Theodore Shabad, *Geography of the U.S.S.R.*, New York, 1951, p. 151.

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portance only to Moscow. A German writer stated in 1938 that "The USSR can never abandon such an important . . . center, and the military preparations taken to date indicate that such is not the intention."[23]

All of the above considerations were no doubt honestly adduced in the negotiations of 1939. The fact that the regime decided to publicize these demands when negotiations lagged makes it plausible to believe that the Soviet leaders felt that their demands were reasonable, and that they would seem so to both friend and foe. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the Russians were willing to jeopardize the security of other strategic points farther north—the Murmansk Railway and the Stalin Canal—in order to provide land "compensation" to the Finns for territory which, in the Soviet scale of values, was of greater immediate importance to themselves.[24]

The results of two wars and the terms imposed by the treaty of 1947 confirm both the politico-military and the economic objectives of Soviet policy. To the surprise of most observers—although an inadmissible emotion for hardened Soviet apologists—the Russians contented themselves with only limited territorial annexations of Finnish territory. The most important was the whole of the Karelian Isthmus, along with a substantial bloc of territory west and north of Lake Ladoga. Leningrad was now provided with a protective belt of land and water which was undeniably more advantageous to the Russians than that which they had in 1939. The so-called Mannerheim Line was transformed into a Russian defense zone, and the former Finnish port city of Viipuri became a key Soviet outpost on the Baltic. Viipuri, the islands of the Gulf, and the leased territory of Porkkala now formed an integrated part of the Soviet-Baltic defense system.

By the terms of the treaty of 1947, the Russians also strengthened their position along the Finnish waistline. They acquired a fifty-mile wide strip of territory which, among other benefits, gave them control over the railway line from Kandalaksha to Kuolajarvi. The Finns were obligated to complete a portion of

23 Vitalis Pantenburg, *Russland's Griff um Nordeuropa*, Leipzig, 1938, p. 72.

24 See map opposite page 35 in the Soviet "colored" book, *Die Sowjetunion und Finnland*, Moscow, 1939.

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the line, Kemi to Kuolajarvi, providing the Russians with a means of transporting heavy goods and equipment from the Soviet north to the Gulf of Bothnia. Its potentialities as a military route were obvious to everyone. The shift of the Finnish frontier westwards in this middle section put both the Stalin Canal and the Murmansk Railway in a somewhat improved security position. Lakes, marshes, and timberlands in the annexed territory did not represent a substantial economic gain, but they did widen the Soviet defensive zone in an area of unusually rugged terrain.

Not the least important of the Russian acquisitions was the northern port of Petsamo (Pechenga) and its surrounding territory. Finland was thus cut off from her Arctic outlet, and the protective circle around the port of Murmansk was enlarged. Complete control of Petsamo had not been a part of the initial Russian demands, and in the treaty of 1940 Finnish sovereignty was only slightly limited, but the treaty of 1947 forced the Finns to relinquish both their political control and their economic holdings. Petsamo may thus be classified as war booty rather than as an incipient political and military objective. A very substantial prize for the Russians was the nickel industry in Petsamo, for which they compensated the previous owners and concessionaires.

By means of territorial acquisitions and the delimiting terms within the final treaty, the USSR achieved a measure of "security" on the Soviet-Finnish frontier which went far beyond the announced aims of 1939. But there remained an additional sphere in the north where her status had never been satisfactorily resolved. That was the Arctic. A more incisive formulation of Soviet policy in that area awaited the postwar period.

Soviet Policy: The Arctic

Connected intimately with the establishment of a favorable power advantage for the USSR in the northwest was a continued Soviet interest in the Arctic and the Polar area. Murmansk had long been a port of paramount importance to the USSR. With its facilities for basing large numbers of naval and merchant craft, it had become a center of Soviet economic life in the north. And yet, even after the war, it remained vulnerable to potential

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enemies. It was easy to visualize a blockade of ships or of mines interposed between North Cape and the solid ice to the north, thus eliminating the Soviet corridor to the North Atlantic.[25] Soviet strategists had not been insensitive to this danger, but there was no evidence that they had accepted the premises of at least one German geopolitician; namely, that ". . . an expansion to the west must therefore necessarily be one of the prime objectives of Soviet foreign policy."[26] This would mean, specifically, that the Soviet Union would be driven by considerations of security to seize certain Norwegian fjords and coastal islands. Nazi occupation of the northern and western Norwegian coastlands during World War II highlighted the strategic importance of this area for both naval and air warfare. It was the consciousness of this fact by the Western powers, as well as by the USSR, which made the participation of Norway in NATO a matter of critical importance for both sides. In this case, the country involved—Norway—was far enough removed from the reach of effective Soviet pressure to hazard a decision which could not be other than distasteful to the Kremlin. At the same time, the realistic Norwegians were aware of the risks, should East-West tension develop into a shooting war.

Largely through the instrumentality of the press, the Soviet government tried to clarify its viewpoint on the Arctic after World War II. It was then reiterated in unmistakable terms that the USSR subscribed officially to the "sector theory" in the Arctic.[27] Evidence was produced to show that Russia, as early as 1916, had "notified the powers of her claims to the islands north of Siberia."[28] The tacit agreement between Canada, Denmark, and Norway, in 1924, that ". . . sectors were to be considered as under the sovereignty of the corresponding state" was accepted and reinforced in principle by the Soviet government when, two

25 Allied experiences during World War II made this fully apparent. Cf. "Allied Convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk, 1941-45," by an anonymous British Admiralty writer, in *The Polar Record* (January 1950), pp. 427ff.

26 Pantenburg, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

27 See the article by V. Durdenevsky, "Antarctica and the Arctic," *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta*, October 1950; also published in full in *C.D.S.P.*, IV: 40. For a summary of earlier Russian claims, see C. J. Webster, "The Growth of the Soviet Arctic and Subarctic," *Arctic* (May 1951), pp. 27-45.

28 Cf. Durdenevsky, *ibid.*

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years later, ". . . all the lands and islands, both those discovered and those which might be discovered later, lying between the coasts of the USSR on the Arctic Ocean, the North Pole and the meridian of longitude 32 degrees 4 minutes 35 seconds East and 168 degrees 49 minutes 30 seconds West (from Greenwich) were proclaimed Soviet territory." A Soviet decree of September 8, 1931, included in its definition of the Far North all the islands of the Arctic Ocean and of the Okhotsk, Bering, and Kamchatka seas.[29] An exception was made in the west to exclude that part of the eastern Spitsbergen archipelago, 32 degrees to 35 degrees East, which lay inside the western line of demarcation. The Soviet government has let it be known that she considers the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukotsk seas as Soviet internal waters, and that the White Sea, south of a line from the Kanin headland west to Svyatoi on the Kola Peninsula, is under direct Soviet jurisdiction. Official Soviet geographies speak of the Barents Sea as a "Soviet Arctic Sea."[30] It can thus be assumed that the Soviet government has served notice that she will be the sole arbiter over the destinies of the waters, islands, and the ice of the great wedge-shaped polar sector from the Rybachii Peninsula in the west to Bering in the east. Current Soviet geographies and atlases support this claim.

Soviet sensitivity about the Arctic was heightened in the postwar period by the possibility that Spitsbergen might be utilized as a base by the North Atlantic powers. The Russians rightly claimed that such a use of the archipelago would violate the agreement made when Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen was initially recognized by a group of powers in 1920. Soviet interests in the area dated particularly from 1931, when the Soviet company, Arctic Ugol, purchased the property of the Anglo-Russian Grumant Company, Ltd., and in the following year acquired the holdings of the Nederlandsche Spitsbergen Compagnie. They too were forbidden to maintain military forces in the area, but having once obtained an economic stake in Spitsbergen, it was perhaps only natural that the Russians should be

[29] Webster, *op.cit.*

[30] S. S. Balzak, V. F. Vasutin, and Ya. F. Feigin, *Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R.*, New York, 1949, p. 27.

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concerned with maintaining the relatively favorable power relationship. During World War II the Germans occupied Spitsbergen with little opposition. That prompted the Russians to propose to the Norwegians, as early as 1944, that the treaty of 1920 be revised and that some provision be made for the defense of the islands.[31] What the Russians would have preferred was a bilateral agreement between the powers having primary interests there, Norway and the USSR, but the Norwegians insisted that all signatory powers take part in the negotiations. No doubt feeling that multiple participation would not be to their advantage, the Russians suspended conversations. Meanwhile, they began a press campaign which enlarged upon earlier Russian exploits in Spitsbergen, and one writer justified the Soviet position by asserting that the treaty of 1920 "was signed without the knowledge or participation of the Soviet Union and consequently failed to take into account the security interests of the USSR in the North and the important economic interests of the Soviet Union in the Spitsbergen area."[32]

In addition to arguments based upon security considerations, Soviet spokesmen have stressed the economic importance of Spitsbergen to the USSR. Primarily, it had "supplied the northern areas of the USSR and the Soviet northern fleet with more than 400,000 tons of coal annually."[33] Two decades ago that argument would have had some validity; today it is only an argument. There is no coal in the European Arctic, and it is no doubt convenient for the administration of the Northern Sea Route to tap this island supply, but two developments of recent years have rendered obsolete the Soviet dependence upon coal from Spitsbergen. The first is the rapid expansion of coal production in the Pechora basin, somewhat west of the northern Urals. The resources of this field may possibly exceed those of the Ukrainian Donbas.[34] The second is the marked improvement in land transportation facilities in the Soviet northwest. Perhaps most im-

[31] R. N. Rudmose Brown, "Svalbard of Today," *Scottish Geographical Magazine* (December 1950), p. 177.

[32] G. Rassadin, writing in *Pravda*, October 28, 1951.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Cf. William Mandel, "Some Notes on the Soviet Arctic During the Past Decade," *Arctic* (April 1950), p. 61.

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portant was the wartime construction of a railway linking the Archangel-Vologda line with the Pechora basin, terminating in Vorkuta on the Usa River. There is a northern linkage of the Archangel-Vologda and Leningrad-Murmansk lines, which would permit easy transit to all the major northwestern ports and cities. Up to World War II, the north had to import some coal from the Donbas[35]; but that is probably no longer necessary.

Arguments based upon the economic importance of Spitsbergen to the Soviet Union are, therefore, largely specious. But Russian coal operations on Svalbaard remain a symbol of Soviet "interests," a symbol which can be conjured up whenever the Kremlin feels that its sphere of influence is being trespassed. For that reason, and because of the useful weather data which installations there afford, there is little likelihood of the USSR abandoning its operations, even if it should ultimately prove more economical for them to obtain coal elsewhere.

The Arctic is therefore one part of a security zone for the Soviet northwest which stretches in a sweeping arc from the North Pole through Spitsbergen, northern Norway, the Baltic Straits, and then to the south Baltic. Soviet sovereignty is not exercised at any of the peripheral points, but Soviet spokesmen have not hesitated to specify the places where Soviet interests are involved, and the premises upon which these claims are asserted. Within this arc of land and water, policies have been pursued to strengthen the politico-strategic position of the USSR. The key Baltic coastal points, and especially offshore islands, such as Dagö, Ösel, and the various islands of the Finnish Gulf, have been heavily militarized. Alterations in the Soviet-Finnish frontier improved the strategic position of the USSR vis-à-vis Finland. But far more significant was the virtual disarmament of Finland. Not only has Leningrad been given a degree of security which it could never claim before, but the present power ratio means that Finland could be occupied entirely within a matter of days. The threat of Soviet military retaliation and the strictures consequent upon reparation obligations and trade agreements have meant a severe limitation upon Finnish freedom of action. This has served

[35] Balzak *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 214.

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not only to keep Finland out of NATO, but it has helped to determine Swedish policy toward membership in that coalition. It was abundantly clear to the Swedish government that she would jeopardize Finnish independence by joining such an openly anti-Soviet bloc of powers. In the far north the Soviet Union has expanded rapidly both its naval and air strength. All of these measures reflect quite normal "bourgeois" calculations of politico-military strength and weakness, and seem quite divorced from classical geopolitical and Marxian premises.

Ideology: Handmaiden of Expansion

Ideology has a role in Soviet policy-making, but largely one of secondary importance. Soviet pronouncements on policy toward the Baltic and northern Europe, containing as they do the usual ideological overtones, appear designed to make the position of the USSR a matter of public record should exigencies arise, and major changes ensue, which would require proper rationalization. There is no hint of imminent action to alter the status quo. Soviet diplomatic language contains no allusions to a need for "living space," "breathing space," or "population pressure," and the like. Efforts are frequently made by official spokesmen to deny that Soviet diplomacy has any resemblance to "bourgeois diplomacy," but the denial is meaningful only to the degree that one is willing to accept the Marxian premises which are postulated.

No Soviet policy declarations, however, are so worded as to preclude future action in the north. Soviet criticism of the northern countries is couched in such terms as to leave the specific impression that these countries are allowing themselves to become the bonded servants of the capitalistic West; and further, that the respective regimes are bent upon the enslavement of the masses of their people. To conjure up such a picture for the Soviet citizenry could have useful consequences. It would fit neatly into what the Soviet masses have been taught about just and unjust wars, and about non-interference and intervention. Public support for possible future Soviet action would then be forthcoming because the ideological groundwork had been laid.

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Intervention in the Leninist-Stalinist lexicon can take many forms.[36] These include not only armed intervention, but the financing of counterrevolutionary groups, as well as simple financial-economic intervention, "particularly the utilization of business firms and trade missions as the best reconnaissance agents of the world bourgeoisie." This then develops into a kind of capitalistic encirclement which ties the victimized countries—not least the small ones—to the bourgeois-capitalist states, inspires the ruling circles of these countries to one or another kind of adventurist policy, and, in the process, the masses of working people become enslaved. It was this of which Finland was accused in 1939, and it has been a recurrent theme in the postwar period, but is now directed most sharply against Norway.

Having then established the case for "intervention" on these premises, it becomes possible to justify eventual military involvement in these areas, given these circumstances. Such a war would be justified in the Marxist catechism because it would be a war against imperial-colonial exploitation, a war of national liberation for peoples, and therefore a "just war."[37] Since it is the Soviet viewpoint that Russian action in Eastern Europe after the war was a model of proper action, there should be no illusion on the part of Finland or the Scandinavian countries as to what to expect under such circumstances.[38]

Meanwhile, politics remains the art of the possible, even in the land of the Soviets. Past experience has demonstrated that such pronouncements are rarely followed by early action, and frequently by none. But they are reiterated to demonstrate continuity—and purity—of doctrine. As shown during World War II, and in the postwar period, they can then be conveniently cited to justify action in a given situation. However, such situations do not arise in a vacuum, nor is Soviet action solely a consequence of certain ideological premises. The Soviets act and react

[36] Cf. M. I. Lazarev's summary of the Stalinist position in *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, December 15, 1949. Complete text also in *C.D.S.P.*, II: 6.

[37] For the military viewpoint, cf. Lt.-Col. E. Khomenko, "On Wars Just and Unjust," *Krasny Flot*, October 9, 1949; also the appropriate sections of *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Short Course).

[38] Lazarev, *loc.cit.*

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in accordance with the power situation which prevails, a power situation which is measured in psychological and tactical terms as well as in terms of military strength. Were that not true, Finland would long ago have disappeared into the maw of Stalin's Russia.

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THE IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

By PAUL E. ZINNER[1]

FOREIGN policy, the very existence of which Soviet leaders admitted only hesitatingly during the green years of the Revolution—although they availed themselves of it as an indispensable tool from the moment they gained power—has become a primary weapon in safeguarding the interests of the "Socialist Fatherland" and propagating the struggle against "world capitalism."

According to current authoritative Soviet scholarly thought, "the world influence of Stalinist foreign policy is indivisibly linked with the fact that [it] has firmly and staunchly championed the vital interests of the [Soviet] state and those interests, as is known, have completely coincided with the interests of all toiling humanity."[2] The prestige now enjoyed by Soviet foreign policy has led to efforts to glorify it as "the most important factor in the progressive development of mankind and the struggle of the proletariat and the working people of all countries against imperialism" from the very first day of the October Revolution.[3]

It is not necessary to share the hypertrophied enthusiasm of Soviet scholars for the achievements of "Stalinist foreign policy" in order to acknowledge that it is a redoubtable weapon which impinges on virtually every aspect of the daily life of the entire world. The openly professed hostility of that policy toward the Western nations in general and the United States in particular, and the manifold difficulties encountered in meeting its challenge, impel a serious investigation of the factors which primarily determine its make-up. Among these, ideology appears to occupy a role of considerable importance.

[1] The author gratefully acknowledges the generous assistance of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, which made this study possible.

[2] On the task of studying the history of the Stalinist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 4, April 1950, translated in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, II, No. 31, September 16, 1950.

[3] *Ibid.*

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I

The assertion that ideology plays an important role in shaping Soviet foreign policy is not meant to imply slavish, mechanistic acceptance of the written word of Marxism on the part of the present rulers in the Kremlin. What it suggests is that day-to-day decisions, although pragmatic in nature, are arrived at within the general framework of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Although specific Marxian dicta are often inadequate for or inapplicable to contemporary situations, Marxism does not seem to have lost its importance to Soviet Russia as a basic philosophy —a "science," as Stalin puts it—of the general historical and social process. It still serves the Soviet leaders as a method of inquiry and an analytical tool. The relevance of Leninism, of course, is greater and the Soviet world outlook seems to be predicated on a few simple Leninist postulates concerning "capitalist antagonisms" in the "epoch of imperialism," as well as on the concept of a basic "socialist-capitalist" dichotomy resulting from the emergence of the Soviet Union as the "first socialist state" in the world.

Even if Soviet leaders do not consciously refer to Marxist-Leninist theory for guidance in meeting specific practical problems, it is difficult to see how their decisions could fail to reflect the influence of life-long exposure to doctrinal education. In the final analysis, the world outlook of Soviet policy-makers is narrowly sectarian. It is based on preconceived value judgments concerning the historical process in general and the *modus operandi* of capitalist countries in particular. The effect of these value judgments is the more dangerous as they are based on the premises of "objective, pre-determined and inevitable" categories of "contradictions" and struggle as the only means of resolving conflicts.

The difficulty in accepting the possibility that Soviet leaders could consistently abide by the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist theory stems primarily from the absurdity of the major concepts of Marxism-Leninism, the frequent absence of a visible link between individual Soviet moves and officially proclaimed doctrine,

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and the obvious shifts in emphasis from one concept to another within the framework of Marxist-Leninist theory in the course of time. Yet many of the seemingly inexplicable facets of Soviet foreign policy might be explained by the presumption of underlying ideological motives. Let us turn to an examination of Soviet foreign policy in the light of its possible ideological orientations.

II

An outstanding feature of the Stalinist regime before the Second World War was its de-emphasis of the world revolution and a corollary recession of the world revolutionary movement into the background. The stabilization of capitalism, to use a Marxist term, and the subjective propensities of Stalin appear to have played about equally important roles in this development, although, in this respect as in many others, Stalin was less responsible for originating a trend than for accentuating and carrying to their logical conclusions trends established under Lenin.

The Comintern at the time of its foundation appeared as the general staff of the world revolution, a staff to whose policies Soviet foreign policy was merely incidental. The trend toward Soviet Communist domination, however, quickly became apparent. Lenin, who earlier in his career willingly admitted the supremacy of the German Social Democratic Party because of its fund of experience, now proclaimed that despite Russia's backwardness the Russian Communist Party should serve as a model, since, after all, it had achievements to its credit which no other party could boast. The Soviet Communist Party soon occupied a position of *primus inter pares* in the Comintern and Lenin's leadership was pretty much unchallenged. But already at this time some Western Communists resented Bolshevik supremacy and Bolshevik efforts to impose methods proven in Russia which seemed to them inapplicable in Europe. An incipient cleavage between Russia and a segment of European Communism appeared. The trends toward Russian domination and toward cleavage both became more pronounced under Stalin.

Of all the leading Soviet Communists, Stalin held the least brief for revolutionary movements outside Russia. He remained

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indifferent toward them, and skeptical of their success even during the heroic stage of the Russian Revolution when every other Soviet Communist, including Lenin, expectantly looked to revolutionary victories as the "saviors" of the Russian Revolution.

Stalin's attitude toward world revolution and the international revolutionary movement may have been shaped to a considerable extent by what seems a rather solid sense of realism—which made it appear utter folly to risk the substance of socialism in one country for the shadow of revolution abroad—and a fundamentally suspicious and distrustful nature. A survey of Stalin's past actions reveals a great consistency in the means he favored to advance his cause. Whereas Lenin held authority because of his undisputed prestige and obvious intellectual superiority, and Trotsky, if given the chance, might have risen to the same position, Stalin rose to power primarily by virtue of seizing the physical apparatus of control in his own party. The history of the office of Secretary General of the Party, a post first occupied by Stalin and never relinquished by him, shows this with incontrovertible clarity. If he found it difficult to secure his hold on the party in the Soviet Union, the extension of his control over the Comintern must have appeared an even more arduous task. For here he was confronted with a heterogeneous assembly of foreigners whom he did not know at all, and with whose countries he was also unfamiliar. Moreover, the cause in which the foreign Communists were primarily interested—the furtherance of revolution in their countries—was a *bête noire* to Stalin. Finally many foreign Communists, among them the most prominent ones, held views akin to Stalin's successive domestic enemies—Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin. To make the Comintern amenable to his own aims, Stalin proceeded with its *Gleichschaltung* along much the same lines he had employed in his own party, i.e., physical purges, and transfer of personnel he did not fully trust to Moscow, where they were effectively put on ice and were within easy reach of his avenging arm. Even with an apparatus completely subservient to him, Stalin relied more and more on Russian foreign policy to shoulder the burdens coincident with the propagation of the world revolution. It is axiomatic in

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Stalin's past behavior that he has never fully trusted any Communist undertaking which he has not been able to control and reach in a physical sense. This is significant for appraising the roles and tactics of Western European Communist parties after World War II.

The world revolutionary movement became an adjunct of Soviet policy, one of the means of furthering Soviet aims in accordance with the requirements of any given situation. As Trotsky had correctly prophesied, from "the vanguards of the world revolution" the Communist parties became the "border guards" of Soviet Russia.[4] In a possible conflict of interest between foreign Communist parties and the Soviet Union there was never any question as to which would be sacrificed for the other. The outstanding instance on record is the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 which jeopardized the very existence of all European Communist parties and in fact constituted an ideological blow the effects of which still reverberate in the European Communist movement.

In the struggle for succession to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky stood against each other primarily because of their sharp difference of opinion regarding the international revolutionary movement, and the relative role of the Soviet Union and other revolutionary movements in the ultimate achievement of fundamental Communist aims, i.e., of a Communist world society. Because of their differences Trotsky was apt to charge Stalin with plotting against the revolution. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. It has been conclusively enough documented that Stalin never renounced world revolution as an ultimate aim of Communism, nor did he ever proclaim the possibility of a final victory for socialism without the revolutionary transformation of several, if not the majority, of the countries of the world. But under Stalin's direction the propagation of the world revolution has become a methodical project, less spectacular than Trotsky's brand of revolution might have been, and perhaps for that very reason deadlier. The actors in the arena are the same but their roles have been overhauled. The local proletariat is the infantry, expendable under any circumstances. Local Communists are the

4 See L. Trotsky, *The Third International after Lenin*, New York, 1936.

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non-coms of the revolution. Soviet armed force is the motorized artillery. Soviet Communists are the chiefs of staff.

The crucial difference between Trotsky and Stalin concerns timing and tactics, not fundamental aims, and this is well to keep in mind.

III

Throughout the twenties and thirties, Stalin was preoccupied with consolidating his personal power and building socialism in Russia. Everything else assumed secondary importance. It was obvious to him that if the Soviet Union was to become a powerful base of the world revolution—in fact, if it even aspired to provide a foothold for the revolution in a preponderantly hostile capitalist world—it would have to be strengthened internally. Only after it became internally consolidated could it hope to lunge beyond its frontiers in quest of the fulfillment of its messianic mission. The world revolution—as seen by Stalin—thus became a long drawn-out affair, its second phase, the spread of revolution to other countries, being a somewhat distant and nebulous proposition. "The epoch of world revolution constitutes a new stage in the revolution, it covers a whole strategic period which may occupy years or even decades. In the course of this period there will occur, nay, must occur, ebbs and flows in the revolutionary tide."[5] In Stalin's view the international revolutionary movement was "for the time being [1925] in the declining phase." He expected little support from revolutionary outbreaks elsewhere, and this was one of the fixed points on which his foreign policy was predicated. The other two were the predatory attitude of capitalist countries toward the Soviet Union, and the inevitability of another war as a result of contradictions in the "imperialist camp." He did not venture to predict when the next war would break out, but generally implied that a respite of some fifteen to twenty years could be expected. This may have represented wishful thinking more than anything else, for it coincided with his estimate of the approximate amount of time needed to build "socialism" in the Soviet Union.

[5] J. Stalin, *Leninism*, London, 1928, p. 221.

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The precarious position of the Soviet Union "surrounded by capitalist lands" filled Stalin with constant forebodings of "the danger of intervention," and the primary tasks of Russian foreign policy and of the world proletariat consisted in staving off capitalist intervention in Russia, to give the Soviets time to build up strength for the inevitable showdown with the "imperialist camp."

During the early twenties, interventionist efforts did in fact subside and the Soviet Union was able to establish normal diplomatic relations with a number of countries. Stalin hailed this development at the 14th Congress (1925) of the party as "the essential and novel feature in [Soviet] foreign relations" and called the existing state of affairs a "sort of provisional equilibrium of forces," a "kind of peaceful coexistence" between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries.[6]

The expectation of war, however, was axiomatic to Stalin, and at this same Congress, as Mr. Deutscher puts it, he "enumerated with the greatest precision the storm centres from which the Second World War was to begin."[7] He did not expect Germany to acquiesce forever in the "unjust provisions" of the Versailles Treaty and looked to her eventual rise as the beginning of a new conflict. Although it is possible that Stalin, consistently guiding himself by the major categories of contradictions in the capitalist camp and between the capitalist and the socialist camps, was able to foresee the general course of international developments, he was unable to narrow his predictions sufficiently to derive accurate tactical guidance from his analysis. This was the case in China in the twenties, where the liberation movement attracted his attention and raised his revolutionary hopes. His incorrect appraisal of the nature of colonial revolutionary forces, at least in this particular instance, led him to support the Kuomintang and to subordinate the Communist Party of China to it. The experiment resulted in fiasco. Later, he completely failed to see the incipient danger of Nazism and instead battled the Social Democratic parties, whom he considered the more dangerous

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 354ff.
[7] I. Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography*, London and New York, 1949, p. 410.

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opponents of Communism. In the early thirties he was obviously at a loss as to the guise under which the new war would start. He correctly gauged a number of developing antagonistic trends among the capitalist countries but could not decide to which set of conflicts he should assign priority, nor was he sure whether the attack would be directed on one of the colonial countries, or on the Soviet Union. Finally he realized that Germany and Japan were the most aggressive nations in the imperialist camp.

In his report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1934 he called Fascism the most fashionable commodity among bellicose bourgeois politicians "who no longer being able to find a way out of their present situation—of growing capitalist crises—were compelled to resort to war." But he warned that war was no real way out, for in its wake would follow a further deterioration of the position of the bourgeoisie and new proletarian revolutions.[8] In order to stave off war as long as possible, the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934, that League which Stalin had branded a creation of warmongers only a few years earlier. To be sure, Stalin had no illusions about the League. He still considered that its actions were determined by contradictions inherent in the capitalist world. But he saw in the Soviet Union's entry into it a means to struggle against imperialist wars by further isolating Germany and Japan, and by organizing resistance to the warmongers within the League itself.

Meanwhile, the search for a formula for Soviet behavior in the event of a war or possible revolutionary outbreaks appears to have continued within the Politburo. A revealing statement on these issues which Stalin made as far back as 1925, and which appears actually to have developed into the main guiding line of Soviet policy, came to light only recently. It was published for the first time in 1947 in the seventh volume of Stalin's collected works. It emphasizes the pre-eminence of the Red Army over any revolutionary force in the West, and preference for a wait-and-see attitude in the event of a future imperialist war.

> The preconditions for war [Stalin said in a debate over defence expenditure] are getting ripe. War may become inevitable, of course not to-

[8] J. Stalin, *Leninism, Selected Writings*, New York, 1942, pp. 302ff.

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morrow or the next day, but in a few years. . . . I suppose that the forces of the revolutionary movement in the west are great; that they grow; that they will grow; and that they may overthrow the *bourgeoisie* here and there. That is true. But it will be very difficult for them to hold their ground. . . . The problem of our army, of its strength and readiness, will inevitably arise in connexion with complications in the countries that surround us. . . . This does not mean that in any such situation we are bound in duty to intervene actively against anybody. . . . The banner of peace remains our banner as of old. But, if war begins, we shall hardly have to sit with folded arms. We shall have to come out, but we ought to be the last to come out. And we should come out in order to throw the decisive weight on the scales, the weight that should tilt the scales.[9]

It is not too far back to remember that this was indeed the premise on which Stalin acted at the beginning of World War II. This was his rationale for concluding a pact with Hitler. There is no evidence to refute the assertion that he actually did hope to "throw decisive weight on the scales" at a time when the two imperialist rivals, Germany and her Western opponents, had nearly consumed each other. Hitler's attack on Russia, however, dashed this hope.

IV

The German attack on Russia automatically transformed an "imperialist" and consequently "unjust" war into a war of "liberation." Faced with the threat of annihilation, the former antagonists of the "imperialist" and "socialist" camps joined hands in the Grand Alliance for the purpose of achieving common objectives. Ideological differences were for the moment overshadowed, although not totally superseded, by the more urgent task of quashing a mortal enemy. The termination of hostilities almost immediately, and to all intents and purposes immediately, brought the period of collaboration to an end, revealing underneath it a persistent and unbreachable ideological chasm.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the alliance was patently a temporary expedient and, steeped as the Soviet leaders are in Communist ideology, they could have imputed no different motives to their "imperialist" allies. While public opinion in the West

[9] Translation as quoted in Deutscher, *op.cit.*, p. 411.

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wishfully hoped for a fundamental change in the Soviet Union's attitude toward world problems, while the possibility of prolonged cooperation with Russia as just another great power was cherished as a hope of peace for mankind, to Stalin and company the end of hostilities marked the starting point of a new phase in the era of "imperialism." In their view, the continuity of historical development had not been interrupted. This was still the epoch of "imperialism" with its inevitable contradictions, with the inevitable hostility between the "capitalist" and "socialist" camps.

The war had hardly been won when from Mikhail Kalinin, the late president of the Soviet Union, came words of sober warning.

> But even now, after the greatest victory known to history, we cannot for one minute forget the basic fact that our country remains the one socialist state in the world. . . . The victory achieved does not mean that all dangers to our state structure and social order have disappeared. Only the most concrete, most immediate danger, which threatened us from Hitlerite Germany, has disappeared. In order that the danger of war may really disappear for a long time, it is necessary to consolidate our victory.[10]

In February 1946, Stalin himself forcefully reiterated his faith in the theses of "capitalist encirclement" and the inevitability of war under capitalism.

> It would be a mistake to believe that the second world war broke out accidentally or as a result of mistakes . . . actually the war came about as an inevitable result of the development of international economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism. Marxists have repeatedly explained that the capitalist system of world economy contains the elements of a general crisis and armed conflicts, that consequently the development of international capitalism in our time takes place not peacefully and evenly but through crises and war catastrophes.[11]

Historic continuity of the struggle between the two camps was not only reaffirmed, but from the Soviet viewpoint the immediate postwar period was precisely the one in which inherent hostility between the capitalist and socialist camps would have to be—on the basis of the laws of historical development—at its highest

[10] F. C. Barghoorn, "The Soviet Union between War and Cold War," *Annals*, American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 263 (May 1949), 4.

[11] *Pravda*, February 10, 1946.

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pitch. For the war in many countries undermined the stronghold of capitalism on its oppressed proletariat; it weakened the hold of "imperialism" on hundreds of millions of colonial peoples. The time for social and political upheaval, for the extension of the revolution, was at hand. The citadel of "socialism" which had existed in painful isolation for so many years was about to advance the frontiers of "socialism" beyond its borders into as many countries as possible in order to move closer to the "final victory." There was no time to waste in reaping the harvest of these favorable trends. The floodgates of social ferment would not stay open forever. A stabilization of capitalism was inherent in the laws of historical development and the colonial emancipating movement might go awry without proper guidance. All along the vast world front of social and political activity the Soviet Union would be pursuing aims diametrically opposed to those of its former Western Allies. If the Soviet Union entertained predatory aims—as it obviously did in relentlessly pursuing the extension of its influence over outlying territories, in imposing its brand of socialism on the countries of Eastern Europe—it imputed similar aims to the "imperialist" powers, whom at any rate it did not expect to witness the expansion of "socialism" with folded arms. Every defensive move on the part of the Western countries was interpreted as a confirmation of ingrained hostility to the Soviet Union; each time the attitude of the Western allies stiffened, new aggressive motives were imputed to them. Aggression, from the Soviet viewpoint, is axiomatic with "imperialist" powers and the more the objective position of capitalism deteriorates the more aggressive its gets. Now, from the Soviet vantage point, the "objective position" of the capitalist countries had deteriorated.

But while the strength of "capitalism" in general had deteriorated, the United States had obviously gained in prestige and power. The Pacific had, to all intents and purposes, become an American pond and the US position in Japan was an obvious impediment to Soviet expansionism, as was the precarious toehold of the United States in South Korea. In Europe the United States was obviously trying to revive Germany as a powerful ally of "imperialism." Moreover, US economic aid to Europe

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was serving not only to bolster European economies, but also to stave off an imminent economic crisis in the United States and thus to postpone the death rattle of the "imperialist camp."

This in broad outline appears to be the frame of mind of the Soviet leaders, based largely on their ideological preconceptions of a predetermined pattern of behavior on the part of "imperialist" powers. It explains the implacable hostility of the Soviet Union toward the United States, the calculated step-by-step alienation of public opinion friendly toward the USSR, the pilfering of "the reservoir of good will" of which Mr. Bundy speaks so eloquently.[12] Good will, in any event, is a tenuous and volatile commodity on the Soviet market, and the good will of the "real rulers of America," of the "Wall Street bankers and industrialists," cannot be bought anyway. In exchange for good will, possibly certain very tangible material conquests, the extension of Communist rule to one or another area of the world, might have to be sacrificed. The exchange hardly seems equitable to Stalin. A parallel might here be drawn with Stalin's attitude toward world revolution in the early twenties. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Socialism in Russia was then far more attractive than the promise of revolution elsewhere. The extension of Communist control to Poland or Czechoslovakia or China now is worth more than all the good will in the world.

V

In Europe, the revolution—Stalin style—cold, calculated, and methodical, was carried forward to the border of advancing Soviet troops and there it stopped. Within this area, at arm's length from the Kremlin, through a mixture of orthodox revolutionary strategy and tactics, and real or apparent threat of Soviet intervention, several small nations were slowly remolded in the image of Russian socialism. The revolution had lost all aspects of spontaneity. It had become a controlled hothouse affair, in which most if not all the variables were held in check. This was the sort of thing Stalin liked best.

Beyond the limits of the area controlled by the Red Army,

12 McGeorge Bundy, "The Test of Yalta," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVII (July 1949), 618.

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Communist parties also revived Leninist political strategy and made as if to conquer political power. But their initial successes were not followed up and soon the tide turned against them. It is and for some time to come must remain a matter of speculation whether the Soviet Union viewed developments in France and Italy with equanimity, or whether, as some suggest, it actually betrayed the Western Communist parties. The only hint from Soviet sources comes indirectly through the Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence, in which the services of the French and Italian Communist parties to the revolution are evaluated (by the Soviet Union) as greater than the contributions of the Yugoslav Communists. It is, of course, necessary to remember the context within which this assertion was put forth. But the crucial point is that the lesser actual success of the French and Italian parties is attributed to the fact that "Unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render . . . assistance to [them]."[13] The revolutionary significance of the Red Army is once again reaffirmed. The assertion that the French and Italian Communist parties could not come to power without Soviet armed assistance may in fact correspond to the truth, but the question remains unanswered whether the Soviet Union, always wary of independent foci of power within the Communist camp, actually wanted them to come to power without the presence of Soviet armed forces.[14]

The most coveted prize in Europe remained Germany. It is undeniable that the Soviet Union fervently desired a united Germany and a quick withdrawal of Allied occupation forces. In this manner, acting from the Soviet-bolstered Communist stronghold in the East, Stalin hoped to bring Germany under Soviet control and then, having established a contiguous zone of Soviet influence, to extend the revolution to the rest of Western Europe.

The unwillingness of the Western Allies, led by the United States, to facilitate the implementation of Soviet plans, forced Stalin to accept the limitation of Soviet influence to the confines of the Eastern Zone, and to establish the status quo on a more

13 *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute: Text of the Published Correspondence*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1948, p. 51.

14 For a discussion of this problem see M. S. Handler, "The New Pattern of Soviet Aggression," *New York Times Magazine*, October 1, 1950, p. 32.

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or less permanent basis by creating the Eastern German People's Republic, an event which he hailed as "the turning point in the history of Europe."[15]

In the meantime, trouble brewed in the Kremlin's own back yard. The Yugoslav Communists refused to become satellites, and insisted on the maintenance of some sort of relation with the Soviet Union that suspiciously resembled the time-honored but discredited notion of free association of nations under Communist auspices. Thus an independent focus of power within the Communist camp sprang up, a dreaded occurrence from Stalin's point of view which must have further confirmed his long-standing suspicion of foreign Communists and increased his dependence on the Soviet army as a reliable revolutionary force, in preference to foreign Communist parties. The ideological implications of Tito's defiance are easily perceived. A number of independent foci of power—even if bound by the fraternal bond of Communist ideology—are incompatible with the hierarchical and monolithic concept of the organization of power which has become ingrained in the Soviet Union. The more time that elapsed between the Russian Revolution and successful revolutions elsewhere, the more authoritative the Soviet attitude became toward the world revolutionary movement, the more ingrained became the belief that Communism could be achieved—nay, must be achieved—only through the Soviet Union. In the view of the Soviet leaders, the cumulative experience of Russian socialism and the lone battles it fought on behalf of the world revolution gave it unchallengeable prerogatives for directing the world revolution, and for demanding the loyalty of foreign Communists to the Soviet Union first and to their own countries second. Tito's attitude challenged these prerogatives. Hence his excommunication as a heretic.

The purges which have followed in Eastern Europe testify to Stalin's wariness of further "ideological" deviations and his determination to apply preventive rather than merely curative measures.

[15] This, of course, does not mean that the Soviet Union has abandoned hope and effort to reunite Germany under "proper" conditions.

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As the advance of "socialism" in Europe was brought to a halt, Soviet attention appeared to shift to Asia. The shift was more apparent than real and was occasioned by the imminence of the final victory of the Chinese Communists, both because it opened up the possibility of quick additional conquests, of consolidating Communist power in a large sector of the Asiatic continent, and because the definitive settlement of relations between Russian and Chinese Communists undoubtedly required more attention and skill than had similar enterprises in Eastern Europe. Early in 1950 a Chinese-Soviet friendship treaty was finally signed. Aside from its published provisions, little is known about it. The unusual length of Mao Tse-tung's sojourn in Moscow gave rise to rumors of dissensions between him and Stalin. The rumors so far have remained unconfirmed. But with the consolidation of Communist victory in China the entire Asiatic front seemed to go into more feverish action. Its culmination was the attack by North Korean forces on the Republic of South Korea on June 25, 1950.

Behind the attack on South Korea undoubtedly loomed a sense of urgency to bring Asia within the Communist fold. For, much as happened in Europe, preparations for stiffening resistance against Communist infiltration in Asia cast an ominous light on Soviet expansionist aims. Korea may have been chosen as the starting point for the rapid consolidation of power in Asia because of its relative strategic and economic importance both to Russia and to China. In the choice of methods by which to bring Korea under Communist rule, the element of timing may have played a decisive role. Attempts at mere Communist infiltration by means of political and social unrest and agitation would at any rate have taken a long time. Moreover, weak as the South Korean defenses were, the United States was probably considered sufficiently on guard and certainly capable of suppressing by police measures any Communist attempt at seizure of power short of a lightning attack by a well-prepared army. The alacrity of the US and UN response to this challenge and the skill of UN military forces imposed a revision in the plans of the Communist high command, the results of which are now unfolding in Korea.

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VI

One of the axiomatic features of Leninist revolutionary ideology is the utilization of any means whatever for the furtherance of the Communist cause. Thus, in its struggle against imperialism, the Soviet Union feels free to resort to a far greater variety of weapons than the repertoire of any non-Communist country might conceivably include. In addition to the main lines of expansion in Europe and in Asia, the Soviet Union has resorted to direct diplomatic pressure (Turkey, Iran), to threats of armed intervention (Iran), and to guerrilla warfare (Greece), as a means of achieving its objectives.

It has felt free to create disturbances behind enemy lines by galvanizing the various national Communist parties into action whenever needed.

It has launched a gigantic "peace campaign," a modified version of its prewar crusade for peace, designed to pit war-weary European populations against their respective governments, designed to play on the sentiments of ill-guided "liberals," to undermine popular will to resist aggression, and thus to further Soviet aggressive undertakings. This is the sphere in which the Soviet Union has sought good will in the most ignominious manner, not in the sphere of official relations with other countries. This is the sphere where it hoped to recoup whatever good will it had lost by its intransigence, and in this endeavor it has based its campaign on the simple postulate of the advertising executive whose only and eminently successful method is repetition *ad nauseam*. Love that soap! Love that peace![16]

Likewise, the Soviet Union has used the United Nations as an international forum of propaganda, and occasionally as an effective weapon for disrupting, confusing, and delaying concerted international action and constructive efforts at peace. Despite the pious assertions of Messrs. Molotov, Vyshinsky, Gro-

[16] The nature of the Soviet peace campaign is perhaps most sharply defined by the following excerpt from the "Program of the Comintern": "There is a glaring contradiction between the imperialists' policy of piling up armaments and their hypocritical talk about peace. There is no such contradiction, however, between the Soviet government's preparations for defense and for revolutionary war and a consistent peace policy." *International Press Correspondence*, VIII, No. 84 (November 28, 1928), 1590.

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myko, and Malik regarding the Soviet Union's genuine desire for collective security, the only evidence the Soviet Union has given of wanting collective security was when it wanted to prevent collective international action against itself or one of its satellites.

Its attitude toward the United Nations is not basically different from what it was toward the League. For the UN is still an organization made up preponderantly of "imperialist" countries and their stooges. The Soviet Union still feels hopelessly outclassed, but it stays in the organization because leaving it would mean the loss of a world platform of propaganda. Instead, it chooses the way of boycotting meetings whenever that seems advantageous. These tactics are built on Lenin's analysis of the value of participation "even in reactionary parliaments."

The Soviet Union's stubborn insistence on its veto right, its vitriolic outbursts against any attempt at upsetting Great Power unanimity—as at the Paris Peace Conference—are based on the fact that only unanimity is considered a sufficient safeguard against the danger that "reactionary imperialist groups" will use the UN or any international conference as a means of isolating the Soviet Union and its satellites. Unanimity, in turn, in the Soviet vocabulary implies universal agreement with its views.

VII

The methods and means by which Soviet influence has been extended beyond the frontiers of the USSR raise the question whether this enterprise can still be considered under the heading of world revolution or if perhaps imperialism, in a conventional non-Marxist sense of the word, might not be a more apt designation.

It has been said that the antagonism shown by the Soviet Union toward its wartime allies was nothing more or less than the customary falling-out among temporary partners after the completion of their common task. It is consequently argued that the developments following World War II can be as easily explained by reference to power politics as to ideological considerations.

This contention cannot be categorically refuted, for it is diffi-

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cult to distinguish between the outward appearance of actions undertaken for power motives alone and those impelled by ideological motives. Traditionally, however, power politics devoid of ideological foundations has had a self-limiting quality. It has been characterized by fluidity and periodic changes in power alignments. It has been used to contravene policies and to contain opposing or potentially menacing states, but not to threaten their very existence. None of these criteria fit Soviet foreign policy, which has been predicated on the extinction of non-Communist states rather than on their containment. The Soviet Union has utilized power politics in the international sphere in the same manner that Communist parties have utilized it in the national domain, i.e., as a means toward the establishment of unilateral Communist hegemony. The Soviet Union has been as little *koalitionshähig* in the international sphere as Communist parties have been on the domestic scene.

If this is only negative proof of the existence of other than power political motives behind Soviet foreign policy, more positive evidence can be gleaned from surveying Soviet activities during the past thirty-four years. They reveal a surprising continuity of tactics and aims. The Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the unfolding of bilateral relations with "bourgeois" countries, and the general tone of Soviet literature on foreign policy during the more heroic stage of the Revolution when ideological considerations were certainly paramount, are strikingly similar to current Soviet behavior.

This is not to say that the original concept of the world revolution has been maintained intact. Indeed, under the impact of a concatenation of objective world conditions, subjective preferences on the part of Soviet leaders, and the passage of time, the world revolution has changed profoundly in substance, form, and direction.

The failure of spontaneous revolutionary outbreaks in advanced industrial countries and the ensuing long isolation of the Soviet Union as the only base of world Communism necessarily entailed far-reaching changes in the concept and implementation of the world revolution. The development and perfection of

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foreign policy was one of them. Soviet leaders accepted foreign policy as an indispensable means of operation from the moment they became heads of a state which was forced to take its place in the international community. They then proceeded to convert diplomacy—or foreign policy, if you like—into an essential weapon of the world revolution. But the mere recourse to foreign policy as a means of spreading the world revolution implied considerable conformity with Czarist modes of operation. For the over-all problems of the international community remain essentially unchanged, and the security of the home base of the revolution depends on the very same strategic considerations as did that of Imperial Russia. The amalgamation of revolutionary and imperialist tenets follows.

Other consequences of the long isolation of the Soviet Union have been: a growing identification of the welfare of world Communism with that of the USSR (in the last analysis, it is more important to protect the existing base of the revolution than its non-existent branches); the growth of prerogative on the part of the USSR vis-à-vis the international Communist movement; and the transplantation of Soviet methods and organization—nay, of the essentials, and in many cases even of the petty features of the Soviet social system—to countries more recently brought into the "socialist" fold. All this profoundly modifies the substance of the world revolution.

Its form has changed insofar as it has come to depend largely on Soviet military power. Civil war as a means of seizing power seems to have become a tenuous proposition in "advanced countries" where the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling regime is usually sufficient to defeat popular risings—even if they could be galvanized into action on a sufficiently large scale, which in itself is doubtful. Thus, the extension of the world revolution becomes identified with the extension of Soviet power. This implies the spread of the revolution contiguously with Soviet or Soviet-controlled territory, leaving it indistinguishable in form from Czarist imperialist military ventures.

Finally, it has become clear during the past years that backward countries are far more susceptible to social revolution than

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more advanced countries. In a backward country political institutions are relatively less stable; the military situation is less weighted against the insurgents if in fact it is not in their favor; there is a considerable amount of elemental revolutionary fervor and the inarticulateness of the masses makes it relatively easy for a small number of Communists to assume leadership of the overall revolutionary movement and to exploit its inchoate character to their own ends.

In this sense, the Marxian prophecy has indeed been turned upside down. The focus of the world revolution has shifted from the advanced countries to the colonial and semi-colonial areas of the East.

The emergence of the East as a decisive revolutionary area which "in the final analysis" will assure the "complete victory of Socialism" had been foreshadowed by Lenin.[17]

Stalin carefully nurtured this notion. He developed a theory of colonial revolutions which before him was lacking in the Marxist-Leninist repertoire. His emphasis on the importance of colonial revolutions in the world-wide struggle against "imperialism" stands out among other appraisals of the Communist struggle for supremacy.

Among other things, the tensions between Russian Communism and at least a segment of Western European Communists, and the general inferiority of Russia vis-à-vis Western Europe with its potentially explosive implications for the Russian Communists, may well have facilitated a shift of attention toward the East as the area where, in the eyes of the Soviet leaders, the future of Communism lies.

The necessity of developing policies according to pragmatic needs and situations over a long period of time is bound to weaken and eventually destroy any rigid theoretical framework built on a priori value judgments. In the long run, if the Soviet Union is forced to continue operating in a heterogeneous world community, the world revolutionary design might wither away. Power politics might supplant ideology as the moving force of

[17] V. I. Lenin, "Better Less, but Better," *The Essentials of Lenin*, London, 1947, II, 852ff.

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foreign policy, and the preservation of power might become the sole motive of the Soviet elite, to the exclusion of the export of their social system. This situation, however, is not yet at hand. To date, Soviet leaders have found it possible to adjust ideology to the changing requirements of the time. They have willingly sacrificed secondary elements of their theoretical repertoire, keeping the central elements intact. Under the impact of historical circumstances, the world revolution has become a more workmanlike and pedestrian project than its progenitors had imagined; it has not been abandoned as a practical aim.

The spread of Communism has become identical with the extension of Soviet influence. The extension of Soviet influence in turn has amalgamated both imperialist and world revolutionary elements. By and large, it has been imperialist in form and world revolutionary in content, the imperialist ingredient being more apparent in Europe and the world revolutionary in Asia.

VIII

By the Communist timetable of the historical process, the last war moved the antagonistic elements of the "imperialist" and "socialist" camps closer to the final and inevitable showdown. In Molotov's words, "A situation has arisen in which the imperialists, in unleashing a new world war, will inevitably encounter on the part of peace-loving peoples, and of the entire democratic camp, such universal resistance as will lead not merely as heretofore to the defeat of some or other aggressive powers but to the destruction of the entire system of world imperialism."

The steady din of invective hurled against the United States since 1945 has reached unprecedented proportions. The antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States, which is, of course, imputed entirely to United States hostility toward the "Socialist Fatherland," is being systematically built up to the point where it is about to become, if it has not already become, dogma.

Though this represents a postwar development, it has its foundation in Marxism-Leninism, where America is designated as the most capitalist of the capitalist countries, the country where

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monopoly capital has reached its highest degree of development. American leadership of the "imperialist camp" is predetermined and the entire Soviet ideological and propaganda apparatus has been hard at work establishing the *basic* nature of American hostility to the Soviet Union. This effort is aptly summarized in the preface of a study issued in 1949 under the title, "The United States, active organizer and participant in the armed intervention against Soviet Russia between 1918 and 1920."[18]

> [To study] the role of the United States in organizing armed intervention against Soviet Russia [in 1918-20] is a serious [matter] not only in seeking to learn about the past but from the point of view of better understanding . . . the events . . . following World War II, when the United States emerged as the leader of the imperialist camp against peace, democracy and socialism . . . when [it] openly announced [its] interventionist, expansive policy . . . the aim of which is the world rule of American imperialism.

In the historical continuum, 1949 was seen as a year of "ever franker preparations for another war . . . by the overweening American imperialists [who] doomed by history have lost all reason. They are frankly banking on another world holocaust." For 1950 "ever more militant struggles by the workers . . . against the bankrupt rulers of capitalism [and of] the peoples for peace against the criminal schemes of the warmongers" were foreseen.[19]

War indeed broke out in 1950 but, of course, not on the initiative of the "warmongers." The next step in the chain of events remains inscrutable. Theoretically, a complete turnabout in tactics is well within basic Communist ideology. "To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, prolonged, and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilize the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and compromise with possible (even though transitory, unstable, vacillating, and conditional) allies—is not this ridiculous in the extreme?" asked Lenin. And later in

[18] A. Berëzkin, *SShA—Aktivnyi Organizator i Uchastnik Voennoi Interventsii Protiv Sovetskoi Rossii (1918-1920); Gospolitizdat*, 1949. (For this work the author was awarded a Stalin prize in 1951.)

[19] *New Times*, No. 1, January 1, 1950.

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the same work he said: "The strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism must be combined with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, to manoeuvre, to make agreements, zigzags, retreats. . . ."[20] Stalin has taken these words to heart. The resulting flexibility, if not opportunism, of Soviet policies has served to bewilder the world. But it is well to remember that retreat and attack, war and peace, are considered by the Soviet leaders merely as different phases of the unrelenting struggle for world hegemony. "Revolutionary war of the proletarian dictatorship is but a continuation of revolutionary peace policy 'by other means.' "[21] Compromise—as a lasting solution—is unknown to Communists in national as well as international matters.

More concretely, the foregoing analysis permits the projection of two possible dominant trends in Soviet foreign policy: continued aggression in Asia in order to bring the entire continent under Communist rule, coupled with the utmost effort to postpone or avoid an armed showdown in Europe or a large-scale war anywhere.

As much as Stalin has talked about the inevitability of a final showdown between "capitalism" and "socialism," he has actually been more than eager to steer clear of major engagements that would measurably disrupt the stability of the Soviet regime. A Pyrrhic victory is the last thing Stalin wants. A direct attack on Europe today might be exactly that, for it would certainly entail immediate retaliation against Russia. Moreover, the administrative problem of absorbing Europe into the Communist fold at present may still seem too great to be undertaken lightly.

Stalin's revolutionary design therefore may call for the conquest of the "capitalist West" by encirclement rather than by direct assault. This design might be predicated on the following considerations: Europe in its present frame of mind is unwilling to fight over remote places such as Korea and the like. This gives the Soviet Union an opportunity to consolidate Asia. To be sure, the risk of war is involved, but it is a calculated and probably controllable risk so long as Europe can be kept divided from the

[20] V. I. Lenin, *"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, New York, 1934, pp. 52 and 76.

[21] *International Press Correspondence, loc.cit.*, p. 1590.

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United States on this issue. The fall of Asia would deprive the West of a much-needed market and of raw material supplies, and by squeezing it into an ever-narrower sphere of economic activity would—in Marxian terms—inevitably hasten its decomposition. Strategically, the fall of Asia would open the back door to the Near East and expose that area to a Soviet pincer move, thus largely obviating the necessity of forcing the straits. Moreover, the loss of all of Asia to Communism is likely further to reduce European morale. Confronted with overwhelming odds, Europe may surrender to slavery rather than face annihilation.

The obvious answer to the problem posed by Soviet expansionism is to make the prospect of future aggression both in Europe and Asia too costly to be worth undertaking. This, of course, is much easier said than done. In addition, however, a more insidious problem than that of aggression in the immediate future also presents itself. It entails coping with the manifold psychological, political, social, and economic problems arising from a more or less protracted period of military preparedness. So far, we have been preoccupied with efforts at meeting aggression and have given only perfunctory attention to the serious difficulties with which we are likely to be faced in our dealings with our European allies and ultimately even at home in the event that a showdown does not materialize while a state of preparedness is maintained. Obviously, we cannot even remotely consider relenting in our effort to stop or prevent aggression. Continued armed preparedness is and will remain an indispensable ingredient if not the only effective means in our dealings with Russia. At the same time, we must now begin to think of bolstering our defenses along the second front—call it the moral front, for want of a better name—which is opened and exposed to danger by the very maintenance of armed preparedness. To meet the twofold task confronting us we will need to deploy our greatest ingenuity. But only by holding on both fronts can we expect to contain the world revolutionary appetites of the Soviet Union and its partners and hope that "time and change," as Mr. Kennan puts it,[22] will eventually temper antagonisms.

[22] See Introduction to Richard P. Stebbins *et al.*, *The United States in World Affairs, 1949*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1950, p. viii.

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THE POLITICAL PARTITIONING OF OUR WORLD: AN ATTEMPT AT ANALYSIS

By JEAN GOTTMANN

IN a previous article we attempted to examine the intricate net in which geography and the study of international relations are interwoven.[1] The basic problem with which we dealt was the partitioning of the space available to men. Our conclusion was that this partitioned, differentiated space is organized: by studying its organization, geography can describe and analyze a network of relations in space which is both useful and at times indispensable to an understanding of international relations.

Further study of the general problem of the division of our world throughout the ages has led us to a new angle of approach based on the ideas elaborated previously. A more theoretical and general method appears possible for an analysis of the fundamental issue: the political partitioning of the world and its constant fluidity. Many important and useful studies have contributed to our understanding of such elusive notions as the power, the resources, and the wealth of nations. But to those phenomena which occur and develop in space, which are largely measured by spatial effects such as conquest, zones of influence, expansion of foreign trade, and so forth, few approaches have been made by means of spatial relations.

Many theorists, however, have pointed out the overwhelming importance of such considerations as position: great routes are controlled by a small number of well chosen positions; the whole global system of maritime navigation has been dominated at times by the powers established at certain points—straits, isthmuses, river estuaries, and the like. The value of position is still a highly variable and elusive notion. The fact that it can be de-

[1] "Geography and International Relations," *World Politics*, III, No. 2 (January 1951), 153-73.

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fined only in space and with the aid of a system of coordinates reveals how close many historians, strategists, and political scientists have been coming to analysis by means of spatial relations. To arrive at the central idea of our method, let us investigate briefly the main characteristics of the space with which we are dealing, and of the relations established or developed within it.

Our political world is a limited one: it extends only over the space accessible to men. Accessibility is the determining factor: areas to which men have no access do not have any political standing or problems. The sovereignty of the moon has no importance whatsoever today, because men cannot reach it nor obtain anything from it. The Antarctic had no political standing before navigators began going there, but since it was made accessible by its discoverers, the icy continent has been divided into portions like an apple pie—and all these portions are distinct political compartments in which a number of international incidents have occurred. When the first explorers land on the moon, the earth's satellite will pass from the field of astronomy to the geography textbooks and lunar political problems will appear and grow steadily. As, with improved techniques, men got within their reach the riches of the ocean's depths beyond territorial waters, the sovereignty and legislation of these abysmal spaces became a matter of concern for political authorities; new partitions were legally established deep in the sea and in the ground beneath it.

Partitioning thus results from accessibility; all the vast globe was partitioned as it was discovered and mapped. The political units or territories, as they emerged, acquired a "position in space" which became and remained a major characteristic of each unit. A position is not a simple thing, easily describable. The latitude and longitude of the points forming a territory provide a mathematical means of placing it on a map; these coordinates also indicate the relation of a position to the equator, the poles, the meridian zero of Greenwich or Paris, according to the mapmaker's choice. But there are a great many other relations, definable according to other systems of coordinates, that describe a

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position in space. These relations are sometimes determined by physical features, such as seacoasts, rivers, and mountains. All these features are important chiefly as they influence the accessibility of the position.

Much more numerous are the features of a position which result from the choices made by its inhabitants as to the relations they want to maintain with the outside; and some features also result from the attitudes of the peoples outside toward that particular territory and the local inhabitants. The system of relations is highly complicated because *every position in our partitioned space can be termed unique.* This means that no one position has much chance of having a network of relations with the outside similar to the network of relations of another position. There could not be two positions exactly alike. There is a simple mathematical reason for this: given one point or area in a limited space of definite shape, is there another point or area the relations of which to other points of the space considered would be similar to the system of relations of the first chosen point or area? The answer depends on the uniformity of the space considered and on the elements of symmetry with which it is endowed. When the elements of symmetry are few and the elements differentiating that space many, as is the case for our earth, the probability of finding two similar positions appears practically negligible.[2]

The uniqueness of its territory's position provides each country with a unique historical background. We have arrived at this statement by simple deduction, starting from the existence of a differentiated and partitioned space available to mankind. It is the people and not the territory of a country who establish the network of outside relations, who choose among the diverse facilities offered by physical conditions the way that they intend to follow. It is the people also who record the past and choose the form in which this historical background is conveyed to growing generations. The uniqueness of a "geographical position" is indeed essentially a political product, which means a work of man—all

[2] We are indebted to Professor Paul Montel of the Sorbonne and to Dr. Maurice Levy of the Institute for Advanced Study for discussing this point with us.

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the more so as it is the accessibility of space to man which causes its political partitioning and makes of it organized, differentiated space.

Relations between one compartment of this space and the others cannot exist unless there is movement across the limits of the territory considered. We have already noted in the earlier article the decisive importance of traffic, trade, transportation, and all the different exchanges existing between countries to an understanding of how closely geography and international relations are intertwined. The extent of accessibility is determined by an analysis of the existing status of traffic, communications, transportation, and trade. The French language describes this set of movements across space by the very useful word *circulation*—which is without an actual equivalent in English. It encompasses all the variety, the complexity, and the fluidity of the exchanges developing throughout the world. "Movement" seems too vague and general to cover the flow of people, armies, material goods, capital, messages, and ideas across the space open to men's activities, in all directions and for all purposes. For the sake of brevity and for lack of a better word in English, let us use the expression "movement factor" to describe all these processes. It is as a major influence in shaping the value of a position and the external relations of an area that the concept is necessary to the purpose of this paper.

Analysis of the movement factor as it applies to a position, whether point or area, helps us to understand easily the motives and imperatives of the policies and political problems focused on or emanating from that position. Movement, however, makes for fluidity and change. The life of relations between the various political units in the world produces constant changes in each of them: the briefest glance at history demonstrates how migration, travel, trade relations, evolution of transportation techniques, cultural relations, and so forth, have constantly brought about changes inside the countries participating in them. These changes inevitably create fluidity and instability in the comparative standing of these countries in terms of power, wealth, and resources.

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We understand better, therefore, why international relations have been in a state of turmoil throughout history.

If the movement factor has made for change and instability, it has always encountered an established order as well, favoring a certain pattern of flow and resisting change. What lies at the foundation of such resistance? Economic vested interests? That would be difficult to demonstrate: no actual economic interest can be proved theoretically to be developed to its full, ideal optimum. Even if such a marvel were achieved somewhere, it could not last, for the evolution of technique, financing, and politics would continue elsewhere in the world. An economic optimum is a relative situation, evolving with the flow of time and movement on earth.

An established order, however, normally has a tendency to defend itself, insofar as it is a structure within which those at the upper levels are afraid change may bring them to a different, less enjoyable level. Moreover, any social and political structure has some abstract values to preserve: those on which it is founded. Few political regimes have ever remained based on sheer force. Force may have often been used at critical moments—and with variable success—but it was always in the name and for the sake of some principle, however hypocritical it may have seemed at times.

The abstract strength of an existing order is rooted in the spirit of the nation or of the group of nations involved. "Spirit" is another difficult notion, the use of which may appear rather unscientific. What it signifies here is a psychological attitude resulting from a combination of actual events with beliefs deeply rooted in the people's mind. In our previous article we used the word "iconography" to describe the whole system of symbols in which a people believes. These symbols are many and varied. A national "iconography" in our sense encompasses the national flag, the proud memories of past history as well as the principles of the prevailing religion, the generally accepted rules of economics, the established social hierarchy, the heroes quoted in the schools, the classic authors, and so forth and so on. A national iconography usually stops at a boundary; the frontier line is in

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grave danger when such is not the case. For any group of people, the iconography is the common cherished heritage. It is a powerful factor and it fights for stability and resists change, except for short periods in every nation's life when claims for change—i.e., for expansion—are raised, supported by a special interpretation of the iconography.

We have now brought to the fore two main factors or groups of factors—movement and iconography—which oppose one another in the play of forces constantly shaping and reshaping the political map. The importance of both these factors was stressed a year ago in our article on geography and international relations. Subsequent study has been devoted to a search for the ways and means by which these two factors combine themselves in order to bring about the political partitioning of space.[3]

It seemed to us worth while to go back far enough into the past to attempt an analysis of this play of forces at a time when partitioning was even less clear and politics more primitive than they have grown to be. Some studies by specialists of pre-history interested in the early establishment of routes of traffic provided us with an invaluable lead. It appears that early man liked to travel a great deal, but that he was afraid of leaving behind him a track which could be followed. To camouflage his itinerary and still be able to find his way back, he usually followed the paths of migrant animals. In every case, he would choose, of course, the path of those animals with which he was most familiar. But grave danger threatened him—or so at least he thought—at the intersection of his track with any other followed by animals or men with which he was less familiar. The crossroad seems to have been one of the earliest and perhaps one of the most permanent fears of mankind. For it is alarming for anyone who knows his own weakness to contemplate whom he might be meeting at the next crossroad—friend or foe, weaker or stronger than he.

At every crossroad the traveler still feels some need of protec-

[3] These problems have been studied at greater length in the recently published volume, Jean Gottmann, *La politique des états et leur géographie*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1952. For the study of prehistoric routes, we are much indebted to the materials supplied by Professor A. Varagnac of Paris.

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tion. The modern motorist gets such protection from the red and green lights and the number of signs and regulations controlling traffic at intersections. But a long time elapsed before such a traffic system was devised. It does not yet exist, in fact, on the larger part of the earth's surface.

In almost all countries settled for a long time, it is customary to find monuments at the crossroads. Often these are religious in nature: chapels, or simply monumental crosses, are still frequently placed at the crossroads of Europe and Latin America; in Moslem countries, it is often the grave of a holy man, a Marabout, or even a stone endowed with religious significance. White and black stones in particular seem to have had an important significance for early man, and they have often been set up at places of meeting chosen for their accessibility. The Kaaba at Mecca is a huge black stone; and Mecca was an important center of caravan trade before Mohammed. The French pilgrimage center of Le Puy on the central plateau of France still has enframed inside the main stairway leading to the basilica a piece of stone known as the "Stone of Fevers," which popular belief has endowed with special curative powers. This stone is thought to have been there since prehistoric times. The region of Le Puy was apparently one of the main hubs of the trade routes through Central France in early times.

One could cite a great many examples of close association between the distribution of religious monuments and the early geography of trade and transportation. It is easy to understand why early travelers wished for a higher spiritual authority to protect them against their own fears and sometimes against the real possibility of danger at the crossroads. When political authority began to rise, one of its earliest and most imperative functions was to insure order along the main arteries of traffic. That so many castles were built in positions dominating navigable rivers, narrow passes in the mountains, or maritime straits was not only a matter of military strategy but also a means of controlling important routes of passage. The lord—and sometimes he was a bishop—would maintain order and insure safe travel and at the same time collect a fee or toll from the passing mer-

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chants. The more historians study the economics of past centuries, the more they perceive the growth of the complicated networks of tollhouses and monopoly regulations which have formed the backbone of the political organization of the spaces considered.

Thus, from the black stones, and later the crosses erected at the crossroads, to the highway policeman in white gloves directing traffic at an intersection, we find an unbroken thread woven through the history of practically every region of the world which shows how the movement factor and the local iconography combined to support the establishment of political authority over a certain area.

The fluidity of the political map shaped with the help of such complicated and varied forces may be easier to understand once a method of analysis is applied which follows these two determinant leads: what we have called the movement factor and the iconography. The geographer ought to add in conclusion that such an approach to the study of the forces and ways of evolution of political partitioning in the world need no longer be based heavily on the physical obstacles that nature has put in man's path. Physical geography has not worked only for division. The vast oceanic spaces which seem to break the continuity of land masses may well have provided the realm where man traveled and mixed the most easily and freely. The development of the traditions of freedom seems to have been associated with sea trade in a great many ways in history.

The real partitions, those which are the most stable and the least flexible, are in the minds of men. The worst barriers stem from the diversity of the historical past. This field of national psychologies is one of the most difficult and most delicate to study; that is probably why scholars of all kinds have tried so hard to go around it. An understanding of how iconography and movement combine to shape political authority and limit it in space may perhaps help in the further analysis of the world's partitioning.

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Review Articles

THE "POLICY SCIENCES": ASPIRATION AND OUTLOOK

By PAUL KECSKEMETI

Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, editors, *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1951, pp. xiv, 344. $7.50.

I

1. The idea of "policy science" is not a new one. In fact, it is organic to the Western tradition. Its first, incomparable formulation is found in Plato's *Republic*; policy, the Platonic Socrates says, can be reasonable and sound only if it is based upon the fullness of scientific insight and knowledge. According to the Platonic conception, it is not even enough to apply scientific knowledge, gathered by specialists, to practical policy problems which the rulers are to decide. Rather, the rulers themselves must acquire all the scientific knowledge needed to frame reasonable policy. The duality of the "expert adviser" and of the "decision-maker" who merely listens to him is implicitly rejected in the *Republic*. The ruler himself must be the knower. For the decisive thing is not knowledge in the abstract, knowledge as something impersonally available and ready to be picked up; it is knowledge conceived as the *quality of a soul*. According to the Platonic (and Aristotelian) view, knowledge is not an alien material "contained" in the mind, but the "form," the ideal essence of the mind itself, so that a mind that knows belongs to a different species than the mind that lacks knowledge. In acquiring knowledge, the mind becomes essentially transformed, it acquires a new form; this is the original meaning of the term "information." In its Platonic sense, then, the idea of "policy science" refers to the soul of the ruler, which must be the highest species of soul.

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2. We encounter another idea of "policy science" in Western Europe since the late Middle Ages, that is, since the inception of rational methods and techniques of government. In the Occident, "policy sciences" *par excellence* are law on the one hand, scientific statecraft on the other. Here, we no longer have to do with the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of knowledge as the "form" of a soul; knowledge has become something existing objectively, laid down in books, and freely transferable from one mind to the other. The difference between the knowing and the ignorant mind is, then, accidental rather than essential. But from a practical (or "pragmatic") point of view, this difference is still all-important. Knowledge is looked upon as an indispensable tool, the possession of which makes all the difference between effective and blundering, as well as between just and unjust, action. Thus, in the Occidental culture as shaped by the Renaissance, the "policy sciences" are still sciences which the rulers themselves must have at their command. The policy-maker must know law and statecraft. Rulers must be trained in the policy sciences.

This tradition had a long life. For European policy-makers down to the modern era, as well as for the founders of the American Republic and their immediate successors, it was still axiomatic that policy-makers had to be trained in law and statecraft. They themselves had to master the principles of rational administration and the maxims of good government.

The "policy sciences" of this period did not represent purely "factual" knowledge. They were frankly "normative" sciences; and they had to be, if the policy-makers themselves were to command and apply them in their daily work. Law and statecraft, the policy sciences of the Renaissance and the post-Renaissance period, differed essentially from theoretical natural science, even though the attempt to improve them by making them more similar to mathematical and natural sciences goes back to early times (it is sufficient to mention Spinoza in this connection). At any rate, principles of valuation, as distinct from fact-finding, are organic parts of the policy sciences of law and statecraft.

3. In our own time, however, the tradition of law and statecraft as the indispensable policy sciences making up the equip-

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ment of the policy-maker has evaporated. Several factors have contributed to this result; we may mention the following:

(a) Where policy control assumes a democratic form, a special training in the policy sciences can no longer be considered as an indispensable requirement in the selection of policy-makers. The democratic policy-maker is essentially a spokesman for group interests and beliefs rather than the master of a "craft." What he must have in order to be selected as spokesman is a suitable personality, a sufficient command of the technique of "selling" and self-projection, and instinctive identification with the beliefs, ideals, interests, and prejudices of sufficiently large and inclusive groups. This whole game, in which the stake is "being selected as spokesman," can be played by ear; mastery of the traditional policy sciences is certainly not needed to play it.

I do not suggest that policy-makers of the pre-democratic period were not "spokesmen" for group interests, or that policy-makers of the democratic era always lack training in the "policy sciences" of the Renaissance tradition; all I am saying is that such training was required of the former and no longer is of the latter.

(b) The modern concept of science. The moral conscience of modern man may or may not have become more latitudinarian. His intellectual conscience, however, has become, without a doubt, more exacting and squeamish. To be accepted as true beyond reasonable doubt, all beliefs now must pass far more rigorous tests than in the past. It follows from this that the traditional policy sciences have largely lost their claim to be regarded as representing "scientific" knowledge. For the increasingly rigorous critical standards applied to all propositions claiming recognition as "scientifically true" have corroded every belief that has a "normative" component. Science, it is felt, cannot warrant the acceptance or rejection of any normative position. Deductions from legal principles or maxims of statecraft may, therefore, be "valid" within a universe of discourse in which certain presuppositions are posited; but they cannot be accepted as scientific.

Propositions now recognized as scientific have two characteristics which are important in the present context. First, as already

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indicated, they are purely factual, devoid of any normative admixture. Second, they are the intellectual property of specialists. Nobody who is not a specialist can understand, let alone discover them.

These two features of "scientific" knowledge in the contemporary sense imply two things. First, nothing that the policy-maker himself "knows" can be science. Second, nothing that is "scientific" can be known by the policy-maker himself.

4. Does this mean that there can be no "policy sciences" in our age and society? Not necessarily. It only means that—if we share the contemporary position as outlined above—we must reject the concept of a "policy science" as knowledge possessed by the policy-maker as his own. Policy sciences, however, might still exist in another form—namely, in the shape of sciences developed by experts and put at the disposal of the policy-makers for the purposes of practical application.

For, indeed, the fact that scientific knowledge itself is considered as devoid of all normative and evaluative admixtures does not mean that scientific knowledge cannot be applied to practical ends. On the contrary, in the measure as science has become more rigorously "factual" and more specialized, its practical uses have gained enormously in scope as well as in reliability. The prestige of modern science is based above all on its technological applications which have changed human life and transformed the globe. The contemporary concept of "policy science" implies that purely factual and specialized knowledge of social phenomena, if "applied" by policy-makers, would bring about as great and salutary a transformation in the social and political field as the technological application of natural science did in the field of mastery over natural forces. No knowledge can be really "useful" unless it is first framed in purely factual terms, disregarding goals and values. It is only when we have built up our "theory" in completely disinterested terms that we can hope to build a really satisfactory "practice" on them. This is the paradox underlying the specifically modern concept of "policy science."

5. Let us see how this paradox works where it undoubtedly does work—in the technological application of natural science.

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The secret of the practical applicability of "pure" theory seems to lie in the fact that a complete inventory of connections among factual "causes" and "effects" in a certain field contains every realizable pair of "ends" and "means" which human beings may adopt. A theory, then, is applicable to the extent that those who want to employ "means" to attain "ends" are able to recognize and to pick out these "ends" and "means" from within a body of knowledge in which they are merely listed as "effects" and "causes" impartially, alongside a myriad other "effects" and "causes." In order to apply theory, we must be able to see the identity of what we entertain as "end" with what the theory predicts as "effect."

6. In order to develop a "policy science" that would duplicate the success achieved by technology, one would need, then, a "comprehensive" theory of human (individual and group) behavior, one that would cover all possible pairs of "causes" and "effects" in the specifically human, behavioral-cultural field. To apply this theory, we would just have to "specify" our ends in terms of the "effects" which the theory predicts. The "means" we have to choose would simply be the "causes" corresponding to these "effects," as spelled out by the theory.

According to the modern concept of "policy science," we must and can develop such a complete, comprehensive theory of behavior, and the question *how* we can do this is easily answered in principle, though it may be difficult in practice. The general principle is that a comprehensive theory of behavior can be constructed by following the same procedure that natural scientists have applied in constructing the comprehensive theory of the physical world. More specifically, the secret of success lies in analyzing human phenomena and the correlations prevailing among them in rigorously quantitative terms. For a quantifying treatment, based upon "measuring" the phenomena to be analyzed, alone ensures objectivity and reliability of the findings.

7. Obviously, even the most sanguine upholders of this idea of "policy science" do not expect the ultimate emergence of a comprehensive theory of behavior in the sense of a strictly deterministic causal pattern analogous to that of classical physics. But

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then, "strict" causality is no longer considered to hold even in the physical world; and if human phenomena can never be reduced to strict causality but always retain something indeterminate and unpredictable about them, this does not mean that they cannot be treated with the methods of natural science. On the contrary, duplication of the methods of natural science in the field of behavior would seem to *preclude* a hankering after strictly determined, Newtonian models, and prescribe, instead, a probabilistic approach, in keeping with the spirit of modern statistical physics. Our "causes" and "effects" will, then, not be specified in definite, absolute terms; rather, they will have to be stated as probabilities. The "quantifying," "measuring" approach will point toward the measurement of probability distributions. But this will still be good enough for the practical application of theory; after all, in physics, too, we have nothing better.

8. Many, both among scientists and in the general public, pin great hopes upon "policy science" conceived in this fashion. Science, and science alone, they believe, can "save us"; the present appalling state of the world is solely due to the fact that the scientific method has not yet been applied to the field of human behavior. This is due (they tend to argue) partly to a "cultural lag" (the prevalence of "pre-scientific habits of thought"), and partly to the sinister influence of "vested interests." We may mention George A. Lundberg and, more recently, Barbara Wootton among the exponents of this doctrine.

9. In the remainder of this article, I shall raise a few points that seem relevant to the assessment of the soundness of this concept of "policy science." The analysis will proceed in two steps. (a) First, I shall discuss the main methodological principle involved in the concept, namely, the idea that in order to construct a comprehensive theory of behavior, we must hew exclusively to the quantifying, measuring procedures employed in the natural sciences. (b) Second, I shall take up the problem of the relation of theory to practice in the social and political fields. My question will be whether a comprehensive theory of behavior—if and when developed—can serve to guide action in the same way as scientific technology does in its field.

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Obviously, no full-fledged treatment of these difficult questions is possible within the limits of an article; I shall merely touch upon a few high lights and present a few rather general (and, of course, tentative) conclusions.

II

1. In examining the first, methodological part of our problem, we can do nothing better than turn to the excellent collection of papers recently published in the series of Hoover Library Studies under the editorship of Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, entitled *The Policy Sciences.*

This is indeed no manifesto of the extreme "policy science" concept I have outlined, and neither the editors nor the other authors represented formulate utopian promises about the ultimate effects of the application of scientific method to problems of policy. The book covers a wide range of topics and methods; in fact, it deals, at least tangentially, with every sector of basic research in sociology, social psychology, and related fields of behavior study in the United States. Comprehensive surveys of research going on in a number of fields of specialization are contributed by leading exponents of that specialty; e.g., Clyde Kluckhohn writes about the "Study of Culture," Margaret Mead about the "Study of National Character," Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Allen H. Barton about "Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences," Edward A. Shils about the "Study of Primary Groups," and so on. Other articles take up a general methodological topic (e.g., Kenneth Arrow's paper on "Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences"), or deal with questions closer to the field of policy determination (Harold D. Lasswell on "World Organization and Society," Hans Speier on "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered"). Some of the authors, e.g., Kluckhohn, Mead, and Speier, draw upon insights developed in cultural, anthropological, clinical, and political research and field work to illuminate problems more or less immediately relevant to policy determination; Lasswell does the same in the substantive chapter he contributes on "World Organization." In these contributions, preoccupation with the methodological problem of applying "quan-

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tifying" techniques to the study of behavior is absent. But Lasswell's introduction to the volume, in which the concept of "policy science" is defined, strongly emphasizes this methodological principle, and many of the most important papers, dealing with basic research, are completely dominated by it. This is not surprising in a volume so representative of the nature of basic work in the behavior field; indeed, the principal effort of workers in this area in the United States is devoted to conquering for the social sciences the advantages inherent in measuring and quantifying.

2. Lasswell's concept of "policy science," while it calls for directing "all the resources of our expanding social sciences . . . toward the basic conflicts in our civilization which are so vividly disclosed by the application of scientific method to the study of personality and culture" (p. 8), stresses basic research rather than immediate application, in keeping with the principle inherent in the "policy science" concept outlined above, according to which we must have a comprehensive theory of behavior before we can put our knowledge to practical use. As he says:

> The policy approach is not to be confounded with the superficial idea that social scientists ought to desert science and engage full time in practical politics. Nor should it be confused with the suggestion that social scientists ought to spend most of their time advising policy-makers on immediate questions. . . . The basic emphasis of the policy approach . . . is upon the fundamental problems of man in society, rather than upon the topical issues of the moment (pp. 7f.).

These "fundamental problems," I take it, are, however, not those which loom largest in the minds of people beset by the crisis of our time, but rather those which are most pregnant with theoretical significance, whatever their apparent momentousness is.

3. It follows from this that, at the present stage, the emphasis must be on the perfection of the tool rather than upon the delivery of the final goods. Methodological self-examination necessarily claims a great deal of attention. To all authors writing about methodological problems in this volume, the conviction is common that the social sciences neither need nor can have methods fundamentally different from those used in the natural

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sciences. The question is not so much *what* the basic methods should be as *how* the only possible method can be applied.[1] Lasswell is even impatient of this way of putting the question: he expresses the hope that "social and psychological scientists will be sufficiently sure of themselves to take method for granted and to put the emphasis on the choice of significant problems on which to apply and evolve method" (p. 7). It is self-understood that the method is the one applied in the natural sciences: the quantitative method. The "stress" put upon this method is "amply vindicated"; the "battle for method is won" (*ibid.*).

4. The papers making up the body of the volume, however, fail to reflect such a complete absence of methodological difficulties as is postulated here; nor is it evident that the magic word "quantitative" effectively disposes of all problems. On the contrary, the impression one gets from the whole array of extremely careful and competent discussions of research techniques and methods presented by the various authors is that, in the social sciences, purely quantitative research is impossible; all models and theories involve a combination of quantitative and non-quantitative elements. (Lasswell himself explicitly acknowledges this "combination" [p. 9].)

5. For instance, in the paper on "The Person: Subject and Object of Science and Policy," by Ernest R. Hilgard and Daniel Lerner, we do read the statement that "in our time, method has come to mean quantification" (p. 23). But the "quantification" referred to here is quantitative treatment of *verbal* material, that is, material secured in interviews. And it is clear that while we may try to "measure" the content of any flow of communications in many respects and dimensions, the ultimate data, the symbols themselves, are not *measured* but *interpreted*. Before I can subject a communication to quantitative analysis of whatever sort, I first must understand it, and this I can do only as a person who shares a universe of communication with the source and acknowledges the same *rules* for communication that the source does.

In all social science, no matter how "quantified" the correlations are that we establish among phenomena, the basic data

[1] Cf. Hilgard and Lerner, in *The Policy Sciences*, p. 28.

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themselves always involve interpretation and hence judgment.[2] Even in the dreariest statistical analysis of marriage rates, the final "unit event," marriage, cannot be established by any act of measurement; we must *judge* whether an event we observe does or does not constitute "marriage" in the institutional system of the society in question.

Hilgard and Lerner stress the necessarily "subjective" element involved in what they call the "interpersonal focus" and which, as they recognize, constitutes one of the indispensable dimensions of social studies. They stress the role of the "interactive observer" and also speak of "making the most of the interactive observer as a biasing factor in the observational situation." The question is, however, whether the "interactive observer" can and should be treated as *nothing but* a "biasing factor," a source of bias which can and should be eliminated. It is certainly important to eliminate from our data possible ambiguities or variations that may be due to personality factors; but it is equally important to recognize that the "interpersonal focus" as such also yields genuine knowledge which would be lost if we tried completely to depersonalize our perspective out of fear of letting some personal bias creep in. There are behavior data which only the "interactive observer" as a person participating in the situation can secure. The "goodness" of the data cannot, then, depend solely on the "goodness" of this participation. Unfortunately, optimum quality of such data cannot be attained, either by reducing the observational material to surface phenomena that can be recorded by lifeless apparatus, or by establishing a consensus of many observers in the hope that we thus get rid of all "biased" observations. For the question is how well our observers have participated in the situation; and the report of one well-trained and sympathetic observer can outweigh many produced by uninitiated ones.

Other authors also feel compelled to stress the "qualitative" nature of ultimate data in the social sciences. Thus, Kluckhohn quotes the following from an eminent linguist:

2 On this, more will be said in my forthcoming book, *Meaning, Communication and Value*, to be published by the University of Chicago Press.

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> Experimental does not mean quantitative. Measuring, weighing, and pointer-reading devices are seldom needed in linguistics, for quantity and number play little part in the realm of pattern, where there are no variables but, instead, abrupt alternations from one configuration to another. The mathematical sciences require exact measurement, but what linguistics requires is, rather, exact "patternment"—an exactness of relation irrespective of dimensions (p. 90).

And, we may add: a patternment which can be detected only by an "interactive observer." We cannot see language as language except when we are engaged in communication.

Kenneth J. Arrow, in his excellent paper on "Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences," rejects any *ultimate* difference between "intuitive" knowledge and knowledge expressed in terms of mathematical relationships. "Any intuitive knowledge," he says, "can always be reduced to mathematical terms" (p. 130). According to Arrow, one may at most admit a *relative* difference between intuitive and mathematically stated knowledge, in the sense that some of those things that we can easily express in "intuitive" everyday language cannot be translated into equivalent mathematical terms, because the latter would have to be too complicated to grasp.

I think this view is irrefutable: no matter what expressions we use, it is possible in principle to specify a "calculus" or mathematical formalism embodying the logic of our use of our expressions (although these formalisms need not necessarily involve complete decidability). But this fact does not invalidate the point made here, namely, that the ultimate data which go into social theories are not ascertained by "quantifying" operations like measurement but by operations involving interpersonal interaction.

Our problem—that of building "quantified" theories upon non-quantified, "qualitative" data—is faced directly, and treated admirably, in Lazarsfeld and Barton's paper on "Qualitative Measurement." Here, the necessity of forming "preliminary, concrete category systems for the raw materials turned up by exploratory research" is expressly recognized; and the authors attempt to "codify" the procedure to be followed in this. It is

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noteworthy that some of the steps they prescribe are far removed indeed from a purely quantitative approach.

All these analyses seem to point in one direction: the methodological problem of theory-building in the social sciences concerns the "measurement" of collections made up of ultimate elements which are not differentiated by measurement but by a non-quantitative operation, such as interpretation of a symbol. The "measurements" (which then may enter into "theories," as possible values of functions) can only be as good as the ultimate "interpretive" units are. Hence (as shown in particular by Lazarsfeld and Barton) great care must be taken to eliminate subjectivity from the judgments by which the ultimate elements are ascertained. This can be done by making all operations into which "judgment" enters completely standardized and non-controversial, so that any two judges will make the same judgment in presence of the same materials.

There is no doubt that in this way, and in this way alone, we shall succeed in maximizing the objectivity and reliability of our data. But we should not forget that a price must be paid for this gain in objectivity. By renouncing data that can be secured only by trained judgment and experienced intuition, we introduce a sizable "degradation factor" into our theorizing; we lose much of the insight that we need to grasp precisely the most important factors on which fundamental social processes depend.

We have to do here with a "complementarity" phenomenon of the kind which is familiar in physics. By increasing objectivity, we lose insight, and vice versa. As in physics, this situation calls for a compromise. In the long run, it will not do, I think, to focus only on the aim of maximizing objectivity. In doing this, we shall run the risk, as Hilgard and Lerner eloquently put it, of developing a "science of nothing" (p. 28); the goal of building "policy science" will then hopelessly recede beyond the horizon. Instead of insisting upon a duplication of the kind of "objectivity" which is attainable and sufficient without qualification in the natural sciences, we must pay more attention to the specific nature of "interpretation" which is always woven into the data upon which social theory must be built. Such an analysis alone

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will enable us to achieve the optimum measure of *both* insight and objectivity.

This suggests that, ultimately, a rigid separation of the role of "actor" and "knower" is not feasible in the behavior sciences. We shall have to take this into account in our discussion of "theory" and "practice" in the final section of this paper.

6. Before taking up this question, however, we shall have to deal briefly with another aspect of the methodological parallelism of natural and social science: the probabilistic one.

Nobody will doubt that a *strict* causal analysis of behavior is impossible. Hence, the "cause-effect" pairs which can correspond to "means-end" pairs in social "technology" will not exhibit the pattern of classical physics. One may argue, then, as Prof. Reichenbach does in the present volume, that in the social sciences, "probability relationships are the only adequate forms of causal law" (p. 128).

This version of the methodological parallelism between natural and social science deserves careful examination. It is true that strict determinism cannot be shown to prevail in the field of behavior, and also that the items we observe in this field can often be characterized in terms of frequencies. But this does not prove, to my mind, that the "comprehensive theory of behavior" that we need and hope to develop must necessarily be a statistical probabilistic theory.

Here as elsewhere in the social sciences, the fact that we can describe and order the phenomena in some quantitative language does not mean that the use of that language will enable us to formulate a good working theory. For instance, we can measure all speech phenomena in terms of patterns of sound waves, but this does not mean that acoustics will enable us to formulate laws about *what* is going to be said. Similarly, to say that all behavior phenomena can be shown to exhibit a statistical frequency pattern does not entitle us to predict that these phenomena can be explained in terms of a statistical theory. We would have such a theory only if we actually discovered statistical distributions which have predictive value. But we do not know such distributions at present, any more than we know "strict"

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causal patterns underlying behavior. Social science not only lacks a Newton; it also lacks a Gibbs.

If the theory of social reality that will ultimately emerge is not going to be "Newtonian" and deterministic, it does not follow that it will inevitably be probabilistic. For the disjunction of these two terms is not exhaustive. There may be logical forms, as yet undeveloped, which differ both from the model of "differential equations" and from that of "distribution functions." It seems to me very likely that social theory can be systematized only in terms of logical forms which are neither deterministic nor probabilistic. Kluckhohn has some extremely illuminating remarks about this (p. 101).

III

1. Let us now turn to the question of applying scientific specialized knowledge to problems of policy determination. The task consists, as was indicated above, in picking out that "effect" predicted by the theory which coincides with the "end" we pursue, and then to adopt, as our "means," the "cause" corresponding to that "effect." This sounds simple in this generality but may be tremendously difficult in practice, even where we do have a sufficiently comprehensive theory. For, obviously, a "cause" can serve as "means" only if we can bring it about; some "causes," however, are not subject to manipulation. Others might be, but then we may discover that their realization would conflict with other ends we entertain (i.e., the means would be too "costly"). For this and other reasons, ends cannot be pursued in isolation; we must choose a system of ends consistent among themselves, meaning that the choice of means necessary to attain end A will not preclude the choice of means necessary to attain end B. The final choice of the ends, then, will be possible only when the chooser has sufficient information about the means on which the attainment of each end depends. He can obtain this information only from the expert.

In all this, however, one condition must be satisfied. The consultation with the expert can be fruitful only when the ends in themselves are not in dispute. To mention an example: technological advice on the building of a bridge can be fruitfully

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applied only if the users of the bridge—those who can cause it to be built—have made up their mind about what kind of a bridge they want at what point, as well as about the cost they can afford.

The application of scientific knowledge in technology has been fruitful because those who were in a position to "choose means" were regularly able to agree about the end they wanted to attain. A comprehensive theory of behavior could similarly be fruitfully applied only if in each case agreement existed about the end to be pursued. In the political field, however, ends are frequently in dispute; and as long as a decision has not been reached about them, the theory cannot be applied.

It is sometimes suggested that this disagreement about ends has no great practical significance, since "the general wants of people are perhaps everywhere highly uniform" (Lundberg). But this uniformity of wants is precisely the reason why people's interests and goals conflict so often and so hopelessly. It is true that everybody is interested in security, food, and shelter; and I certainly do not suggest that people quarrel because some think that food in general is a good thing while others disagree with *this*. When people *do* fight about food, the reason is not that they differ as to the merits of food as such, but that food is scarce, so that it is impossible fully to satisfy everybody.

Such a conflict represents a type of problem which cannot be "solved" on the basis of expert advice. Any of the parties involved may, of course, ask an expert how they can best ensure the success of their cause. But advice of this kind will not benefit the entire society to which *all* parties belong. It is also possible to ask an expert about the best way of reconciling the conflicting interests. But when *all* parties involved in the conflict decide to put such a question to the expert and to abide by his impartial decision, this means that the conflict no longer exists—and that it has been happily resolved *without* the benefit of expert advice.

2. The important policy problems are all of this type; they arise over a conflict about ends. This means that the solution of the problem cannot be based solely upon the application of scientific theory. Before we reach the stage where we can consult the expert, the essential conflict must be put out of the way.

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This can be done in several ways; for instance, one of the parties to the conflict may successfully use force, so that *his* concept of the "ends" to be pursued will be effectively binding upon society. But if we want the settlement of the underlying conflict to be based upon something else than force, we are obliged to conclude that a source of reasonable decision other than expert scientific knowledge is needed. In other words: unless we resign ourselves to let blind force decide, we must, in the end, recapture some new variant of the *older* types of "policy science" which, as we have seen, postulated the possession of science by the policy-maker himself. Not that we could and should go back to "law" and "statecraft," the pre-democratic forms of "policy science," let alone to the Platonic concept of the philosopher-king. Nor do I argue that we have to do without the application of expert scientific knowledge in the sphere of policy determination. My point is merely that a fruitful application of scientific knowledge to problems of policy is not possible if the separation between the "expert" and the "practical man" remains complete—if their roles are as completely differentiated as they are in the realm of applied technological knowledge. When science is to be applied to "policy," the practical man must "know" something, and the expert must "desire" and "value" something. The gap between the unenlightened "wish" and the goal-neutral "information" must be filled. Curiously enough, this conclusion points in the same direction as our methodological analysis did: toward a certain fusion of the roles of the active and the knowing subject. I think that "policy science" can be ultimately fruitful only if it blends over into something which is neither sheer quantifying science nor unthinking practical dynamism.

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THE FIRST YEARS OF THE COLD WAR

By DANA G. MUNRO

James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, Harper and Brothers, New York and London, 1947, pp. xii, 324. $3.50.

Walter Millis, editor, *The Forrestal Diaries*, Viking Press, New York, 1951, pp. xxiv, 581. $5.00.

WE rarely have an opportunity to study the intimate reactions of two members of the President's cabinet to a series of very recent and very important events. Both *Speaking Frankly* and *The Forrestal Diaries* cover about the same period—the period when the United States was slowly awakening to the realities of the postwar world—but they are very different in other respects. Secretary Byrnes' book was written to give a picture of the problems that he encountered during his tenure as Secretary of State and to express his considered views about policy for the future. The *Diaries*, on the other hand, were never intended for publication, and without connective matter supplied by the editor they would be merely a collection of memoranda of meetings and conversations, copies or summaries of documents prepared by other people, personal letters, and less frequent entries in which Mr. Forrestal recorded his own opinions or impressions. They make fascinating reading and throw much new light on events, but they contain little material about many subjects with which the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense must have been actively concerned. One may question whether it is fair to attempt to reconstruct from them the author's considered views about men and events. They do, however, show how he reacted at the time to what was going on, and there are several entries that give what must have been the product of serious thinking on major problems.

Though both books, and especially the *Diaries*, touch on a great variety of subjects, three main themes emerge as one reads them. One, of course, is the story of steadily deteriorating rela-

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tions with Russia, a story which Byrnes tells in great detail down to the time when he resigned as Secretary of State, and which the *Diaries* carry to the beginning of the Berlin blockade. The second, which is barely touched on in *Speaking Frankly* but receives much more attention in the *Diaries*, is the question of military preparedness in its relation to our international commitments. The third is the problem of setting up machinery for the formulation and execution of a foreign policy adequate to meet the needs of the United States in the postwar world.

In both books, the story of postwar relations with Russia starts with the Yalta Conference. Forrestal records that Secretary of State Stettinius reported a most successful meeting, with "every evidence of the Russian desire to cooperate along all lines with U.S." Byrnes, who also attended the conference, likewise considered it a success. If Forrestal had doubts, he did not record them at the time, but he told Byrnes two and a half years later that Stalin "had good reason for liking FDR because he got out of him the Yalta Agreement." Later he doubted, and he found that General Eisenhower doubted, whether it was really necessary to make concessions to get Russia into the Japanese war. In the first months of 1945, however, entries in the *Diaries* show that both General Marshall and General MacArthur were convinced that Russian intervention to pin down the Japanese forces in Manchuria might save a great number of American lives when the invasion of Japan took place.

Within a very short time after Yalta there was less evidence of Russia's desire to cooperate. In March 1945, it was clear that the Communists were disregarding their agreements with respect to Rumania and Poland, and in early April Forrestal incorporated in his diary a series of telegrams in which Ambassador Harriman gave a penetrating and strikingly far-sighted picture of Soviet policy and urged a much firmer stand by the United States. President Roosevelt himself was disturbed and irritated at Russia's attitude. A few days after Roosevelt's death, when Molotov was in Washington, a crisis arose over the Russian demand that the Lublin Polish government have a seat at San Francisco. Forrestal records a meeting at the White House where the situation was discussed and where he and Harriman ad-

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vocated a firm stand on the Polish and Balkan questions. Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, on the other hand, expressed reluctance to bring on a rupture which might deprive the United States of Russia's help in the Pacific, and they received some support from Admiral Leahy, who from Forrestal's account had apparently had no illusions even at Yalta as to Russia's real designs in Poland. Despite the misgivings of his military advisors, Mr. Truman decided to take a firm stand on the issue of admitting Poland, and he talked very roughly to Molotov about the whole question of the Yalta Agreements. There was a reversion to earlier policies, however, when Harry Hopkins visited Moscow and agreed to a compromise that made it possible for the United States to recognize the Government of Poland but did not, of course, save that country from eventual Communization.

Shortly afterward, in July 1945, Byrnes became Secretary of State and embarked on the long series of negotiations which are the main subject of his book. To his mind, the one great problem of postwar foreign policy was to find a basis for a "just peace," and specifically to reach agreements with Russia that would make possible the signature of treaties with the former enemy powers. He assumed that the way to achieve this goal was through the normal diplomatic processes of accommodation and compromise. This, of course, involved concessions on both sides, and in his desire to persuade Russia to move toward a general settlement, he made concessions on such matters as reparations and recognition of the new governments in the Balkans in return for Russian promises which were usually vague and always valueless. He assumed a firmer attitude in 1946 when he finally realized that the Soviet government was deliberately delaying a settlement. Nevertheless, he continued to work for an agreement.

> During the past two years [he wrote in one of the final paragraphs of his book], there were many times when I was deeply discouraged. Our repeated efforts to achieve co-operation in a peaceful world seemed to be meeting only with constant rebuff. But we persisted in our efforts with patience and firmness. I have not lost hope, but today I would reverse the order and alter the emphasis. I would say that our policy should be one of *firmness* and *patience*.

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Pending the achievement of the "goal of a just peace," Byrnes thought that the United States should rely on the United Nations. He believed that the Soviets did not want war, and that they would "retire," as they had in Azerbaïjan and Greece and Turkey, if the United States appealed promptly to the Security Council against any act of aggression and made it clear that the peace-loving nations would act together if necessary for their collective self-defense. At the same time he advocated economic help to Europe and to Asia to eliminate conditions that encouraged the growth of Communism.

Today, with the advantage of hindsight, it is easy to criticize some of Byrnes' policies. We can see now how futile it was to hope that even "*firmness* and *patience*" would bring a general peace settlement when the Soviets simply did not want the sort of settlement that we had in mind. Even in 1945, it was clear that Russia's never very cordial cooperation with the democracies had given way to a policy more in accord with the Communist idea that the capitalist countries were natural enemies, and very early in that year there was evidence that Communists throughout the world were going back to subversive and disruptive activities. Byrnes' reply to criticism along this line would be that we had at least to make the effort to reach a settlement, and that much of substantial value was after all gained in the attempt. "Our assumption that we could co-operate, and our patience in trying to co-operate," he wrote, "justify the firmness we now must show."

It is noteworthy that Forrestal, though he had been obviously impressed by Ambassador Harriman's estimate of Russian policy, does not seem to have disagreed radically with Byrnes' point of view. Though a few entries in the *Diaries* show concern about influences in the State Department which seemed to favor a soft policy toward Russia, and there is other evidence that he was less optimistic than the Secretary of State was, he commented after Byrnes' resignation that "in my opinion accommodation with Russia could only be secured if we continued the firmness and resolution which Mr. Byrnes had displayed during the last year; that any negotiations with Russia had to be predicated upon a thorough awareness of the unbending determination of

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the Russians to accomplish world Communization." He seems to have realized, as Byrnes did, that American public opinion was hardly ready to support a tough policy. When the administration decided that it was advisable to give the public more information about the gravity of the situation, Forrestal was eager to cooperate. In a speech made in April 1946, he emphasized the significance of the Russian thesis that Communism and capitalism "could not live together in the same world," and stressed the relentless character of Russian imperialism.

Both Byrnes and Forrestal also appreciated the fact that the disintegration of our military power made the assumption of a stiffer attitude very difficult. Byrnes complains, in this connection, that his critics wanted him "to speak loudly and carry a twig." In 1945, he even considered it inadvisable to let the American public realize the seriousness of the situation that was developing in our relations with Russia. He seems to have felt that the situation was better after the reorganization of the Army got under way early in 1946.

Forrestal had a much clearer understanding of the true state of affairs. In August 1946, he noted that

> the Fleet is stripped down as a result of our rapid demobilization to a dangerously low point of efficiency, although it is beginning to climb again in this respect slightly since July, which was the nadir of our effectiveness. . . . We have a very large number of vessels in the *active* fleet which cannot go to sea because of the lack of competent personnel.

He knew that the Army was also pitifully weak. When the State Department protested vigorously to Yugoslavia about the shooting-down of American planes, he told Undersecretary Acheson that he "was very apprehensive about our capabilities to meet any sudden emergency in Europe; that the tone of our notes to Yugoslavia was quite strong, and that it seemed to me that it was incumbent upon us—the State, War, and Navy Departments—to make an evaluation of what we had to back those notes with."

Forrestal also suggested a discussion with the British military authorities to determine "what this country and the British had available with which to meet an emergency should it arise."

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He found that "no very definite plans had been evolved because no one had raised the question." He noted that the most important problem would be how to get the American forces of occupation out of Germany and how to support the British and Americans in the Trieste area. There was clearly no hope of offering any real resistance to a Russian advance. On the other hand, the American government was disposed to make effective use of the forces that it had, for on September 30 it was announced that the Navy would maintain units in the Mediterranean to support American forces and help carry out American policy in that area.

In January 1947, Forrestal suggested that General Marshall join him in presenting "our military position as related to our international obligations and responsibilities" to the chairmen of the appropriate committees of Congress, but the Secretary of State was naturally reluctant to take a step that would give the impression that military considerations would dictate his policy in his new post. An effort to convince Congress would probably have produced little result, because public opinion was still against any real increase in the armed forces. Forrestal had noted in October 1946 that: "There is a definite drive on now toward (1) disarmament, (2) spreading of the thesis that the JCS are running American foreign policy, and (3) against Mr. Byrnes' policy in general." There was little evidence during the next twelve months that Congress, or even the administration, gave serious consideration to the relationship between military power and diplomatic policy. In February 1948, when the National Security Council was considering the advisability of sending military assistance to Greece, Forrestal noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised "that dispatch of any American forces to Greece in sufficient numbers to be of consequence would involve a partial mobilization by this country." At the same meeting, the Security Council reviewed the dangerous situations that confronted the United States in other parts of the world, and General Marshall remarked "that the trouble was that we are playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out."

The danger of a conflagration seemed to increase in the months

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that followed. In February 1948, the Communists seized control in Czechoslovakia, and in March, General Clay, who had hitherto believed war unlikely in the near future, telegraphed from Berlin that subtle changes in the attitude of Russian officials led him to feel that hostilities might break out "with dramatic suddenness" at any moment. This, fortunately, was a false alarm, but a few weeks later the Russians took the first steps in the blockading of Berlin. The result was a new interest at Washington in military preparedness, and the passage of the Selective Service Act in June. It was still impossible, however, to obtain the appropriations that the armed services considered indispensable for efficient operation, and a long struggle over the budget for the fiscal year 1950 embittered Forrestal's last months as Secretary of Defense.

One factor that militated against the formulation of an adequate military policy during this whole period of growing tension was the conflict over the unification of the armed services. The *Diaries,* of course, contain a great amount of material about this. As Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal did not oppose the reorganization of the military establishment or the creation of the office of Secretary of Defense, but he worked tenaciously for an arrangement which would not cause too much bitterness in the Navy and especially for one that would maintain the Navy's identity as an institution and not make it merely a subordinate arm of an integrated military force. He thought that the Secretary of Defense should have rather limited powers, confined to decisions in matters of joint interest to the services; but his views on this point changed after he himself had some months of experience in the office. The story of the long, bitter fight over this legislation leaves a rather frightening impression of the power of the military services as vested interests and of the inability of their civilian superiors to control them. Even after the passage of the Unification Act, the position of the Secretary of Defense was made difficult by insubordination and disloyalty, and it was obvious that the coordination of effort which the act sought to promote, and which is so essential in modern warfare, would be slow in attainment.

Another and more serious deterrent to effective rearmament

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was the question of expense. Here Forrestal found himself confronted by a painful dilemma. He was more aware than most of his colleagues were of the dangers involved in a foreign policy which could not be supported, if necessary, by force, but he feared that any material increase in expenditures would "wreck the economy." His background and training predisposed him to the view that a sound and conservative fiscal policy was the first requisite for national safety. He also appreciated the practical political considerations that led the President to reject some proposals for increases that the Defense Department considered essential.

He realized, too, that the promotion of economic recovery in Europe was no less important than the strengthening of our military forces. Several entries in the *Diaries* show that he gave much thought to this problem. His firm belief in private enterprise and sound business methods made him distrustful of purely governmental activity in the economic field, and he insistently urged that efforts be made to enlist the cooperation of American business in the recovery program. In a conversation with the Indian Ambassador in June 1947, he questioned the usefulness of employing foreign technicians to develop state-controlled enterprises, pointing out that "the development in this country had been accomplished through business, which was composed of many different factors: promoters, bankers, engineers, salesmen, and so forth." When the Ambassador mentioned "exploitation," Forrestal "asked him what guarantee American capital would have against exploitation by Indians of it." A few weeks before, he had said to General Marshall that "we *had* the ability to be a catalyst in the restoration of world economy but it had to be done very fast and using all the talents in the country, which means business management as well as proper governmental policy."

Forrestal's views about defense expenditures and foreign aid were succinctly summed up in a letter to Senator Gurney in December 1947:

> . . . At the present time [he wrote], we are keeping our military expenditures below the levels which our military leaders must in good conscience estimate as the minimum which would in themselves insure

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> national security. By so doing we are able to increase our expenditures to assist in European recovery. In other words, we are taking a calculated risk in order to follow a course which offers a prospect of eventually achieving national security and also long-term world stability.

He thought that we could afford to take this risk because the predominance of our sea power, our exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, and our productive capacity would for some years at least offset Russia's predominant land power in Europe and Asia.

Despite his convictions about the close relationship between military and diplomatic policy, Forrestal apparently rarely attempted to interfere in the actual conduct of relations with other countries. In the matter of the Pacific bases, where the national defense was involved, he did take a strong stand, and manifested some dissatisfaction with the State Department's handling of the matter. In the case of Palestine, he emphatically disagreed with the President's course of action, and felt that political considerations of the most sordid nature had shaped American policy in a way that imperiled our whole position in the Near East. But there is not a great deal of evidence in the *Diaries* to bear out the idea that the military establishment was exercising an excessive and increasing influence in foreign policy in the first years after the war.

Forrestal did, however, give a great deal of thought to the problem of creating a more effective machinery for the formulation of foreign policy. He was clearly somewhat dissatisfied with the personnel and the methods of the Department of State. He thought that there had been no adequate diplomatic planning for the peace, and that there had been far too little effort to balance diplomatic commitments with military power. His attitude toward the unification of the armed services was influenced by his conviction that it was but one aspect of the larger problem of coordinating all the activities of the United States government that affected its relations with other countries—a problem which he discussed in several entries in his diary. To achieve this coordination, he had advocated the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, both of which were set up by the Security Act of 1947. The first

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of these was an effort to meet an obvious need. The second he considered "an integral part of the national defense setup" . . . "not as a place to make policies but certainly as a place to identify for the President those things upon which policy needs to be made."

It is interesting to contrast Forrestal's ideas about the making of foreign policy with those of Byrnes, who approached the question from an entirely different standpoint. For Byrnes, foreign policy was a matter primarily for the Secretary of State. He appreciated the importance of bipartisan political support, and the importance of having the support of a well-informed public opinion, but he did not seem particularly interested in the problems that most concerned Forrestal. He did regret the transfer to the State Department of wartime agencies like the O.S.S. and the O.W.I. and he opposed the transfer to the Department of administrative functions in connection with the occupation of defeated countries. He left office with a good opinion of the Foreign Service, though he thought that it should be enlarged and strengthened to meet its new responsibilities. It is not surprising that he had little to suggest in the way of concrete changes, for a Secretary of State who had to spend 350 days at international conferences, out of a total of 562 days in office, would have little opportunity to consider organizational matters.

Byrnes realized that regular and frequent consultation between the State Department and the military establishment was necessary, but it seems probable that neither he nor his successors in the State Department would have been very enthusiastic about giving the National Security Council the role that Forrestal envisaged for it. When consultation is institutionalized, there is always the danger that a new and overlapping policy-making agency will be created. Forrestal warned the Security Council that it must avoid "the appearance of either duplicating or replacing the functions of the cabinet" and avoid "giving the public the impression that our foreign policy was completely dominated by a military point of view." He was not apparently unwilling to contemplate the Security Council's taking over some of the responsibility for planning foreign policy which had formerly been regarded as a function of the Department of State.

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It would be unfair to judge Forrestal's ideas on a matter of this sort from the fragmentary material contained in the *Diaries*, but the reader gets the impression that he looked on foreign policy chiefly as a matter of high level planning and did not fully appreciate the fact that the real substance of our foreign relations is the great mass of questions, some important but many of them relatively unimportant, which arise from week to week in our contacts with other countries. The way in which these questions are treated usually determines the real character of our relations with another country. If they are handled with foresight and skill, there will be fewer crises, and those that do arise will be less likely to require sudden decisions and hastily improvised measures. Dealing with them is usually the responsibility of the representative of the United States in the country concerned; and the indispensable first requisite for a good foreign policy is a competent Foreign Service. The second is that our representatives have proper support and adequate and prompt instructions, and that it be clear that they speak as the voice of the United States and not merely as one of several voices from Washington. It is here that difficulties are likely to arise when other branches of the government participate in the formulation or execution of foreign policy.

Byrnes also was impressed by the need for planning in foreign relations, but it does not seem to have occurred to him that this was not the exclusive prerogative, under the President, of the Secretary of State. When he took office, he found that the Department had no over-all, authoritative statement of policy covering objectives throughout the world, and he felt that the formulation of policy statements under his direction was "one of the more significant undertakings in the conduct of our foreign affairs." These were not quite such an innovation as he thought. If he had searched the almost trackless wastes of the Department's files, he would have found thousands of pages of studies, written in the past decade by officials or by consultants specially employed for the purpose, dealing with most aspects of our relations with other countries. The majority of these had simply been forgotten. It was, of course, an excellent idea to take a fresh look at the problems confronting the Department and to draw

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up statements of objectives which could serve as a guide to action. It was probably the first time that so many officers in the Department and the Foreign Service had had to take time from their daily routine to consider what they were really trying to accomplish. Without implying any disparagement of Mr. Byrnes' idea, however, we may wonder whether the next generation of officers in the State Department, three or four years later, remembered that these statements existed.

Planning in the field of foreign policy is even more difficult than in domestic affairs. Forrestal wrote in June 1945:

> I am more impressed than ever as things develop in the world today that policy may be frequently shaped by events unless someone has strong and clear mental grasp of events; strong enough and clear enough so that he is able to shape policy rather than letting it be developed by accidents.

Unfortunately, policy is too often shaped by events, or accidents, or by the unforeseeable and uncontrollable action of other people, no matter how clearly we may understand the situation with which we are dealing. This is especially true in a democratic government, where so many conflicting points of view affect governmental action, and where the activities of pressure groups and shifts in public opinion have to be taken into account. Planning is, of course, necessary in the sense of defining policy objectives, studying possible means of attaining them, and trying to foresee what the obstacles will be. If it goes beyond this, it will often be a waste of time.

We may differ with Mr. Byrnes or Mr. Forrestal in their views about policy, but it would be hard to read their books without feeling that both men approached their difficult jobs with courage and intelligence, and with a single-minded determination to promote the best interests of the United States. One feels especially a sense of the loss that the country suffered when Forrestal died, a victim of overwork at a comparatively early age. In the unconscious self-portrait that the *Diaries* present, the reader is impressed by his unselfish patriotism, his clear-headed and thoughtful approach to the ominous problems that confronted the government, and his common sense. We could use more statesmen of the same caliber.

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Research Note

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STRATEGY OF STATECRAFT

By MORTON A. KAPLAN

I

THE term "statecraft" is used here in a sense which is stronger than that of "diplomacy" as used, for example, by Harold Nicolson.[1] In its present meaning it includes the construction of strategies for securing the national interest in the international arena, as well as the execution of these strategies by diplomats. In a day when the world is being divided between two great power blocs, when neutrality is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain, when statecraft is invading the economic and cultural aspects of social existence, as well as the political and military, when most great problems of domestic life must be reconsidered with regard to their bearing on the international situation, few, if any, can doubt its importance. The successful or unsuccessful conduct of statecraft may settle the fate of our way of life; and, given the possibilities of modern war, it may, in a deeper sense, settle the question of whether any type of civilized life, ours or the Soviets', can survive.

Is it then not strange that the problem of a formal strategy of statecraft is so little discussed? Men frequently talk of the need for better administrative coordination among those departments of the federal government which have some responsibility for the management of our international relations, or even of the relationship of a particular means to a particular end. Long-run goals are considered occasionally, but there is no sufficient consideration of the relationship of policies to national ends or of formal methods for articulating the problem.

[1] Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, London, 1939, pp. 13-16.

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The blame cannot be placed entirely at the door of our leaders. A brief glance at our political system reveals some of the major reasons for this lack of policy planning. An attempt to agree on national goals would probably generate more heat than light. Virtually everyone would agree on ends as vague as peace or opposition to Communism, but, if we attempted to specify how to achieve these ends, we would not find agreement among any substantial proportion of the people, and it is even less likely that funds for the purpose of specification would be forthcoming from the Congress. Forced to yield to day-to-day pressures, our statesmen tend to think in terms of the immediate goals which they can achieve. As a result, the political activities of statesmen inhibit the execution of statecraft.

In addition to the intrinsic merits of a formal consideration of the problems of statecraft, a formal set of such considerations, as a required tool of policy formation, would have the advantage of forcing statesmen to consider domestic political pressure as merely another factor, albeit an important one, in a complicated situation. It would make it much more difficult for a statesman to become the prisoner of his responses to political pressure. He would be compelled to consider such things as, for example, recognition of the Chinese People's Republic as means to an end of policy, rather than as end policies themselves.

Primarily, therefore, this paper will try to demonstrate the importance of the problem of strategy formation in statecraft. No doubt, the objection will be raised immediately that statecraft cannot be reduced to a set of formal rules. Instead, the argument will run, we must let the statesman employ his genius in the solution of problems that are too complex to be reduced to metrical terms. Indeed, at a certain level, statecraft is and must be an art, and we must hope that our diplomats have superb aesthetic judgment. But there is no inherent opposition between an art, employing the aesthetic judgment, at one level, and formalization at a different level. In one of the most formal and abstract sciences, mathematics, it is a matter of aesthetic judgment whether or not the axiom of choice is employed. There is no way by which one position with regard to that axiom can be proved; yet the

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results differ greatly, depending upon whether or not you do use it. However, even those mathematicians who refer to mathematics as an aesthetic art utilize formalization in employing axioms chosen for aesthetic purposes. At the opposite pole, in painting—that field where the aesthetic choice is greatest, and formalization correspondingly least—there are still formal technical rules, and whether one has the genius of simplicity of a Matisse, or the originality of a Picasso, the end products can be criticized according to formal standards.

That aesthetic and formal elements are obverse sides of the same coin can best be demonstrated by the science of physics. There are no rules of discovery that enable one to find a new law. The discovery of relativity or of the quantum theory was an act of artistic creation. But, once the laws were discovered, the techniques of confirmation could be formalized. Rules cannot produce insight, but one insight need not be as good as another. There are rational techniques for their evaluation. To hold otherwise would be to eliminate rational understanding from life. If there were no critical standards, the insight of a Rasputin would be as good as the insight of a Madison. This is not to say that life is completely rational, but that even its irrationality can be rationally formulated. Unless this be granted, there is no point to any discussion of foreign policy, or of any other policy.

The studies affected by the movement of history cannot have the advantage of retrying an experiment. The solution which we try commits us; it changes both the present and the future, which become different from what they might have been, had a different solution been employed. Does this mean, however, that we can never learn from the past, that each situation is unique, novel, that we are babes in an unknown woods? Fortunately, for men there are sociological and psychological uniformities that can be studied. But, it will be objected, this tells us nothing about a concrete individual situation. In an actual case, our lives and our fortunes may be at stake; if a particular case turns out disastrously, it is little comfort to know that in similar cases disaster has been avoided seven times out of ten. We cannot wait for the law of averages to work in our favor. Must we then, as

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Peirce advised, surrender our lot to that of the entire community of mankind, and make our decisions upon averages which are true only at infinity?[2] This argument is strong, and the point might be yielded if a more rational method of choice could be demonstrated than one based on a careful analysis of analytic rules and all available evidence. However, despite not knowing many of the actual things which individualize an event, we are still able to employ a rational technique. We may never be able to experience the landing of Julius Caesar in Britain, but we can evaluate the evidence within terms of reliability classes and give a very high degree of confirmation to the statement that he did land in Britain.

To make decisions, we need evidence. But this does not mean that evidence is significant as such, that a tyro can copy figures from a book and, because he knows more figures, make a better decision than the experienced man. The point is that an experienced person understands the operational significance of facts; he knows what they mean in practice; he knows them as more than bare words. One of the things that a good method would insist upon is the utilization of experienced people to evaluate the data which are considered in coming to a judgment—indeed, even to determine which data are to be considered. However, the problems of the modern scene are so complex, the relations of events so manifold, that they stretch the span of attention of the human mind past the breaking point. The most experienced and most capable mind is not able to do justice to the situation. The relationship of means and ends tends to become confused; consideration of the effect of one policy upon another is lost; a mountain of independent goals and policies causes an almost total disorientation.

The physicist and the psychologist, in infinitely less complex situations, set up formal procedures by means of which they check themselves. These are good, experienced men; in most cases, they would not run into great difficulties if they were not constantly alert to see that no factor was left out of account, that all defini-

2 *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds., Vol. v, *Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1934, p. 221.

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tions had adequately been made. Yet no good man in these fields would say that he is too good, too experienced, to need these checks upon himself. The true scientist is aware of what has happened when inadequate checks were used; he would not take that chance. It is perhaps true that in the historical sciences we cannot demonstrate in an individual case how far back the lack of control threw off the experiment, for each implementation of policy is unrepeatable. But certainly we can use analogy to this extent. Should the complexity and lack of rigor inherent in a problem excuse the elimination of any type of precise and rigorous method? Surely, when analyzed incisively, the methods now used are seen to be highly irrational. It is bad enough to have to use blunt tools; it is worse to resist any effort to sharpen them, and even to attempt to make them blunter than they are.

II

It cannot be denied that we have a genuine problem. That problem is to adjust the world of the present to, at the worst, the least bad of the possible future worlds which we would find it possible to accept. This involves the problems of norm formulation, of strategy, and of tactics. Ultimate values, since all justification occurs within their terms, cannot be justified themselves, but at least it should be possible to specify them in meaningful terms. It does no good to speak of democracy as an ultimate value if people cannot agree as to what they mean when they use the term. How do things operate? What do they signify in practice? A system of law in which the accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty need not be more of a safeguard to the individual than a system of law in which he is presumed guilty until proved innocent, if it is actually easier to convict a man in terms of the first system than it is even to bring him to trial under the second. I do not intend to imply that the statement of ideals is unimportant, for such a statement may have a long-term corrective effect; but it must in fact have that effect to be significant. In other words, the theoretical statement of the political norms must have consequences which are so stated that they can be compared with what happens. Thus, at least the consequence state-

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ments must be operationally defined, unless the ideals are to be considered goods-in-themselves, unless their verbal statement is the final criterion of justness, unless they are to lose all connection with life. Such a system would, indeed, have an emotional import, but it would be useless in the practical adaptation of means to ends; in short, it would be a non-rational system, if not an irrational one.

If we can specify the norm, then strategy would consist of those long-range measures which would be appropriate to the accomplishment of that end. The harmonization of means to ends is a complex one. It is usually objected that the ends cannot justify the means: the Macbeth problem. If this argument is closely examined, it can be seen that, except in the case of those absolute moralists who would rather the whole world be destroyed than a single wrong be done, the objectors are referring to a bad result of a bad means. But, if the result is bad, the means could not have been good or appropriate in terms of the ultimate objective. Usually, the analysis is a careless one that confuses long-range and subsidiary objectives. If the goal of Macbeth was to lead the life of a king, given the real alternatives open to him—and all strategies should be directed to real alternatives—he would have come closer by not murdering the king. The life of a noble is certainly closer to that of a king than is the life of a condemned man. On the other hand, if the real object of Macbeth was to be king and if nothing else could ever satisfy him, then perhaps the outside chance was worth while. Not every object can be achieved and, if the only objects which make life worth living are incapable of attainment, one may as well perish heroically, at least making the attempt.

The above problem really illustrates the interrelationship of strategy and of tactics. If physically being king was a subordinate goal to living the good life, Macbeth chose both a bad and an inappropriate means. In statecraft, if telling untruths to gain subordinate goals destroys the reputation of a nation for honesty, with the result that its long-range program is inhibited because of the distrust of other states, the tactically successful means are strategically inappropriate. Yet, how many would object to the

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lie if it were necessary to save both the physical existence of the nation and its way of life? Strategy and tactics are interrelated. We cannot lose every tactical advantage, lest we no longer have the strength to achieve our real goal. On the other hand, if, in order to gain a temporary advantage or merely to win a debating point, we undermine the rule of law, the heart of the world order we are trying to create, is our victory worth while?

In this problem, we are dealing with a complex set of functionally related variables. In some fashion, we must be able to spell out the manner in which they are related. If we cannot do it with real precision, at least we can reduce the previously existing imprecision. Perhaps, in the process, we will so clarify our ideas that a revision of our norms will be in order. The separation of life into means and ends is, after all, an artificial one for the purpose of analysis. The reintegration of means and ends through the results of analysis may give us clearer insight into our goals, an insight that could not be specified until means and ends could be distinguished within their interrelationships. If so, that would be a distinct gain.

This point can perhaps be clearly illustrated by again referring to Macbeth. It may be that Macbeth at one time thought that a statement of his system of ultimate values would include within it the value of being, in fact, king. However, the process of life may so clearly have demonstrated to him the interrelationship of that value with the other values which he held that he was brought to the realization that being king was a subsidiary rather than an ultimate value. It is only through the concrete specification of values that their full significance is made known to us. As mere words, they are faint shadows which but hint at a reality hardly known to us.

The manipulation of foreign policy is thus seen to consist of having a set of value goals which are to be attained by means of a strategic and tactical system which is continually modified, the better to attain those values. The utilization of such a technique may involve a set of relatively constant rules which, for want of a better term, may be referred to as an operational code. An army, for instance, has an operational code. To commit all one's

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forces to a particular engagement is viewed as an unsound military maneuver, something that should be done only under highly exceptional circumstances, if at all. Statecraft, too, has its operational code. The diplomatic representative of a nation should never indicate to the government to which he is attached that he is in disagreement with the policy of his own government. He would not, under normal circumstances at least, be an effective instrument for the accomplishment of national ends if he violated this rule. A more important rule is that a government should not discredit its foreign policy by giving the impression of being unreliable. Still another is never to commit oneself irrevocably to the good faith of a possible enemy. No doubt a manual of such rules could be constructed; and, to the extent that they did not lead to an unimaginative rigidity in the conduct of foreign relations, the statement of such rules might be responsible for a wholesome improvement in the conduct of our statecraft.

The above indicates in general outline what a formalized strategy of statecraft would consist of. The first problem in carrying out such a strategy would be to reconstruct the actual world situation. It is necessary to be able, in some fashion, to specify the situation with which we are confronted. If we cannot do this, how can we know how to change or improve it? And here, too, we must eschew general and vague terms. It is not sufficient to say that the present situation is characterized by Soviet-American enmity. In what way is the enmity expressed? Under what concrete circumstances is it likely to be revealed? To what lengths is it likely to be carried?

III

It is proper for us to proceed within the terms of a theory, but that theory must have consequences which can be described operationally. We know things in the way in which they work. Even an idealist like Bradley asked plaintively how we could know the way in which a thing works and still be told by some people that we know nothing about it.[3] When we speak of a metal, we speak really of the way in which it can be seen by the

[3] F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, London, 1908, p. 139.

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eye, the extent to which it resists pressure, the conditions under which it will oxidize or combine with other materials. A metal is not something over and above these specifiable characteristics. This is not to say that all the characteristics of a metal have equal relevance. But what is relevant from one point of view need not be relevant from another. To human beings, certain things may be relevant as food sources or as emotional stimulants, while to a rationally organized creature lacking both a digestive and emotional apparatus these characteristics would remain unnoticed and almost certainly would not be considered important or relevant. The relevant characteristics of a thing can be defined by the number of important ("important" having a systemic reference) experiments that can be made upon it. In any event, these characteristics are operationally definable; indeed, they must be so if we are adequately to explore their meaning. In the field of politics, a number of operationally defined terms have been made available to us by Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan.[4] While certain of their definitions present us with distinct problems, their set of operational definitions provide a good starting point for the specification of the social content of an actual or present world situation.

However, these operationally defined sentences or sentence groups only provide the link for us between theory and actuality. They enable us to jump the epistemological gap; it is only by means of them that we can confirm theory. But it is a theoretical analysis of the actual situation that we need, for no arithmetic trick will enable us to combine our observations into a coherent and meaningful system by mechanical means. In short, we need to construct a hypothesis, a hypothesis which will, we hope, account for the situation as we know it. If our hypothesis is well constructed, it will have consequences which can be stated in our operationally definite terms, and these consequences will be different from those that will follow from other hypothesis constructions.

We do not have to wait for the future in order to attempt to

[4] See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society*, New Haven, Conn., 1950.

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confirm our hypotheses. We are able to test them by means of the past. For instance, if it were believed that the Soviets would never knowingly make a decision that would contribute to political stability, this hypothesis would be refuted if we could demonstrate a situation in which they almost surely did so. If it could be shown that certain decisions they made could follow only from a recognition on their part that they would benefit, in the long run, from encouraging a stable international order, to the extent that they thought such an order to be a real possibility, the hypothesis that there is no point of reconciliation between their foreign policy and ours would be refuted. This example is an oversimplification, of course, but I am attempting to show the type of specific rational or formal test of various hypotheses that can be made.

Now, the confirmation of a hypothesis must always be a probability function. Indeed, it is only within the terms of a probability logic that such a formal assertion may be made. The consequent can never affirm the antecedent in classical deductive logic. Thus, no matter how great a degree of reliability may be attached to such a verification, it can never be regarded as proved beyond the faintest shadow of a doubt. However, it is not the faintest shadow of a doubt that provides problems for us. If this were all that we had to worry about, our task would be an easy one.

The major difficulty we have to face is the precise confirmation of complex hypotheses. As Ernest Nagel has pointed out, even in the physical sciences, the problems of which do not approach those of the historical sciences, the confirmation of a hypothesis is a matter of aesthetic appreciation in which highly arbitrary criteria are used.[5] Why should we prefer a confirmation which selects its data by choosing an example from ten different classes to a confirmation that chooses its data by ten confirmations from one class? There is no formal criterion involved which we can prove to be a good one. And the issue is not really as simple as our example would indicate. When different proportions of data from one set

[5] Ernest Nagel, "Principles of the Theory of Probability," Vol. 1, monograph 6, *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Chicago, 1939, pp. 60-74.

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of experiment-classes must be balanced against different proportions of data from an overlapping set of classes, and when the data obtained confirm different hypotheses, we are in a difficult position. Carnap has made a brilliant attempt to overcome this difficulty with his sets of range statements, but they cannot, at least at present, be applied to any physical system and the complexity of the data would indicate they probably never will be.[6] And even if at some future date his range statements should be able to be applied to simple physical systems, it is too much to hope that they could be applied to complex social situations, where it is doubtful that even frequency statements have any specifiable empirical meaning. Despite Reichenbach's complacency on this point, he has yet to demonstrate to my satisfaction the empirical meaning of frequency statements for complex social situations that are not as adaptable as the "cause-of-death" classes.[7] Where the data expand outside of events subject to a linear form of causality, he has never demonstrated the applicability of his frequency conceptions.

Nevertheless, whatever the imprecision may be in the method by which we confirm hypotheses of these types, it is clear that we do confirm them and that we must continue to do so if there is to be any rational connection between our thought and our action. Our results can be better utilized in two ways. Despite all the difficulties involved in making hypotheses, rational criteria exist by which their construction may be improved. And no matter how bad the hypotheses may be, techniques are available which make better use of them. Since a discussion of these techniques will occur later in the paper, let us confine our attention now to the first of these two statements.

In the first place, we may consider the principle known as the razor of the good John of Occam—the principle of simplicity. The razor states that the systemically simple hypothesis is to be preferred to the complex hypothesis or the hypothesis employing *ad hoc* explanations. To demonstrate: if *ad hoc* explanations are admissible any time that a result does not follow from one's orig-

[6] Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Foundations of Probability*, Chicago, 1951, I, 161ff.
[7] Hans Reichenbach, *The Theory of Probability*, Berkeley, Calif., pp. 376ff.

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inal hypothesis, it would be impossible ever to demonstrate that hypothesis as incorrect. The result would be anarchy within the realm of the rational. No hypothesis would be too absurd. A paranoid customarily believes that the whole world is a gigantic conspiracy against his happiness; his conviction cannot be disproved. He can always claim that the objector is an innocent dupe, that he is a liar, or that he has repressed knowledge of his guilt. Anything which seems to increase his happiness can be explained either as a miscalculation or as a more far-reaching and diabolical plot. It would be well to avoid a paranoid type of reasoning in national policy.

Those scholars who have read a handful of Soviet documents published twenty or thirty years ago and who now "understand" Soviet policy may be making an overgenerous use of *ad hoc* explanations. They present us with their theory and then tell us that it is impossible to disprove it, for anything the Soviets say or do is a trick designed to deceive us.[8] This type of theorizing seems to disobey the dictates of Occam's razor, and it may also disobey another cardinal rule of hypothesis formation: namely, taking all the important relevant evidence into account when constructing the hypothesis. No scientist would think of behaving in so disoriented a fashion.

However, all the relevant evidence is not to be considered atomistically. And this brings us to a discussion of Reichenbach's principle of the concatenation of probabilities, a principle which is closely allied to the principle of simplicity. It implies that probabilities reinforce each other if they fit into a pattern of significance. For instance, most of the laws known to science fit into a general pattern; if someone made an observation that would not fit into this pattern, we would have to doubt the observation sooner than the system of scientific law. In other words, at least our first thoughts would be either that the observation was inaccurate or that there was some explanation which, when offered, would show that it did not contradict our previous knowledge. In the field of international relations, suppose that

8 "Historicus," pseud., "Stalin on Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVII (January 1949), 175-214.

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every act but one of a certain nation indicated that it was peace-loving. It would be more logical to attempt to reinterpret the exception than to reinterpret all the alternative instances, even though the one exception, when considered individually, appeared to be a more impressive illustration of the intentions of that nation than any of the alternatives individually.

It is necessary to enter a caveat at this point. There is no a priori reason why the foreign policy of a nation should be consistent, and it is possible that a nation may have alternative strategies ready for changing circumstances, or even that it may be testing a situation in order to find out which strategy might be more likely to succeed. It does not appear that any rule can be given to show the point at which evidence ceases to reinforce itself and begins to lead to a non-simple hypothesis. But a good working principle would be to suspect that this was happening at any point where important and relevant evidence is forcibly explained away. After all, there is also a point at which the physical scientist will cease to distrust his observations and will begin to distrust his theory. And it might be added that he will never ignore his observations, but will always attempt to test the situation to discover whether his principles do fit or whether a momentary sensory aberration is involved. If the evidence really exists, it cannot be explained away. And, in fact, the principle of the concatenation of probabilities would itself serve to prove the simple hypothesis, for the evidence which reinforces it consists of all the relevant data, whereas the complex hypothesis must either eliminate or reinterpret the conflicting data, in which case there is decidedly less reinforcement. So it can be seen that these two principles are really allied and tend toward the same result.

Now, it should be patent from our previous discussion that the same set of data can probably produce more than one hypothesis, according to the weight assigned to the various evidence-factors. And it is precisely at this point that our methods are imprecise, rule-of-thumb, and difficult of proof. It is here that the artist in the field of statecraft must make available to us his aesthetic insight. A sudden *aperçu* may combine the evidence in a way not

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apparent to the ordinary man, may shed convincing light on events that appeared to be unconnected, may convince us that we had not really understood what we thought we had understood. But someone may get a competing *aperçu*, and one group may accept the first, and another group of equally able, alert, well-informed, and honest men may prefer the second. The ordinary rules by which hypotheses can be criticized may not apply here; the hypotheses may be equally simple, they may make equally good and full use of the relevant evidence, and yet they may differ. Possibly we will some day develop analytical tools which will solve this problem for us. It would be much simpler if every hypothesis but one could be avoided, but this is not the case. And, as we shall see later, even if we could agree that one hypothesis is better than another, it still does not follow that this is the hypothesis upon the basis of which we should proceed. Our task is not an easy one.

IV

Our knowledge of the actual or present world situation can be explained according to a number of conflicting hypotheses. These hypotheses can be ordered logically, and all practical statesmen must in fact so order them if they are to act in a given situation.

Let us be more specific. In the actual world situation, as specialists in international relations, we are deeply concerned with the strategy of the possible enemy. Our first task would seem to be the specification of that enemy. In our day and age this appears to be easy, although the ease of the task may in fact dull our understanding. However, for the purpose of the discussion in this paper, let us agree and name the Soviets as at least the greatest apparent potential threat to us at present.

Once we have specified the potential enemy, we become interested in his goals, the strategic and tactical framework within which he expects to achieve them, and the operational code which directs his employment of strategy and tactics. Much current thinking makes no clear attempt to separate these elements. With respect to the goals of the enemy, it would appear wise to restrict our attention to his real rather than his verbal goals. If

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we do not believe anything else that he says, there is no point in believing past statements he has made concerning his goals.

By the real goals of the enemy, I am referring to those which are the objects of his strategic plan. We care about what he says only to the extent that his words yield clues as to his subsequent actions. We are very interested in what he says if his strategy conforms to it. It is permissible to utilize verbal statements as part of the objective criteria employed in analyzing the goals of strategy, but they cannot be exclusively or even primarily utilized in that fashion. Words can have many purposes. They can be designed to deceive externally; they can be designed to rouse enthusiasm internally, either among the people or among the party leaders, to hold out bright visions of the future as a spur to present activity; they can be attempts on the part of a heretic to cloak himself in the mantle of orthodoxy in the struggle for "church" leadership, or they may be the rationalizations of the heretic who would like to think himself the true believer; they can be true expressions of belief, or they can be pawns in either the tactical or strategic game. In any event, all the available relevant evidence must be examined in an attempt to determine whether announced goals are real or verbal. In this situation we can employ hypotheses as theoretical models. We can ask ourselves what the consequences of the model are. And, if the consequences do not correspond to what happened, then the model had better be discarded.

Now we have provided ourselves with another formal tool in addition to the proper methods for the construction of hypotheses. We do have tests for our hypotheses and they lie in past history. If the hypothesis is correct, would the enemy have acted that way in the past? If there are a significant number of instances or an instance of significant importance where he did not, it is perhaps time to see if we cannot construct a better hypothesis. It is probable that tests of this type would establish that we had better search for new hypotheses, that previously used hypotheses will not conform to a test of this type, that our statesmen have constructed situations where their very plans led to the results they feared, that, in turn, the results obtained served as a con-

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firmation for the theory upon which they operated. This is the indeterminacy effect as it occurs in international politics. I shall expand on this idea later, but I should like to suggest at this point that, for our purposes, the experiment in the past is a superior device to the experiment in the future.

The attention we pay to the goals of the enemy cannot be separated from that we pay to his tactics and strategy, for between them a relation must exist even if we may not assume that the most appropriate relation is the one that, in fact, does exist. However, in considering a nation where not quite so much attention need be paid to public opinion, it would not be a bad initial assumption that the greatest flexibility possible also results in the best adjustment of means to ends. In our country we dare not always explore the real interconnection of means and ends, because the public has a great tenderness for certain shibboleths. However, in the country of the enemy, only the fear of criticizing the leader need inhibit discussion of that type, and astute politicians should be able to phrase their criticisms so that such a difficulty is avoidable. The real difficulty in our examination of enemy strategy would result from faulty analysis on the part of enemy, rather than from lack of thorough analysis.

As a hypothesis for testing the situation, it is, then, proper for us to consider the tactics and strategy of the enemy as mutually revealing phases of his goal-seeking activities. Yet, it is clear that the strategy must have more goal-seeking import than the tactics. For instance, it is, at least immediately, not clear that the lifting of the Berlin blockade was more than a tactical shift in order better to obtain a constant goal. It would take a series of such shifts to indicate conclusively to us that the goal itself had changed. However, a decision on the part of the Soviets to withdraw from Czechoslovakia would be an almost conclusive proof of a change in goal. It is true that, in terms of vague and total goals, such as the ultimate victory of one side over the other, the goal need not have changed. But we have discarded the consideration of such vague conceptions in favor of concretely specifiable goals which bear a direct relationship to tactics and strategy. This does not mean that vague goals cannot be enter-

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tained; but, if they are, there can be no coherent relationship between strategic plan and goal, and irrationality is introduced into policy formation. Cannot the enemy be irrational? He can, but his plans would then become predictable only within an almost meaninglessly broad range. In addition, his actions would bear little relationship to his goal, and they would not be effective for the attainment of that goal. Under such circumstances, we need not fear him or his goal; we need fear only the possible evil consequences of irrational activity, and it is that contingency which we must guard against. However, in this case, I doubt that it is the irrational activity of the enemy which we need fear.

The strategic and tactical plan of the enemy is carried on within the framework of an operational code, and understanding precisely what it is would be an advantage in the formulation of our own strategy. A very acute analysis of that code has been made by Nathan Leites.[9] We have only space to mention one or two of the principles which form the operational code of the Soviets; for instance, the zigzag policy, the retreat under pressure in order to regroup, and the tactical use of the lie. However, a casual reading of Mr. Leites' volume might give one the impression that he intended to include the interpretational set or perspectives of the Soviet leadership within his catalogue of their operational code. For instance, the idea that the capitalist powers constitute a bloc united against the Soviets is not a rule for policy formation; it is rather an interpretation based upon the study of history. Certainly no Soviet leader would contend for the impossibility of, at least, a mistaken reading of history by the leaders of the capitalist powers. They might consider it unlikely, but not impossible. And it is possible that events might prove to even the more stubborn members of the Politburo that their analysis was mistaken. Indeed, our positive activities might induce such a reinterpretation on their part. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that any activities on our part, short of a declaration of war, could convince them that they should not retreat under attack in order to regroup for a more favorable

[9] See Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, New York, 1951, esp. pp. 33 and 58-60.

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opportunity. Therefore, it is not desirable in terms of correct analysis to include the operational code and the interpretational set in the same category.

V

When we have defined the problem of constructing the actual or present world situation, the next problem confronting us is the construction of the future or possible world situations. Of course, it is necessary to begin with the problem of the norm, for we are not trying to predict what the future actual world will be. Instead, we are trying to enlist the activity of men to construct it in as good a fashion as external circumstances allow. We cannot do this unless we have some conception of what the good is. It is not necessary to specify here either what the good is or should be; it is sufficient for the problem of analysis that it is specified that there is a good. However, it may be pointed out that the so-called "good" may stand for a complex of values which are not completely consistent. In such a case, our analytical construction of the future possible worlds need not fill in all the details. Given the difficulties of social control, there need be no expectation that, even under the most favorable circumstances, we shall be able to build our brave new world as we would have it in any but the most broad and general terms. What is important is not the precise blueprinting of the future, but the concrete specification of the institutional meaning of our goal programs.

It is this specifiable meaning that we must include in our calculations, and which must be immanent in our construction of our future possible worlds. However, since men cannot be certain of obtaining their hearts' desire, it would be wise to construct a maximally favorable possible world, a minimally acceptable possible world, and at least several possible world states somewhere in between these two limits. Of course, whatever would not be minimally acceptable would, by definition, be so undesirable that no chance to avoid it would be unacceptable, no matter how long a shot it might be.

Once we have constructed this series of possible worlds, it behooves us to develop a strategic plan and tactical campaigns

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to achieve one of the more or less favorable or acceptable states. This, of course, is the age-old problem of means and ends, except that it is here presented in a more complex and precise way, for it can be seen that there are alternative end situations, and we cannot determine, without a thorough consideration of strategic theory, which one of the possible ends we ought to strive for in a concrete situation. Indeed, it cannot even be certain to us from which one of the present actual worlds we should start in order to achieve one of the possible worlds. However, it is certain that there must be an adaptation of means to ends if activity is to be rational; it is also certain that we must try to find rational criteria for making these choices. To do less would be a renunciation of our rational nature.

The first consideration we must take into account in the rational adaptation of means to ends is the time factor. We are faced here with the problem of the opposition of opportunism and idealism. However, there is a third alternative: realism. Opportunism can be defined as the attainment of immediate goals at the expense of more important values; idealism as the sacrifice of obtainable goods in the service of an unobtainable good; and realism as the adjustment of tactics and strategy in order to obtain the more important and the more durable social and moral values. Suppose a diplomatic agent is carrying a message which will touch off a war. If he can be stopped, the conditions responsible for this situation will so change that war will not occur. The only way in which he can be stopped is by murdering him. Assume that there is no alternative to this analysis. An opportunist would permit him to proceed provided he were bribed; an idealist would refuse to bloody his hands and would allow millions of innocent people to die; and a realist would regretfully kill him. I know that many people would reject realism, but I suspect that they would really be hoping that someone else would kill him. Those who are finally responsible for decisions, however, do not have the option of letting others do their dirty work for them.

The adaptation of means to ends involves the utilization of field concepts. The field involved in international relations may be considered as a vector through a segment of time in which

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certain forces are operating. However, these forces are not purely physical. As Von Neumann and Morgenstern point out, the governing social rules can change while the physical system remains the same.[10] There are social as well as physical rules involved in the game. There is no physical reason why ambassadors should not be shot when war breaks out. Other reasons may exist, but not physical ones. Despite the fact, therefore, that they can be changed, these rules are subject to rational analysis. Now, it is of major importance to us to try to determine whether the enemy is adhering to the accepted rules of the game or whether he is changing them. If he is changing them, is there any way in which we can force him to return to the old rules? If we cannot, we must determine whether he has merely changed the rules, or whether he has eliminated them so that only the physical rules apply. If only the physical rules apply, it might be disastrous for us to try to proceed upon the basis of the old rules. We might force his relative quiescence, but we could never come to any sort of agreement with him in terms of the social rules of the game. If, on the other hand, he is playing a game in which social rules apply, even though they are not the rules of the traditional game, some sort of agreement with him in terms of these rules is distinctly within the realm of possibility, once the potentialities of the bargaining process have been explored. If this is true, no grievance could justify a resort to full-scale war, and only irrational statesmanship would call for it. If this is not true, then only great statesmanship could prevent war. In any event, it is incumbent upon us to make our analyses in these terms.

Another element of extended field analysis consists of total field analysis as opposed to linear field analysis. For instance, with respect to our policy of extended defense through force, it has been contended that the decision to aid Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression gives us two chances for national survival, as opposed to the one chance offered us by the policy of hemisphere defense alone: we have a chance to stop the Soviets in Europe first, and if we fail there, we still have the same chance

10 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Princeton, N.J., 1944, pp. 40-42.

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we always had of stopping them from the vantage point of the Western hemisphere. However, it can be seen that this analysis, in terms of over-all strategy, is an oversimplification. There is certainly a calculable risk that the attempt to defend Western Europe would, if war came, leave us in a worse position vis-à-vis the Soviets than if we had never made the attempt. (For purposes of a simplified analysis, the possible provocative result of such a policy will not be taken into account.) It is rather the weight of the above-mentioned risk against the weight of the possibility that a positive policy would prevent a European war, hence achieving a better result than the policy of hemisphere defense, plus the possibility that the result of a European war would not be unfavorable to our power position, that is decisive. Given estimated orders for these possibilities, a rational strategy should be determinable, but it should be noted that this is not a mere linear or one-dimensional strategy of calculating the most probable result of a given course of action and assuming it to be uniquely or individually effective in the determination of the subsequent pattern of events. Indeed, a strictly linear strategy, by minimizing the attention given to the other important factors concurrently affecting the field, might well result in a policy that had very little rational expectation of success. A unilinear policy attempts to effect results within a single chain of causation, whereas a total field policy leads to a re-evaluation of the whole field when one of the component parts of the field has its value changed. Between the two kinds of considerations only one choice can be made.

But, even if we agree on the definition of the field, how do we choose the actual or present world from which we are going to start and how do we choose the possible world to which we are going to attempt to travel? It is at this point that it is well to draw upon some of the concepts from the theory of games. In the first place, it behooves us to attempt to define the type of game which is played by national states in the world arena. If it is a zero sum game, then the gain of one state must necessarily be the loss of another, for the fund of goods that can be drawn upon is fixed in size. If it is not a zero sum game, if the fund of goods drawn upon can vary either upwards or down-

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wards, it is theoretically possible for all states either to gain or lose together in the playing of the game. Now, it would appear that unless relations among nations are considered purely in terms of power, the game which interests us is not a zero sum game. At times the feeling of security among all states may be high, and at other times it may be low. This can also be true concerning their physical well-being, their economic activity, and other aspects of their national being. Hence, gains for one country need not result in losses for another. Therefore, while the playing of the game may be tremendously complicated, it is clear that there is no a priori reason why a rational strategy on the part of all the players could not result in many important points of agreement. Moreover, to the extent that the game becomes calculable, it may not have to be played. In other words, it may be possible to make whole series of adjustments by agreement. The situation may not reach this point until the relative power factors become more clearly defined, but so long as power remains the means of the game rather than the end, the outcome need by no means be fatal.

In playing the game, it is not always the most probable hypothesis that should serve as the basis for action. For instance, in a poker game, one may not play a very good hand because the investment is not justified by the size of the pot or the investment already made. Contrariwise, one may play a mediocre hand because the size of the pot warrants the investment despite the nature of the hand. Certain tactical advantages in the international game should not be sought, no matter how easily they may be won according to appearance, if what is to be gained is not worth the possible cost. On the other hand, not to make certain gains might be so unfortunate that the attempt to obtain them might justify great expenditures at relatively low odds. Somewhat the same principles apply to the choice of actual worlds and possible worlds. One hypothesis or present actual world construction might have a more favorable probability order than a second. However, if the first hypothesis or present actual world construction, and the strategy or strategies based upon it, stand a very poor chance of producing a good possible world and a good chance of producing an unfavorable or even an unacceptable

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possible world, and if the second hypothesis, and the strategy or strategies based upon it, stand little chance of producing an unfavorable or unacceptable result and a very good chance of producing a favorable possible world, without going into details, it can intuitively be seen that it would probably be a better strategy to proceed upon the second hypothesis or construction. With regard to the choice among possible worlds, if the attempt to attain the most favorable result would succeed only improbably, whereas the probable outcome of the attempt would be an unacceptable result, and if the attempt to secure the minimally favorable result would almost certainly succeed, it is again intuitively clear that it is the second of the strategies which should be designated rational.

Although we can define truth as the observational system of a perfectly functioning instrument which has access to all relevant information, in practice our information is nowhere near the point of sufficient completeness. We do not know the results of the deliberations of the Politburo; we can only infer them from Soviet activity. We have no guarantee that the members of the Politburo will act consistently. It is difficult to predict what will happen when an old and sick man dies. Therefore, the method we are using does not merely not give a certain result, but, together with the difficulties we have noted in the problem of hypothesis formation, we are able to form sentences which are only moderately confirmed. We do not even precisely define "moderately." This method seems poor, but it is the most rational and most precise that has yet been offered in this particular field.

However, there is still an important strategic factor to be discussed. There is a great barrier to accurate observation in the field of international relations; a genuine indeterminacy effect of large proportions is involved. Fear can create the danger feared. If the danger created by fear is used as a confirmation of the initial validity of the fear, a reinforcing exacerbation of conditions may well ensue. It is easier for this effect to be noticed by a non-participant, although it is not impossible for the participant to correct his own faulty observations by the test of the past which was suggested earlier. It is important to note that

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the reverse process may also be true. If one may create the danger that one fears, one may also create the favorable environment that one hopes for. Friendship can be as contagious as fear. Reaction to anticipated hostility often creates that very hostility. On the other hand, a smile produced at the right moment often disarms the other party. This principle need not be true only on the personal level, although its applicability is probably more limited in international politics. If we are hostile to the Soviets because we think they are hostile to us, we only confirm in them the impression that their policy of hostility was a correct one. Unless someone takes the initiative in breaking such an unfortunate chain of events, it will not of its own accord cease to be operative.

Real issues which divide nations cannot be eliminated by the friendly handshake, by the policy of moral rearmament. But not all the differences between nations are real; suspicion plays its role in this picture. Suspicion may raise the level of difference to the point of danger, and it may prevent the rational compromises that could adjust, if not eliminate, the real differences. Since our fears will produce situations that confirm them in cases where the objective grounds for fear were not objectively existent, at least to the point required for disastrous consequences, it is essential that we employ the test of the past as a check upon the indeterminacy factor in international relations, that we employ hypotheses with verifiable consequences. The only alternative to the test of the past, assuming that we desire to test our hypotheses in the first place, would be the adoption of a policy not based on fear. If this resulted in a superior situation, we would not really have proved that the previously existing situation had been favorable all the time, for again our action might have created the result obtained. However, we need not examine the pedigree of a successful result too closely, since our only interest in the real intentions of the enemy is to enable us to calculate a more reliable strategy in order to produce a good result. The only difficulty with this type of approach is the practical one of getting men to lay aside fears which they really hold. We probably could not do this in the first place without making a convincing demonstration of the "test of the past" technique.

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And, in this case, if we were convincing, this alone would be sufficient to enable us to adopt an alternative strategy. If, after trial, it did not produce a favorable result, we could hardly expect it to be continued, particularly if it led to a reduction in our physical defenses. However, a friendly policy need not really reduce them.

VI

A short discussion of the set of operational rules within the framework of which we should proceed is in order. The rules given should be regarded as preliminary hypotheses rather than as dogmatic formulas.

In the first place, our strategy should be flexible. We should attempt not to commit ourselves irrevocably to any particular hypothesis, especially if that hypothesis commits us to minimally favorable results. (I assume that we would never adopt a strategy that would commit us to an unacceptable result.) As a corollary, when the situation permits it, our policy planners should carry out their policies within the framework of an intelligently informed public opinion. It would be unfortunate if, in an effort to gain public support for a particular action or set of actions, we created a public opinion so excitable as to inhibit or prevent the rational adjustment of strategy to changing circumstances. A simple statement of this rule is that policy should not be self-defeating.

It would be wise to have alternative strategies available. In the event that enemy strategy is genuinely aggressive, it is necessary to know which areas of the world we should commit ourselves to defend. In those areas, we should attempt to make the price for action by the enemy higher than he is willing to pay. However, this means that the price of action must be higher for him than the price of inaction. In other words, we should not attempt to impose so great a defeat upon him that he could not possibly accept it unless his position were so weak that he could never constitute a threat in the first place. And, in that event, there would certainly be no rational reason for fear. It is clear, then, that a policy of total victory contradicts its premises, particularly if it is desirable to avoid war.

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In the event that enemy strategy is in response to what have traditionally been considered genuine security needs—i.e., if he does not interpret security so broadly that his security becomes incompatible with ours—it would be wise to determine in what areas we can compromise and what we can offer in return for certain considerations. We should make it attractive for the enemy to cooperate with us, for, since this is not a zero sum game, it is a rational posit that some point of accommodation may exist. We cannot afford to follow a strategy which permits no play to such possibilities.

Again, with regard to the policy of total victory: it can be a good strategy only when a tremendous preponderance of force exists. Short of such a preponderance, a rational enemy will make the price of success too high for us; indeed, an irrational enemy may do the same thing.

The bluff is a poor weapon in statecraft. It should not be employed when we cannot afford to be called. In any event, it should be used sparingly. Used too often, it will inhibit belief in the seriousness of our intentions, possibly at a time when it may be essential to have it understood that we are not bluffing.

So long as real internal shifts in the balance of power occur and so long as external power factors change, there may be shifts in the pattern of coalitions. One of the rules of the game is to attempt to change hostile powers into neutral or friendly ones and neutral into friendly ones. It is not rational to concede the unity of the enemy bloc of powers, although, under certain circumstances, it might be rational to agree not to interfere with the bloc if tangible benefits ensue. Moreover, since changing a hostile state into a neutral state is a distinct gain, it is suggested that we not disdain real benefits because we cannot get the greatest benefits. We certainly will not necessarily be successful in weaning all satellite states from the enemy bloc; on the other hand, they should not be irritated merely for the sake of irritation. Since such a policy would inhibit the possibility of their breaking with the enemy, there must be some positive gain to be secured from the policy of irritation for us to employ it. We do not want to discourage potential splits in the enemy camp unnecessarily.

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If we come to the conclusion that our policy must be directed against the vitals of the enemy, it would still be unwise to advertise this for his amazement and edification. Especially if such is not our object, it is essential that we do not so broadcast our policies that we might cause that suspicion to be aroused in him, as recent pieces of "statesmanship" have in fact operated.[11]

Again, our rules should be so constructed that our policy planning will be rationally adjusted to the value goals of our system and not simply oriented to ideological considerations. Possible gains should be weighed against possible losses when policies are considered. Public clamor should not be a decisive factor in policy formation, although a rational strategy should take into account public reaction to it and support for it. We should particularly avoid ideological explanations of the enemy position. It is possible that no single-theory explanation of his activities is the repository of inclusive truth. Certain of his moves might have been made with the full knowledge that they violated agreements, in the belief that they were strategically necessary and that there would never be a better time to make them. This does not imply unlimited bad faith on his part, and he in turn may so interpret history that he is convinced that certain of our moves were dictated by bad faith. Other moves of his may have been ideologically revolutionary, and yet not necessarily indicative of his over-all strategy. Additionally, there is no reason to believe that his planning concepts are such that little excursions are never made, that he never tests the opposition to see how much he can get, that attempts are never made to see which policies will work out best in practice, that there are no disagreements within his high command with regard to policy, and that, consequently, the major objectives of his policy can never change.

As we tend toward ideological interpretations in our estimation of enemy strategy, we tend to excessive morality and rigidity in the bargaining process. It might be wise not to expose our hand when we make our bets. In addition, it is good to have

[11] "X," pseud., "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July 1947), 566-82. The well-known statement of President Truman to the effect that Soviet promises are not worth the paper they are written on is also *à propos*.

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forward positions from which we can retreat, particularly because it is difficult to convince others that we have really put forward our best offer in the beginning. Cutting off one's bridges behind one often leads to valiant defense, but it rarely is productive of a rational policy.

To the extent that our constitutional system permits, it might be wise to negotiate in secret, subject only to keeping faith with public policy. Some of the statements made by our military for no purpose other than that of securing funds for necessary defense establishments must convince the enemy that he is in momentary danger.[12] No one suggests that we should change our form of government, but a little more discretion and responsibility in the management of our affairs would be a decided gain.

VII

As we see, then, a rational strategy in diplomacy is a distinct possibility. It will not provide us with precise policies, but it will enable us to use in a better fashion the information available to us. We will be able to formulate better hypotheses concerning the present actual world situation and the possible world situations. We will be provided with analytical and formal tools for making choices and for shaping a strategy which will properly relate means and ends in process.

It is necessary to calculate upon all the operative factors in a situation rather than upon just those factors which it is desired to control in order to achieve a particular or isolated favorable result. It should be remembered that the game is strategic and not tactical. Tactics are good only when they conform to a strategic plan or process which is governed by a hierarchy of norms.

Life is uncertain. No actual program can guarantee its own success, but the possibility of increasing one's chances of success in the real world depends upon using a rational method in arriving at a decision or strategy. It is method that is of paramount importance. One can have objectives which more complete information would change. One can have erroneous information which it would be extremely difficult to correct. Often

12 See almost any request by the military, particularly the Air Force, for funds from Congress.

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this cannot be helped, but it is inexcusable to use a bad method when a better one is available. One should have a relatively clear objective which is described in terms of a hierarchy of norms. The field should be determined, but it must be recognized that this determination is uncertain. In addition, one needs a general strategy which can be adjusted to any of the probable interpretations of reality, so that one does not become the prisoner of dogma and of ideological misconceptions. Alternative strategies, with determinable consequences, to meet both objective changes in the concrete situation and changes in one's evaluation of it are desirable. Tactics should continually be adjusted within terms of the over-all strategy so as to secure something within the probable limits of the probably best result or of the probably least harmful result. Tactics should not be viewed as an independent game to be won in-and-for itself. Planning requires method. This method, within the terms already mentioned, must take account of the need for constant adjustment to the realities of the life process, to the constant adjustment without which life itself disappears.

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